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Chapter 1: The Intergenerational Transmission of Employers and the
Earnings of Young Workers
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Disclaimer
Any analysis, opinions, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author alone
and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have
been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. See U.S. Census
Bureau Disclosure Review Board bypass numbers CBDRB-: FY20-002, FY20-186,
FY20-CED006-0020, FY20-CED0006-0025, and FY21-CES011-001.
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1.1 Introduction
In the United States, earnings are highly persistent from one generation to the next.1
The fact that children born into poverty are likely to remain in poverty as adults
runs counter to the ideal of equality of opportunity and may be indicative of un-
tapped human potential. But the justification and design of an effective policy re-
sponse depends on the mechanisms through which parents shape the earnings of their
children. Much of the research on intergenerational mobility attributes differences in
earnings by family background to differences in human capital (Black and Devereux,
2011). However, family connections in the labor market may also play a role. Indeed,
most jobs are found through a social contact (Ioannides and Loury, 2004), with po-
tentially important implications for earnings given the substantial variation in pay
policies across firms (Manning, 2011). But despite their potential importance, it is
not well understood how family connections shape the intergenerational persistence
in earnings.
I investigate how the earnings of young workers are affected by individuals working
for the same employer as a parent, which I refer to as the intergenerational transmis-
sion of employers. My paper therefore sheds light on one particular type of family
connection; connections that operate within the current employer of the parent. Pre-
vious research suggests that this is an important way in which parents provide access
to jobs. For example, in the context of Sweden, Kramarz and Skans (2014) find that
10 percent of individuals find their first job at the same employer as a parent. Previ-
1Intergenerational mobility in the United States is low both relative to the past (Chetty et al.,
2017) and relative to other developed countries (Solon, 2002).
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ous research on the intergenerational transmission of employers is largely descriptive
and I advance the literature by investigating implications for the intergenerational
persistence in earnings.2 Specifically, I ask how the intergenerational persistence in
earnings would change if no one worked for the same employer as their parent–i.e.,
if individuals who do work for their parent’s employer instead worked at their next
best option. I focus on outcomes at the first stable job, which has important and
long-lasting effects on an individual’s career.3
The intergenerational transmission of employers will increase the intergenerational
persistence in earnings if individuals with higher-earning parents benefit more. How-
ever, the benefits–which depend on the likelihood and earnings consequences of work-
ing for a parent’s employer–could be increasing or decreasing in parental earnings. On
the one hand, higher-earning parents may be better able to provide access to high-
paying jobs. On the other hand, individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds may
be more reliant on their parents to find a decent-paying job. Which force dominates
is an empirical question, which I answer by estimating descriptive statistics of how
common it is to work for a parent’s employer and the causal earnings consequences
of doing so.
I begin by showing that it is not uncommon for an individual to work for their
2Other papers that study the intergenerational transmission of employers include Corak and
Piraino (2011), Bingley et al. (2011), Stinson and Wignall (2018), Eliason et al. (2019), and San
(2020). Of these papers, Eliason et al. (2019) and San (2020) are most closely related and also find
that parents affect the earnings of their children by providing access to higher-paying firms. However,
neither of these papers study how parental connections affect the intergenerational persistence in
earnings. Eliason et al. (2019) and San (2020) focus on understanding on how parental connections
affect overall earnings inequality and the earnings gap between ethnic groups, respectively.
3Both theoretical (e.g., Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1997; Gibbons and Waldman, 2006) and empirical
(e.g., Von Wachter and Bender, 2006; Khan, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012; Altonji et al., 2016;
Arellano-Bover, 2020) evidence suggests that early career experiences can have a large and persistent
effect on earnings. See Section 1.3.1 for the definition of the first stable job.
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parent’s employer. I link survey data from the 2000 Decennial Census to adminis-
trative data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program
and study 10 recent cohorts. I find that 7 percent of individuals work for a parent’s
employer at their first stable job, and 29 percent do so at some point between the ages
of 18 and 30.4 Individuals with higher-earning parents are more likely to work for a
parent’s employer. There are several possible explanations for why someone might
work for their parent’s employer. For example, children may simply tend to work in
the same industry and live in the same geographic region. However, individuals are
70 times more likely to work for their parent’s employer relative to another employer
in the same industry, commuting zone, and size category. Rather, the evidence is
more consistent with parents acting as a social contact to help children who other-
wise would have struggled to find a decent-paying job. Indeed, individuals with less
education who are searching for a job in periods of high unemployment are more
likely to work for a parent’s employer.
Next, I find large earnings benefits of working for a parent’s employer. Estimating
causal effects is difficult because individuals who work for a parent’s employer likely
differ from those who do not. In an ideal experiment, I would prohibit some employers
from hiring the children of current employees and use this random assignment as an
instrument. My actual empirical strategy mimics this ideal experiment and exploits
exogenous variation in the availability of jobs at the parent’s employer. Specifically, I
instrument for whether an individual works for their parent’s employer with the hiring
4My estimates of the rate of transmission are consistent with other estimates from the United
States (Stinson and Wignall, 2018).
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rate at that employer and include fixed effects for the parent’s employer and the local
labor market. Intuitively, my empirical strategy compares individuals whose parents
work for the same employer but who enter the labor market at different times when
there are relatively more or less job opportunities at the parent’s employer (measured
by the hiring rate). The key assumption is that, conditional on the local labor market
fixed effects, differences in earnings between the individuals are attributable to dif-
ferences in the propensity to work for their parent’s employer. I find that individuals
earn 31 percent more at their first stable job when working for their parent’s employer
relative to their next best option. Individuals with higher-earning parents experience
larger gains.
These earnings gains appear to be explained by parents providing access to higher-
paying employers. Following Abowd et al. (1999), I estimate employer-level pay
premiums and find that working for a parent’s employer leads individuals to work for
employers that pay all workers 30 percent more, which is virtually identical to the
effect on individual earnings. A wide class of models (e.g., Postel-Vinay and Robin,
2002) illustrate how search frictions lead to job ladders, whereby more productive
firms offer higher wages. Consistent with these models, I find that parents provide
access to firms on a higher rung of the job ladder as measured by productivity, average
wages, and worker flows. A narrative consistent with my results is that there is a
group individuals who, without help from their parents, have limited labor market
options and would end up at low-paying firms such as a fast food restaurant. However,
their parents provide access to jobs at better-paying firms such as a manufacturing
plant. Indeed, access to jobs in higher-paying industries explains 75 percent of the
6
effect on individual earnings.
Lastly, I find that the intergenerational transmission of employers leads to a mod-
est increase in the degree to which earnings persist across generations. I develop a
methodology that allows me to quantify the difference between observed measures of
the intergenerational persistence in earnings and measures that correspond to a coun-
terfactual world in which no one worked for the employer of a parent as a function
of the benefits of working for a parent’s employer conditional on parental earnings.
These benefits depend on the likelihood of working for a parent’s employer and the
earnings consequences conditional on doing so, two objects that I estimate in my
paper. I find that the elasticity of the initial earnings of an individual with respect
to the earnings of their parents would be 10 percent lower if no one worked for the
employer of a parent.
Non-Black males with high-earning parents are the largest beneficiaries of the in-
tergenerational transmission of employers. Consistent with Chetty et al. (2020), I find
that, conditional on parental earnings, Black males have lower expected earnings than
White males. On average, the intergenerational transmission of employers explains 10
percent of this conditional Black-White gap in initial earnings. The intergenerational
transmission of employers disproportionately benefits sons of high-earning parents
but daughters of low-earning parents. On average, daughters benefit more than sons,
and the gender pay gap in initial earnings would be 4 percent larger if no one worked
for a parent’s employer.
My main contribution is to show that the positive association between the earn-
ings of an individual and the earnings of their parents is attributable, in part, to
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parents using their connections to provide access to higher-paying employers. For
some individuals, a job at their parent’s employer offers better pay relative to jobs
they could find through alternative search methods. Individuals from high-income
backgrounds benefit the most from these connections because their parents are more
likely to hold positions of authority at high-paying firms. Most explanations of the
intergenerational persistence in earnings focus on the development of human capital
during childhood. In contrast, I show that parents continue to affect the labor mar-
ket outcomes of their adult children by using their connections to provide access to
jobs. Given that parents could have contacts at other employers, my results likely
understate the importance of parental labor market networks more broadly defined.
My conclusions depend on the estimates of the earnings consequences, whose
credibility is supported by a number of supplemental analyses. Existing evidence
of the earnings consequences of working for a parent’s employer–or, more generally,
finding a job through a social contact–is mixed, in part, because it is difficult to fully
account for factors that affect both earnings and the method of job finding.5 While
my empirical strategy exploits exogenous variation in the propensity to work for a
parent’s employer, there are several potential issues. First, employers may offer higher
wages when hiring more intensively. However, my estimates are robust to controlling
5For example, Kramarz and Skans (2014) control for observable differences between children
who do and do not work with their parents and find negligible earnings benefits in Sweden. In
contrast, Stinson and Wignall (2018) use data from the United States and find large benefits using
an individual fixed effects estimator. More generally, estimating the causal effect of finding a job
through a social contact has proven difficult (Topa, 2011). Although, a number of recent papers
convincingly establish that social contacts can improve labor market outcomes by reducing the
duration of unemployment (Beaman, 2012; Cingano and Rosolia, 2012; Glitz, 2017), helping workers
find jobs at high-paying firms (Schmutte, 2015), and strengthening workers’ bargaining positions
(Caldwell and Harmon, 2019).
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for the earnings of other new hires, the earnings growth of existing employees, and
the employment growth rate at the parent’s employer. Second, the hiring rate at the
parent’s employer may be correlated with local labor market conditions even after
conditioning on labor labor market fixed effects. However, using a placebo exercise,
I show that the earnings of the child is related only to the hiring conditions at their
parent’s employer and is unrelated to hiring conditions at other similar employers in
the area. These results–and other results discussed below–support the credibility of
my estimates.
My results also provide novel evidence that firm-level pay policies are an important
determinant of earnings. A substantial portion of earnings inequality is attributable
to differences in average pay across firms. But competing explanations emphasize
the role of dispersion of firm-level pay policies versus the sorting of workers into
firms (Manning, 2003). Prior research finds that moves to higher-paying firms are
associated with earnings growth (e.g., Abowd et al., 1999; Haltiwanger et al., 2018).
However, the changes in earnings are not necessarily explained by differences in firm-
level pay policies since worker mobility is endogenous, and factors that lead workers
to change firms could be correlated with factors that have an independent effect on
earnings. A number of recent papers (e.g, Schmeider et al., 2020; Lachowska et
al., 2020) study workers who leave their employers for exogenous reasons and find
that changes in earnings are predicted by changes in firm pay premiums. I provide
complementary evidence of the importance of firm-level pay policies in determining
individual earnings since my empirical strategy isolates exogenous variation in the
employers that individuals end up joining.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the con-
ceptual framework. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 documents descriptive
patterns in the intergenerational transmission of employers. Section 5 estimates the
earnings consequences of working for the employer of a parent. Section 6 investigates
implications for the intergenerational persistence in earnings. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
This section presents a conceptual framework that relates the intergenerational trans-
mission of employers to the intergenerational persistence in earnings. Let yij denote
the log earnings of individual i at their first stable job, which is at employer j. And
let yp denote the log of the life-time earnings of i’s parents. A common measure
of the intergenerational persistence in earnings is the intergenerational elasticity of
earnings (IGE), which is the coefficient obtained from regressing yij on yp and is
denoted ρ(yij, yp). It is important to note that most estimates of the IGE use a mea-
sure of life-time earnings for both the parent and their child. In contrast, I focus on
initial labor market outcomes of the child. My objective is to understand how the
intergenerational transmission of employers affects the intergenerational persistence
in earnings, as measured by ρ(yij, yp).
I use the potential outcomes framework to characterize the role of the intergener-
ational transmission of employers. Let yij(1) denote the individual’s earnings if they
work for their parent’s employer and let yij(0) denote their earnings if they work for
the employer that is their next best option (i.e., where the individual would work
10
if they did not work for their parent’s employer). The treatment effect of working
for a parent’s employer is the difference between potential outcomes and is denoted
βi = yij(1) − yij(0). Thus,
yij = Diβi + yij(0) (1.1)
where Di is an indicator equal to one if the individual works for their parent’s em-
ployer. It is possible that working for a parent’s employer could affect when and even
whether an individual finds their first stable job. This poses potential challenges to
estimating the earnings benefits. Section 1.5.3 discusses this point in more detail.
I quantify how the intergenerational transmission of employers affects the intergen-
erational persistence in earnings by comparing the observed IGE, ρ(yij, yp), to the IGE
that corresponds to the counterfactual in which no one worked for their parent’s em-
ployer, ρ(yij(0), yp).
6 Combining equation 1.1 with the identity ρ(yij, yp) ≡ cov(yij ,yp)var(yp) ,
yields,




To estimates cov(Diβi, yp) I develop and use the following approximation:



























where rp is the percentile rank of parental earnings.
The approximation relies on two insights. First, the expected value of the product
of two random variables is approximately equal to the product of their expected val-
6As discussed in more detail in Section 1.6.1, this is a partial equilibrium analysis, which assumes
that yij(0) does not change if individual i does not have the option to work at their parent’s employer.
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ues if there is little variation in one of the variables: E[Diβiyp|rp] ≈ E[Diβi|rp]E[yp|rp].
Second, by iterated expectations, the average benefit of working for a parent’s em-
ployer is the product of the proportion of individuals who work for their parent’s
employer and the earnings benefits conditional on doing so: E[Diβi] = E[Di]E[βi |
Di = 1]. I validate the methodology by showing that estimates of the IGE based on
the micro data are virtually identical to estimates derived from the approximation.
See Appendix A.3 for details.
Equations 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate that the intergenerational transmission of employ-
ers will increase the intergenerational persistence in earnings if the average benefits,
E[Diβi | rp], are increasing in parental earnings. These benefits are a function of
the proportion of individuals who work for a parent’s employer, E[Di | rp], and the
earnings benefits of doing so, E[βi | rp, Di = 1]. Thus, my goal is to understand how
these two objects vary with parental earnings. I estimate the former in Section 1.4
and the latter in Section 1.5.
My methodology is a significant improvement over the descriptive analysis in
Corak and Piraino (2011) and Stinson and Wignall (2018). These two papers estimate
a standard intergenerational earnings regression as well as a modified specification in
which they control for whether an individual works for their parent’s employer. They
then attempt to determine how the transmission of employers shapes intergenera-
tional mobility by comparing the estimated coefficients on parental earnings between
the two specifications and by examining sign of the coefficient on the interaction be-
tween parental earnings and employer transmission. As both papers acknowledge, the
modified intergenerational earnings regression is likely to deliver biased estimates of
12
the earnings benefits of employer transmission, which makes their estimates difficult
to interpret. In contrast, I use causal estimates of the earnings benefits of working for
a parent’s employer in order to quantify how the IGE would change if no one worked
for their parent’s employer. More generally, many papers estimate the causal rela-
tionship between characteristics of parents–such as income (Shea, 2000), education
(Black et al., 2005), or labor market networks (Magruder, 2010)–and outcomes of
their children.7 These causal estimates are informative, but they fall short of quanti-
fying the extent to which different channels shape intergenerational associations. My
methodology helps to bridge the gap between the focus on causal identification and
the broader research agenda that seeks to understand why economic outcomes persist
across generations.
1.3 Data
I rely on two main sources of data: (1) the Hundred Percent Census Edited File
(HCEF), which measures the relationship between parents and children who are living
together in 2000 and (2) data from the LEHD program to measure labor market out-
comes of both parents and their children between 2000 and 2016. The HCEF contains
all responses from the 2000 Decennial Census Short Form and, in principle, includes all
individuals living in the United States in 2000.8 The LEHD is an employer-employee
linked dataset produced by the U.S. Census Bureau and is constructed from two core
7Of these papers, Magruder (2010) is most closely related to my paper. Magrduer (2010) finds
that parental labor market networks help young unemployed workers find a job in the context of
South Africa.
8In practice, some individuals are not surveyed in the 2000 Decennial Census and non-respondents
are more likely to be minorities or lower-income households. See Appendix A.2.1 for details.
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administrative datasets: (1) unemployment insurance (UI) records, which provide
job-level earnings records and (2) the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages,
which provides establishment-level characteristics. The earnings records in the LEHD
capture roughly 96 percent of private non-farm wage and salary employment in the
United States (Abowd et al. 2009). Employers are identified by a state-level employer
identification number (SEIN), which typically captures the activity of a firm within
a state and industry.9 The LEHD covers most jobs, but a notable exception is self-
employment. While previous work, such as Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000), documents
strong patterns of intergenerational persistence in self-employment, I focus on more
formal employer-employee relationships.
The sample frame is defined based on the HCEF and includes children who are
living with their parents in 2000 and who were born after June 30th of 1982 and before
July 1st of 1992.10 The cohorts were chosen so as to focus on a set of individuals
who are young enough to likely have lived with their parents in 2000–the oldest
individual in the sample was 17 years old when data collection for the 2000 Decennial
Census took place–but old enough to have likely entered the labor market by 2016–
the youngest individual in the sample was 24 years old by the end of 2016. There are
approximately 37 million individuals in the sample frame. See Appendix A.2.1 for
details.
I implement two sets of sample restrictions. First, I require that the individuals
9A worker could have positive earnings at multiple employers in a given quarter. In such cases,
I measure the characteristics of the employer providing the majority of earnings in that quarter.
10Over 90 percent of individuals within this age range live with a parent in 2000. Children are
individuals whose relationship to the household head is: son/daughter, adopted son/daughter or
step son/daughter. I exclude individuals living in U.S. territories in 2000.
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and their parents found in the HCEF can be linked to the LEHD. In order to account
for non-random attrition from the sample due to issues associated with linking records
across the two data sources, I construct sample weights and use them to produce all
descriptive statistics. Second, I drop cases in which the earnings of the children or
parents are likely to be affected by coverage issues in the LEHD. Of the 37 million
children in the sample frame, approximately 21 million (57 percent) meet the two
sets of restrictions. Based on these sample restrictions and the source of earnings
data, my analysis should be viewed as representative of working families, a category
which excludes very low income households (approximately the bottom 10 percent
of households) and very high income households (approximately the top 1 percent of
households). See Appendix A.2.2 for details.
1.3.1 Measurement of Key Variables
My paper focuses on initial labor market outcomes and thus I need to define when
individuals enter the labor market. Conceptually, I define entry as the first period in
which work becomes the primary activity. My empirical definition of entry is the first
quarter in which the individual earns at least $3,300 per quarter–which approximately
corresponds to working 35 hours per week at the federal minimum wage–in the current
and two consecutive quarters, and receives positive earnings from the same employer
for those three quarters.11 I refer to the employment spell at this employer as the
first stable job. Approximately 80 percent of individuals (17 million individuals) that
11Dollar values are converted to 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers.
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meet the sample restrictions have entered the labor market by the end of 2016.
There are many possible ways to define entry, but three pieces of evidence suggest
that my approach is reasonable.12 First, individuals experience a dramatic and per-
sistent increase in earnings upon entry. Average quarterly earnings in the three years
prior to entry is $1,258 compared to $6,597 in the three years after entry. Figure
A.1 provides more detailed evidence by plotting the average quarterly earnings in the
three years before and after entry. Second, the age of entry generally lines up with
common perceptions of when individuals start their careers. For example, 89 percent
of children enter the labor market between ages 18 and 26. Figure A.3 depicts the
distribution of the age at which the children enter the labor market and compares this
distribution to results based on an analogous measure constructed from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort (NLSY97).13 The timing of entry is quite
similar in the two data sources. Furthermore, 83 percent of workers in the NLSY97
data are not enrolled in school at the time of labor market entry, which suggests that
my measure is not primarily picking up jobs held by students. Third, the first stable
job is indeed stable as the average duration of employment at the first stable job
exceeds two years.
I construct a measure of the lifetime earnings of the parents. Without data on
the full labor market history, a common approach is to calculate parental earnings as
the average earnings over a limited number of years. In addition to the measurement
12Kramarz and Skans (2014) use a similar set of criteria to identify the first stable job.
13The analogous measure constructed from the NLSY97 is the first time an individual works at
least 35 hours for 36 consecutive weeks (or three quarters). An alternative approach is to focus on
labor market outcomes after all schooling is completed and I also present results for this definition
of entry.
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issues raised by Solon (1989) and Zimmerman (1992), this approach problematic
when using the LEHD since there is no way to distinguish between zero earnings
and missing data.14 Instead, I construct a measure of lifetime parental earnings
by estimating a regression of quarterly earnings on an individual fixed effect and a
third degree polynomial in age within cells defined by the interaction between state of
residence in 2000, sex, and race.15 The measure of the lifetime earnings of each parent
is the imputed value of earnings between ages 35 and 55. For one-parent households,
parental earnings is the lifetime earnings of the parent. For two-parent households,
parental earnings is the average of the lifetime earnings of both parents. The parental
earnings percentile ranks are calculated within each cohort of children using sample
weights.16 See Appendix A.2.4 for details.
1.4 Intergenerational Transmission of Employers
I begin the empirical analysis by documenting descriptive patterns related to the
intergenerational transmission of employers. Table 1.1 presents summary statistics.
The first column presents results for the entire sample. The second through fifth
columns present results for subsamples defined by whether the first stable job is at
the employer of neither parent, the secondary earner, both parents, or the primary
14Earnings data could be missing either because a state may not report to the LEHD in a given
time period or because the job may not be covered in the LEHD frame.
15The data are a panel measured at a quarterly frequency that include all strictly positive earnings
records between 2000 and 2016 for the parents in the sample. Quarters with zero earnings are not
included in the sample. I further restrict the panel to observations when the individuals are between
the ages of 30 and 60 and drop individuals that have fewer than 4 quarters of strictly positive
earnings over the entire time period. Parents not included in this sample are assumed to have zero
lifetime earnings.
16Cohorts consist of individuals born between July 1st of year t and June 30th of year t+1.
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earner, respectively.17 The bottom row indicates that 7 percent of individuals work
for the employer of either parent at their first stable job. A comparison across columns
indicates that individuals who work for a parent’s employer tend to stay at their first
stable job longer, are less likely to be employed in the unskilled service sector, are
more likely to work in the manufacturing/production sector, and earn slightly less.18
One interpretation is that parents are a social contact and influence the hiring or
job search process. This would be consistent with Loury (2006), who finds that 10
percent of males found their current job through a parent, as well as with the literature
that finds ubiquitous use of informal search methods (Ioannides and Loury 2004; Topa
2011) and that labor market networks influence where individuals work (Bayer et al.
2008; Hellerstein et al. 2011). However, there are other possible interpretations.
Individuals are much more likely to work for their parent’s employer relative to
other similar employers in the same local labor market, which suggests that the inter-
generational transmission of employers is not explained by the tendency for parents
and children to work in the same sector and location. Table 1.1 indicates that individ-
uals who work for a parent’s employer are no more likely to work for large employers
and over 70 percent of these individuals are located in urban areas. This suggests
that the tendency to work for a parent’s employer is not driven by cases in which a
single employer dominates a local labor market. To investigate the issue more rigor-
ously, I calculate the proportion of individuals who work for an employer of the same
17The primary earner is defined as the parent with the greatest earnings in the year prior to the
quarter in which the child entered the labor market.
18I group two-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry codes into
three sectors: unskilled services, skilled services, and manufacturing/production. See Appendix
A.2.5 for details.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
First Job at the Employer of
Full Neither Secondary Both Primary
Sample Parent Earner Parents Earner
A. Individual Characteristics
male 0.50 0.49 0.46 0.61 0.60
White non-Hispanic 0.79 0.78 0.83 0.84 0.79
Black non-Hispanic 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07
Asian non-Hispanic 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02
Hispanic 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
born in United States 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97
B. Household Characteristics
parents are married 0.78 0.78 0.96 0.98 0.78
parent has unmarried partner 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
primary earner is male 0.57 0.56 0.77 0.80 0.54
parental earnings / 1,000 51.42 51.26 53.15 67.28 51.28
C. First Stable Job
age at first job 20.94 21.00 20.10 19.81 20.08
tenure at first job (quarters) 10.07 9.77 13.40 18.03 13.67
log of quarterly earnings 8.74 8.74 8.62 8.70 8.72
skilled services 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.31 0.37
unskilled services 0.46 0.47 0.36 0.31 0.28
manufacturing/production 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.39 0.36
employer size < 50 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.62 0.30
50≤employer size<500 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.15 0.29
500≤employer size 0.40 0.40 0.47 0.23 0.40
located in urban area 0.77 0.78 0.71 0.71 0.72
Sample Size
proportion of full sample 0.93 0.02 0.01 0.04
observations 17,010,000 15,830,000 298,000 137,000 746,000
Notes: The table presents the average value of the variable defined in the row. Column 1
presents results for the full sample and columns 2-5 present results for the sample of children
who, at their first stable job, worked for the employer of neither parent, the secondary earner,
both parents, or the primary earner, respectively.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
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size category and located in the same census tract as the employer of the primary
earner.19 I find that individuals are 43 times more likely to work for the employer
of their parent compared to another employer in the same census tract. I calculate
a similar statistic for employers that are in the same commuting zone, size category,
and industry (defined at the three-digit NAICS industry code) and find that individ-
uals are 70 times more likely to work for the employer of the primary earner.20 These
results suggest that geography, industry, and employer size are poor explanations for
the intergenerational transmission of employers.
Individuals are also more likely to work for the current employer of their parent
relative to past or future employers, which casts doubt on the possibility that the
intergenerational transmission of employers is explained by intergenerational trans-
mission of human capital or preferences. I identify past employers (the employer of the
primary earner when the child was 10 years old) and future employers (the employer
of the primary earner in 2016). Separately for past and future employers, I limit the
sample to cases where the past or future employer existed in the quarter in which
the child entered the labor market but the current employer of the primary earner
differed. Within these two samples, I find individuals are 6 and 4 times more likely
to work for their parent’s current employer relative to the past and future employers,
respectively. The fact that the child is more likely to work for a past or future em-
ployer of the parent relative to other employers in the same local labor market could
be explained by the presence of other social contacts.
19Employer size categories are: small (employees< 50), medium (50 ≤employees< 500), and large
(500 ≤employees).
20These statistics are derived from the estimates in Panel A of Table 1.3.
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Thus, it is the presence of a parent at an employer, not the characteristics of the
employer, that leads individuals to work for their parent’s employer. This suggests
that the intergenerational transmission of employers occurs primarily because par-
ents influence the hiring or job search process.21 The extent to which the employer
benefits depends largely on how parents provide access to jobs–be it through nepo-
tism or reducing information asymmetries between the child and employer. While
distinguishing between the alternative explanations is difficult, descriptive evidence
suggests that employer transmission tends to benefit children with more limited labor
market opportunities. Table A.1 links responses to the American Community Survey
to a subset of records and shows that, conditional on parental earnings, individuals
with lower levels of educational attainment are more likely to work for a parent’s
employer. Table A.2 shows that, conditional on the age of entry, the transmission of
employers is more likely to occur when unemployment is high.22 Figures A.4 and A.5
illustrate that the industries in which employer transmission is more common tend
to offer higher wages (conditional on observable worker characteristics) and exhibit
higher rates of unionization. These results provide suggestive evidence that the inter-
generational transmission of employers benefits the child in the form of higher wages
but does not necessarily benefit the employer by providing access to more productive
workers.
Individuals with higher-earning parents are more likely to work for their parent’s
21It is also possible that non-monetary benefits could make it more likely for individuals to want
to work for their parent’s employer. However, this explanation seems less likely, in light of the large
earnings benefits found in the next section.
22I condition on the age of entry because older individuals are less likely to work for the employer
of a parent and average age of entry is older later in the sample period (when unemployment is
higher).
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employer, although the relationship is nonlinear.23 Figure 1.1 presents the proportion
of individuals who work for the employer of either parent at their first stable job
by parental earnings, sex, and race/ethnicity. There is a strong positive association
between the likelihood of working for a parent’s employer and parental earnings in
the bottom quintile and top decile of the parental earnings distribution and a weak
(slightly negative for sons) association elsewhere. For daughters, the patterns are
similar across the race/ethnicity categories. In contrast, Black sons are substantially
less likely to work for the employer of a parent relative to other groups throughout
the parental earnings distribution.
A plausible explanation for the relationship between parental earnings and the
intergenerational transmission of employers is that higher-earning parents are more
likely to be employed and hold a position of authority within their employer. The
percent of primary earners that are employed when their child enters the labor market
rises steeply from 55 percent to 84 percent between the 1st and 20th percentiles of
the parental earnings distribution and eventually plateaus at 94 percent. The percent
of primary earners whose earnings are in the top percentile within their employer
when the child enters the labor market rises gradually from 4 percent to 14 percent
between the 1st and 90th percentiles of the parental earnings distribution and then
rises steeply to 41 percent in the top percentile. Thus, the nonlinear relationship
between the probability of working for a parent’s employer and parental earnings
23Sons are more likely to work for the employer of a parent at their first stable job relative
to daughters, with 7.8 percent of sons doing so compared to 6.0 percent of daughters. Sons and
daughters are more likely to work for the employer of the primary earner relative to the secondary
earner, but the difference is larger for sons. Individuals are at least twice as likely to work with the





















































































































































































































































































































closely tracks the probability that the parent is employed or is a top earner within
their employer.24
The nonlinear relationship between the intergenerational transmission employers
and parental earnings is also present in longer-run measures. Within the sample of
individuals who turn 30 by the end of 2016, 28 percent of daughters and 29 percent
of sons work for the employer of a parent between the ages of 18 and 30. These
estimates are consistent with Stinson and Wignall (2018), who find that 22 percent
of sons have shared an employer with their father by the time they are 30 years
old.25 Figure A.7 presents how these estimates vary across the parental earnings
distribution and illustrates that the nonlinear patterns observed at the first stable
job are replicated in these longer-run measures.
1.5 Earnings Consequences
This section estimates the earnings consequences of working for a parent’s employer.
I begin by considering a structural earnings equation in order to highlight potential
mechanisms and illustrate the challenges associated with estimating causal parame-
ters. Building on the notation from Section 1.2, let the log earnings at the first stable
job (yij) be additive in an individual component (αi), an employer component (ψj),
and an individual-employer component (ζij), where i denotes the individual and j
denotes the employer. Working at a parent’s employer affects where an individual
24Figure A.6 presents these results in detail by plotting the proportion of parents that are employed
and that are top earners within their employer against the percentile of parental earnings.
25Similar estimates for other countries include 40 percent in Canada (Corak and Piraino 2011)
and 28 percent in Denmark (Bingley et al. 2011).
24










αi + ψj(0) + ζij(0)
)
(1.4)
where Di is an indicator equal to one if the first stable job is at the parent’s employer.
The treatment effect of working for a parent’s employer consists of an employer com-
ponent (βψi = ψj(1)−ψj(0)) and an individual-employer component (β
ζ
i = ζij(1)−ζij(0)),
where j(1) denotes the parent’s employer and j(0) denotes the next best option.
Equation 1.4 highlights two mechanisms through which working for the parent’s
employer could affect earnings. First, the term βψi indicates that parents may provide
access to employers that pay all workers higher (or lower) wages. This mechanism
is consistent with the model of labor market networks developed in Mortensen and
Vishwanath (1995) as well as models which show how imperfect competition in the
labor market leads to dispersion in employer-level pay policies. Second, the term βζi
illustrates that employers might offer different wages to children of current employees
relative to otherwise similar workers. This could happen if parents reduce information
asymmetries between workers and employers (e.g., Montgomery, 1991; Dustmann et
al., 2016) or if working with a parent affects worker productivity (e.g., Heath, 2018).
Equation 1.4 also highlights the empirical challenges associated with estimating
causal parameters. In the previous section I found that individuals were more likely
to work for a parent’s employer if they were less educated–this could be modeled
as a negative correlation between αi and Di–and if they were searching for a job
in labor markets with higher levels of unemployment–this could be modeled as a
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negative correlation between ψj(0) or ζij(0) and Di. These patterns suggest that a naive
comparison between individuals who do and do not work for their parent’s employer
would understate the earnings benefits. More generally, an empirical strategy that
identifies causal parameters must account for the possibility that the characteristics
and outside options of individuals are related to the probability that they take a job
at their parent’s employer.
1.5.1 Instrumental Variables Strategy
I use an instrumental variables strategy that exploits exogenous variation in the avail-
ability of jobs at the parent’s employer. In order to explain the empirical strategy,
consider estimating the following equation via two-stage least squares,
Di = π̃
1 + γZj(1)t−1 + ũi
yij = π̃
2 + βiDi + ṽi
(1.5)
where t is the quarter in which the individual starts their first stable job and Zj(1)t−1
is the average quarterly hiring rate at the parent’s employer in the four quarters prior
to the quarter in which the child begins their fist stable job.26 Intuitively, the parent’s
employer will be more likely to make a job offer to the child of a current employee
when they are hiring more intensively. By taking the average hiring rate over the
preceding four quarters, I avoid measuring the hiring rate in the quarter in which the
26I follow the methodology used to produce the Quarterly Workforce Indicators and calculate the
End-of-Quarter Hiring Rate, which is the number of new hires that remain with the employer for at
least one additional quarter divided by the average of the total employment at the employer at the
beginning and end of the quarter.
26
child starts their first job and ensure that the hiring rate is not affected by seasonal
variation.
The stylized model highlights two main reasons why the independence assumption–
which is a key assumption needed to interpret the estimates as causal–is unlikely to
hold.27 First, the hiring rate at the parent’s employer could be correlated with local
labor market conditions that directly affect the earnings of the child–this could be
modeled as a positive correlation between ψj(0) or ζij(0) and Zj(1)t−1. Second, employ-
ers that hire more intensively may tend to employ more highly educated workers who
have more highly educated children–this could be modeled as a positive correlation
between αi and Zj(1)t−1.
I include two-way fixed effects in the empirical model to address the concern
that the hiring rate at the parent’s employer could be related to time-varying local
labor market conditions or time-invariant characteristics of the parent’s employer.
Specifically, I estimate the following equation via two-stage least squares,28
Di = π
1 + γZj(1)t−1 +XiΓ




2 + βiDi +XiΓ




where δj(1) is a fixed effect for the parent’s employer; λl(j(1),t) is a fixed effect for the
local labor market in which the parent’s employer is located, which is defined by the
interaction between the state, industry (two-digit NAICS code), and calendar year;





2 = αi + ψj(0) + ζij(0), and ṽi = E[αi + ψj(0) + ζij(0)]− π̃2. The
independence assumption is {αi, ψj(1), ψj(0), ζij(1), ζij(0)} ⊥⊥ Zj(1)t−1.
28I estimate all regressions without sample weights since the empirical strategy explicitly accounts
for the reasons weights should be used when estimating causal effects (Solon et al. 2015). In practice,
I find that the using sample weights makes little difference for the results.
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Xi is a vector of demographic characteristics; and ui and vi are regression residuals,
which are clustered at the level of the parent’s employer.29
I implement two sample selection criteria when estimating the specification. First,
since I exploit variation in the hiring rate at the parents’ employer, I require that the
parent is employed at the time the child enters the labor market. For much of the
analysis I focus on estimating the effect of working for the employer of the parent
who is the primary earner and require that the primary earner has at least one year
of tenure in the quarter in which the child enters the labor market. The tenure
restriction helps address concerns that children and parents might be responding
to common economic shocks affecting firms in the local labor market. Second, I
drop all singleton observations because these observations do not contribute to the
identification of any parameters in the model and retaining them would bias estimates
of the standard errors.30
The estimates from equation 1.6 have a causal interpretation under three assump-
tions. First, the hiring rate must affect the probability of working for a parent’s
employer. This assumption is testable and I present the relevant empirical evidence
in Section 1.5.2. Second, the hiring rate must have a monotonic affect on the prob-
ability of working for a parent’s employer. With the two sets of fixed effects in the
29The vector of demographic characteristics includes: the log of the annual earnings of the parent
in the year prior to entry; a fixed effect for the cohort of the child; and an interaction between the sex
of the child and their race, ethnicity, and an indicator equal to one if born in the United States. The
race categories include White, Black, Native American, Asian, Pacific Islander, and other. Ethnicity
is defined as Hispanic and non-Hispanic.
30A singleton refers to an observation which has a unique value of a fixed effect. For example,
if there only existed one observation for a given parent’s employer, then the outcome would be
perfectly predicted by the employer fixed effect and this observation would not contribute to the
identification of any other coefficients.
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model, this assumption implies that for any two employers and any two periods, the
employer that experiences a larger increase in the hiring rate also experiences a larger
increase in the propensity to hire a child of a current employee.31 While not directly
testable, Section 1.5.3 presents some empirical evidence to support the plausibility of
this assumption.
Third, the independence assumption requires that the hiring rate is only related
to the earnings of the individual through the effect on working for the parent’s em-
ployer.32 The covariates directly address two main concerns. First, the state-by-
industry-by-year fixed effects address the possibility that the hiring rate at the par-
ent’s employer might be correlated with local labor market conditions. Second, the
fixed effects for the parent’s employer address the concern that the hiring rate may
be correlated with time-invariant characteristics of the employer that are correlated
with the characteristics of the parents and their children. The vector of demographic
variables accounts for additional individual-level heterogeneity not captured by the
employer fixed effect; although, the demographic controls do not play a major role
in identification.33 In Section 1.5.3 I present evidence to suggest that the covari-
ates achieve their stated objective and I also explore other possible violations of the
31The hiring rate may be correlated with the composition of new hires if some types of workers are
relatively more likely to be hired than others when the employer is hiring more intensively. However,
this is not a violation of the monotonicity assumption as long as the absolute probability–as opposed
to the probability relative to other workers–of a given worker being hired is weakly increasing in
the hiring rate. To see why, consider the following example. The parent’s employer only makes job
offers to the high ability individuals when hiring is relatively low and makes job offers to both high
and low ability individuals when hiring is relatively high. While this affects the interpretation of the
estimates (the estimates identify the average effect for low ability individuals in this case), it does
not necessarily affect the validity of the instrument. I make this point formally in the context of the
stylized model presented in Appendix A.4.
32Independence requires that {αi, ψj(1), ψj(0), ζij(1), ζij(0)} ⊥⊥ Zj(1)t−1 | {Xi, δj(1), λl(j(1),t)}.
33The main estimates are qualitatively similar when including no demographic controls.
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independence assumption.
With two-way fixed effects, the identifying variation comes from the difference
across employers in the differences in the hiring rate over time. Intuitively, the first-
stage compares individuals whose parents work for the same employer but who enter
the labor market at different times. I ask if the individual is more likely to work with
their parent if they enter the labor market when their parent’s employer is hiring
more intensively, and whether this difference is larger relative to individuals who
enter the same local labor market in the same periods but whose parent’s employer
experiences a relatively smaller growth in the hiring rate. In this way, the empirical
strategy exploits variation in the hiring rate that is orthogonal to both time-invariant
characteristics of the parent’s employers and time-varying conditions of the local labor
market.
If the three identifying assumptions are met, the two-stage least squares estimator
identifies a local average treatment effect (LATE), which is the average effect for the
compliers–the population whose treatment status depends on the value of the instru-
ment (Imbens and Angrist 1994). I first focus on understanding the consequences
of working for a parent’s employer for this population. After presenting the main
results, Section 1.5.5 explores the relationship between the LATE and other causal
parameters of interest.
30
1.5.2 Effect on Initial Earnings
Table 1.2 presents estimates from equation 1.6 of the earnings consequences of work-
ing for the employer of a parent (the primary earner) at the first stable job. Column
1 presents the estimates from the first-stage and demonstrates that the hiring rate at
the parent’s employer is highly predictive of whether or not the child works there, with
an associated F-statistic of 1,434.34 Column 2 presents the reduced form estimates,
illustrating that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between
the hiring rate and initial earnings, which are measured during the first full-quarter of
employment at the first stable job.35 Column 4 presents the second stage estimates,
which indicate that working for a parent’s employer leads to a 31 percent increase in
initial earnings. Column 3 presents Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates for com-
parison, which are positive but significantly smaller than the two-stage least squares
estimates. The OLS estimates could be negatively biased if, for example, low-ability
children with limited labor market opportunities are most likely to accept job offers
from their parents’ employers. It is plausible that the OLS estimates would suffer
severely from bias since the data lack meaningful measures of human capital.
The estimated earnings benefits of working for the employer of a parent are large
34To assess magnitude of the first-stage, note that a one standard deviation increase in the resid-
ualized hiring rate leads to an 8% increase in the probability of working for the parent’s employer.
I also estimate placebo regressions in which I replace all variables related to the employer of the
parent with variables that correspond to the placebo employers considered in Section 1.4, including
employers in the same census tract or local labor market and past or future employers. Both the
point estimates and F-statistics associated with the true employers are an order of magnitude larger
(see Panel B of Table 1.3).
35A full-quarter employment spell occurs when a worker receives strictly positive earnings from
the same employer in the current, previous and subsequent quarter and variation in earnings is less
likely to be driven by differences in the duration of an employment spell within a quarter. The
definition of the first stable job implies that every worker experiences a full-quarter employment
spell in the second quarter at their first stable job.
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Table 1.2: Effect on Initial Earnings
works for
parent’s employer log of quarterly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
hiring rate 0.119*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.003)
works for parent’s employer 0.032*** 0.307***
(0.002) (0.029)
estimator OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
F-statistic 1,434
mean 0.056
control mean 8.737 8.737 8.737
control s.d. 0.427 0.427 0.427
observations 11,460,000 11,460,000 11,460,000 11,460,000
Notes: Each column presents results from a separate regression. The outcome variable in column
1 is an indicator equal to one if the individual works for their parent’s employer (primary earner)
at the first stable job. The outcome variable in columns 2-4 is the log of the first full-quarter
earnings at the first stable job. The main independent variable in column 1 is the average
quarterly hiring rate at the parent’s employer and the main independent variable in columns
2-4 is an indicator equal to one if the individual works for their parent’s employer. The results
in columns 1-3 are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the results in column 4
are estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the instrument is the average quarterly
hiring rate at the parent’s employer in the four quarters prior to entry. All specifications include
a fixed effect for the parent’s employer; a fixed effect for the year of entry by two-digit industry
code of parent’s employer by state of parent’s employer; and the standard vector of demographic
characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the level of parent’s employer and are presented
in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.01, * p≤0.05
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but not inconsistent with other evidence of the importance of place of work in de-
termining earnings. For example, the estimated effect is about twice as large as the
union wage premium (Farber et al., 2018) and about two standard deviations of the
inter-industry wage premium (Katz and Summers, 1989). Another way to assess the
magnitude of my estimates is to compare them to the college premium–the relative
wage of college versus high school educated workers–which is about 68 log points
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). In the context of the United States, Stinson and Wig-
nall (2018) estimate specifications with individual fixed effects and find that sons
and daughters who work for the employer of their father experience an increase in
earnings by 22% and 8%, respectively. My results differ more dramatically relative to
Kramarz and Skans (2014), who study the school-to-work transition in Sweden and
find small wage losses in the short run, which appear to be offset by stronger wage
growth in the medium run; this finding is supported by Eliason et al. (2019), who
use more recent data from Sweden.
1.5.3 Validity of the Empirical Strategy
One potential issue is that employers might offer higher wages when hiring more
intensively. I assess this concern by controlling for the log of average earnings of all
new hires at the parent’s employer in the preceding year. This only reduces the main
estimates from 0.307 to 0.299 (see column 2 of Table A.4). However, changes in the
earnings of new hires might partially reflect a change in the composition of workers
being hired. Columns 3 and 4 of Table A.4 take an alternative approach and control
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for the earnings growth of the parents and all workers at the employer, respectively,
in the year prior to entry. The idea is that changes in offer wages are likely to be
correlated with earnings growth for current workers. Again, the estimated earnings
benefits are largely unaffected. Lastly, column 5 of Table A.4 shows that the results
are also robust to controlling for the growth in employment in the year prior to entry
(point estimate is 0.307). In general hiring and employment growth are positively
correlated, but, conditional on the covariates in the model, the hiring rate captures
variation in job opportunities that is orthogonal to more general measures of firm
health. Thus, the results do not appear to be affected by a correlation between the
hiring rate and time-varying wage setting policies.
The empirical specification might not adequately control for local labor market
conditions. I investigate this by estimating placebo specifications in which I replace all
variables related to the employer of the parent with variables related to the placebo
employer. Panel C of Table 1.3 presents the estimates from the reduced form. In
column 3 the placebo employer is an employer in the same commuting zone, three-
digit industry, and size class as the parent’s employers. Note that the local labor
market fixed effects in the empirical model are defined at a higher level of geography
(state versus commuting zone) and higher level of industry (two-digit versus three-
digit) relative to the placebo employers. The estimates illustrate that the hiring rate
at the placebo employers is unrelated to the earnings of the child. Thus, the positive
relationship between initial earnings and the instrument is unlikely to be driven by
local labor market conditions. The estimates in column 2 indicate earnings are also




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































category as the parent’s employer. Columns 5 and 7 indicate that the reduced form is
relatively more positive for past and future employers. However, the magnitudes are
substantially smaller compared to the first stage when using the parent’s employer
(see columns 4 and 6). I do not view these results as problematic since it is possible
that young workers have access to these employers through other connections. This
interpretation is consistent with the results in Panels A and B.
Local labor market conditions could also lead to a violation of the monotonicity
assumption. If there are more job opportunities at all firms when the parent’s em-
ployer is hiring, an increase in the hiring rate at the parent’s employer could actually
accompany a reduction in the probability that the individual works there. I measure
the aggregate hiring rate in the three sectors–unskilled services, skilled services, and
manufacturing/production–in the commuting zone in which the parent’s employer is
located and include a vector of controls that interacts these aggregate hiring rates
with the sector of the parent’s employer. This modified specification directly controls
for hiring conditions at all employers in the local labor market. The point estimate
(standard error) from the first and second stage are 0.118 (0.003) and 0.297 (0.029),
respectively. These controls have little impact on the results, which provides addi-
tional evidence that local labor market conditions are not biasing the estimates.
Where the parent works is not randomly assigned, which raises two concerns.
First, the sample excludes parents that are not employed and some parents may lose
their jobs when the hiring rate is lower and the employer is not doing well. It is
likely that this would produce negative bias, since lower-earning parents would be
more likely to appear at employers with higher hiring rates. Second, parents may
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anticipate that their child will struggle to find a job and move to employers that
have more job opportunities when their child is starting their career. If parents are
more likely to do this for children with lower earnings potential, then this would also
lead to negative bias. The sample selection criteria requiring parents to have at least
one year of tenure likely helps to address these concerns, as the concerns are more
applicable to parents that are less attached to their employer. As an initial check,
I estimate the main specification on a sample of parents with at least five years of
tenure and continue to find large positive earnings benefits for this sample with a
point estimate (standard error) of 0.23 (0.048).
I use comparisons between siblings to further investigate potential issues that could
arise from parents sorting into employers. Specifically, I estimate one specification
that includes a fixed effect for the parent’s employer and another that includes a fixed
effect for the parent’s employer by household, which limits the identifying variation to
comparisons between siblings. Both regressions are estimated on the same subsample,
which retains cases for which at least two siblings entered the labor market when the
primary earner was at the same employer. The estimates (standard errors) from the
specification with the employer fixed effect and the household by employer fixed effect
are 0.199 (0.040) and 0.155 (0.045), respectively (see Table A.5). The two estimates
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, which suggests that the results are not
driven by unobserved differences across households. These estimates are smaller than
the main estimates but this does not necessarily indicate any issues related to the
validity of the empirical strategy.
The hiring rate at the parent’s employer could be related to earnings through
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some other channel. First, the option to work for the parent’s employer might raise
an individual’s reservation wage, leading them to match with better employers even
if they do not end up working with their parent. Second, if the hiring rate is cor-
related with other measures of parental financial well-being, individuals might stay
in school longer absent financial constraints. Both mechanisms ought to delay entry
into the labor market. However, the estimates in Table A.6 illustrate that working
for a parent’s employer leads individuals to find their first stable job almost a year
earlier and makes them slightly less likely to be employed in the three years prior to
entry, which might indicate a smoother transition between school and work. Thus,
there is no evidence that the earnings gains are driven by an increase in educational
attainment or in the time spent searching for a job. This is not surprising in light
of evidence from Hilger (2016) and Fradkin et al. (2018) who find that parental job
loss during adolescence does not meaningfully impact educational attainment or job
quality through extended search.
It is potentially problematic that working for a parent’s employer affects the timing
of entry. There are two stories for why the hiring rate at the parent’s employer
could affect the timing of entry. First, if there are job opportunities in the current
period, the individual may start their career earlier if they anticipate not being able
to find a better option in future periods. Second, if the parent’s employer is not
hiring when the individual decides to start looking for work, they may not find their
first stable job until the parent’s employer is hiring at later date. Both stories are
more relevant for individuals who have more limited labor market options. This
would then likely bias the estimates downward because individuals with low-earnings
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potential would be disproportionately likely to work for a parent’s employer when
the hiring rate is high. My main empirical specification measures the hiring rate at
the parent’s employer in the four quarters prior to when the individual enters the
labor market. I assess the sensitivity of the estimates to shifting this window of
measurement four quarters earlier and four quarters later. Shifting this window of
measurement backwards one quarter or forwards three quarters yields qualitatively
similar results with point estimates (standard errors) that range from 0.25 (0.013) to
0.42 (0.054). Outside of this range the point estimates grow larger (point estimates
between 0.49 and 0.72), but first stage grows weaker.36 See Table A.7 for all estimates.
Taken together, these results suggest that is unlikely that issues related to timing of
entry are driving the positive earnings benefits.
Lastly, it is possible that working for a parent’s employer could affect whether
an individual finds a first stable job. This would likely produce negative bias, since
individuals with the lowest earnings potential would be disproportionately likely to
appear at their parent’s employers. Figure A.2 presents age-earnings profiles between
the ages of 17 and 30 for different groups of workers defined by when they enter
the labor market. For workers that ever enter the labor market, annual earnings
rise dramatically and persistently at the time of entry. For workers that never enter
the labor market, earnings remain persistently low (average annual earnings is only
$1,814 at age 30). Workers who never enter the labor market simply never participate
in work in a meaningful way. Based on this observation, it seems unlikely that an
36The F-statistic from the first stage falls to 177 when the hiring is measured between eight and
four quarters prior to the quarter of entry.
39
individual would satisfy the earnings restriction for labor market entry only if they
had the option to work for their parent’s employer.
1.5.4 Mechanisms and Other Results
One possible channel through which working for a parent’s employer could affect
earnings is by matching individuals to firms that offer higher pay to all workers. I
investigate this in column 1 of Table 1.4, where the outcome is the employer-level pay
premium estimated from the full sample of workers in the Unites States via a model
with worker and employer fixed effects as in Abowd et al. (1999), hereafter referred
to as AKM (see Appendix A.2.6 for details). Working for the parent’s employer
leads individuals to work for employers that pay all workers 30.4 percent more. A
comparison to the main results in Table 1.2 reveals that virtually the entire impact on
individual earnings is explained by an improvement in the employer pay premium.37
A wide class of models illustrate how search and matching frictions lead to dis-
persion in firm-level pay policies.38 In these models more productive firms pay more
and poach workers from less productivity firms. Consistent with this class of models,
columns 2-4 of Table 1.4 illustrate that working for the employer of a parent leads
individuals to work at employers that are more productive (measured by revenue per
37I estimate a specification where the outcome variable is individual log earnings minus the em-
ployer pay premium and the estimated effect falls to 0.004 with a standard error of 0.03. This
provides additional evidence that the earnings benefits are driven by access to higher-paying em-
ployers.
38Dispersion in firm-level pay policies also arise out of static models in which heterogeneous
preferences over a firm’s non-wage characteristics lead to imperfect competition (Card et al. 2018).
While these models could also be used to interpret my results, dynamic models that emphasize
the role of frictions (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen 1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002) offer a more
explicit explanation for the outcomes related to poaching hires and subsequent job mobility.
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worker), that are more likely poach workers from other employers when hiring, and
whose employees are paid more on average.39 These results suggest that working for
a parent’s employer increases earnings by allowing individuals to start their careers
on a higher rung of the job ladder. Column 4 suggests that individuals who work for
their parent’s employer end up at smaller firms. While job ladder models typically
predict that larger firms will occupy higher rungs of the job ladder, Haltiwanger et
al. (2018) find that firm age complicates this prediction because there are produc-
tive young firms that have not had ample time to grow into large firms. Consistent
with this explanation, column 6 indicates that working for a parent’s employer leads
individuals to work for younger firms.
A number of papers find a systematic relationship between individual earnings
and the identity of the employer. For example, workers tend to experience earnings
growth when they move up the firm job ladder defined by productivity (Haltiwanger
et al., 2017), poaching flows (Bagger and Lentz, 2019), and average pay (Haltiwanger
et al., 2018). Furthermore, evidence from the AKM empirical model suggests that
different workers who move between the same employers experience similar changes in
earnings. One interpretation of this evidence is that some firms pay higher wages than
others. However, this interpretation is complicated by the fact that worker mobility
is endogenous: workers on an upwards (or downwards) career trajectory, might tend
to move to certain firms.
My empirical strategy isolates exogenous variation in where individuals are em-
39The outcomes in columns 2-4 correspond to the rank of time-invariant characteristics of the
first stable employer relative to the national distribution of employers. See Appendix A.2.7 for a






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ployed and thus I provide more direct evidence that the firm-level pay policies are
an important determinant of earnings. My results indicate that, for the complier
population, the parent’s employer occupies a higher rung of the job ladder than the
employer that is the next best option and individuals earn more at their parent’s
employer. The fact that the estimated effect on individual earnings is virtually iden-
tical to the estimated effect on the employer pay premium is most easily explained by
the following three statements being true: (1) my instrumental variables estimator
identifies a causal parameter, (2) the AKM empirical model identifies an employer
pay premium, and (3) the earnings benefits of working for a parent’s employer are
driven by parents providing access to higher-paying employers. In this way, my re-
sults offer novel support of the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the AKM
empirical model. Importantly, the identifying assumptions imposed by AKM are en-
tirely distinct from the assumptions required to interpret my two-stage least squares
estimates as causal. Identification of the AKM model relies on assumptions on the
relationship between unobserved error term and the individual- and employer-level
components of earnings, whereas my empirical strategy makes no assumptions about
the relationship between these variables.
Part of the effect on the employer pay premium is explained by parents providing
access to employers in higher-paying industries. Columns 7-9 of Table 1.4 present
estimates in which the outcome is an indicator equal to one if the child works in one
of three broad sectors. Working for a parent’s employer reduces the probability of
working in the unskilled service sector by 43 percentage points and increases the prob-
ability of working in the manufacturing/production sector by 37 percentage points.
43
The effect on the industry of employment has large predicted earnings consequences.
Table A.8 presents estimates in which the outcome variable is the industry-level earn-
ings premium (estimated analogously to the employer-level pay premium). Working
for a parent’s employer increases the two- and six-digit industry pay premium by
0.167 and 0.230, respectively. Thus, 75 percent of the effect on individual earnings is
explained by individuals working in different six-digit industries. To the extent that
young workers are aware of pay differences across industries, these results cast doubt
on the possibility that parents simply provide information to their children about
where to look for high-paying jobs.
Working for a parent’s employer leads individuals to stay at their first employer
longer. Column 1 of Table 1.5 indicates that working for a parent’s employer increases
the probability of remaining at the first employer for at least three years by 17.4
percentage points. Columns 2 and 3 illustrate that this effect is entirely driven by
a reduction in the probability of making a job-to-job transition. If the outcomes in
columns 2 and 3 are viewed as proxies for quits and fires, respectively, then these
results suggest that working for a parent’s employer allows individuals to gain access
to employers that pay more and are generally more desirable than their outside option
and so they choose to remain at those employers, whereas the employers are not
gaining access to better workers and so they are no less likely to fire these workers.40
However, employers may benefit from the lower quit rates if hiring and retention are
costly.
40Fallick et al. (2019) find a strong association between transitions into nonemployment and



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Columns 4-6 of Table 1.5 illustrate that the earnings benefits of working for a
parent’s employer are quite persistent. Working for the parent’s employer leads to an
increase of $7,363 in the first year after entry into the labor market. The effects are
persistent but by the third year the magnitude of the effect falls to $4,790. Figure
A.8 presents estimates of the effect on annual earnings one to six years after entry
for a group of individuals for whom I am able to observe these outcomes. There
is less statistical precision in the later years but the point estimates suggest that
the earnings benefits are quite persistent, with annual earnings benefits that exceed
$5,000 even six years after entry.
Table 1.6 investigates heterogeneous effects by estimating the main specification
on subgroups of workers defined by sex and the quintile of parental earnings. On
average, the benefits for daughters (0.424) is larger than for sons (0.312). While
earnings benefits for daughters are also larger within each parental earnings quintile,
large standard errors prevent me from concluding whether or not there are meaningful
differences between the earnings effects by sex. A comparison of estimates across
columns 1-5 in Panel A indicates that children with parents higher up in the parental
earnings distribution experience greater earnings benefits from working for a parent’s
employer. For example, the estimated effect for individuals whose parents are in
the fifth quintile (highest earnings) is 0.328 compared to 0.189 for individuals whose
parents are in the first quintile (lowest earnings). The estimates in Panels B and C
illustrate that the positive association between the effects on earnings and parental
earnings is entirely driven by sons.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































working for the employer of the parent who is the secondary earner.41 The results,
presented in Table A.9, indicate that working for the employer of the secondary earner
leads to an increase in initial earnings by 29 percent. Thus, there is no evidence
that working for the employer of the secondary earner produces different earnings
benefits compared to working for the employer of the primary earner. In addition,
Table A.10 presents the estimated effect of working for the father’s and mother’s
employer. Working for the father’s employer leads to a 52 percent and 33 percent
increase in initial earnings for daughters and sons, respectively. Working for the
mother’s employer leads to a 28 percent and 34 percent increase in initial earnings
for daughters and sons, respectively. Thus, there are substantial earnings benefits
associated with working for the employer of either, particularly for daughters who are
able to get a job at their father’s employer.
1.5.5 Interpreting the Local Average Treatment Effect
If the three identifying assumptions are satisfied, the two-stage least squares estimator
identifies a LATE, which is the average treatment effect for the compliers. This
section explores the relationship between the LATE and other causal parameters of
interest. First, I provide a theoretical argument for why in my context, in which
working for a parent’s employer is determined by the decisions of multiple agents,
the LATE may be a reasonable approximation of the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT)–which is the average treatment effect for individuals who work for their
41In order to avoid estimating effects of working with the primary earner, I limit the sample to
cases in which the secondary earner is employed with a year of tenure in the quarter of entry and
does work work at the same employer as the primary earner.
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parent’s employer. Second, I present empirical evidence to assess the plausibility of
this interpretation.
Let Yi(d, z) denote the potential outcome of individual i who has the treatment sta-
tus Di = d ∈ {0, 1} and instrument value Zi = z ∈ {z, z̄} where z < z̄. Let Dzi denote
the treatment status of i when Zi = z. Furthermore, assume the following: (Inde-
pendence) {Yi(Dz̄i, z̄), Yi(Dzi, z), Dz̄i, Dzi} ⊥⊥ Zi, (Exclusion) Yi(d, z) = Yi(d, z̄) ≡ Ydi
for d = {0, 1}, (First Stage) E[Dz̄i − Dzi] 6= 0, and (Monotonicity) Dz̄i ≤ Dzi ∀
i. Under these assumptions, the instrumental variables estimator identifies a LATE,
which is the average treatment effect for the compliers (i.e., the population for which
Dz̄i < Dzi).
In the standard selection framework of Roy (1951), the LATE will likely depend
on the specific values of the instruments, since selection into treatment is deter-
mined by a single agent who weighs the benefits (treatment effects) against the costs
(instruments). To see this more formally, consider the selection model in which
Dzi = 1{βi > z}, where βi = Y1i − Y0i is the individual-level treatment effect. It
immediately follows that the LATE, which is E[βi|z < βi < z̄], will generally depend
on the values of the instruments.
In my context, selection is determined by the choices of more than one agent–
the young worker and their parent’s employer–and this potentially breaks the link
between the instruments and the treatment effects. To see why, consider an alternative
selection model in which the individual works for their parent’s employer if and only
if the employer makes them a job offer and they choose to accept the offer. The
employer’s decision to make an offer depends on the instruments and is defined as,
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Ozi = 1{ηOi > z}. The child’s decision to accept the offer depends on the benefits and
is defined as, Azi = 1{βi > ηAi }. Where ηOi and ηAi are unobserved error terms whose
values are defined independent of Di and Zi.
42 Treatment status is then defined as,
Dzi = Ozi × Azi.
The LATE and ATT are equal if the employer’s decision to make an offer is
unrelated to the child’s decision to accept. Formally, if {ηOi , ηAi } ⊥⊥ Zi and {βi, ηAi } ⊥
⊥ ηOi , then
E
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Under these conditions, both the compliers and the individuals working for their
parent’s employer are a random sample of individuals who would accept an offer
from their parent’s employer if made one. Importantly, because of the multi-agent
nature of the selection problem, the LATE and ATT may be equivalent even in the
presence of selection on gains and selection bias. Appendix A.4 develops a stylized
behavioral model and provides a more detailed discussion of the intuition by focusing
on a specific case of equation 1.7.
The assumptions that imply the equality of the LATE and ATT also imply that
the estimated treatment effects should not be sensitive to the variation exploited in
the instrument; I test that implication here. To do so, I regress the instrument on
the covariates from equation 1.6 and compute the residualized value, which is the
42More formally, let ηxi (d, z) denote the potential outcome with treatment status Di = d and




i (d, z) for x ∈ {O,A}.
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source of identifying variation.43 I then compute terciles based on the residualized
instrument, partitioning the sample into periods in which employers have a relatively
low, medium and high rate of hiring. I estimate equation 1.6 on samples defined
by different combinations of the three terciles. The point estimate (standard error)
is 0.44 (0.05), 0.31 (0.029), and 0.23 (0.11) when excluding observations from third,
second and first terciles, respectively (see Table A.11). While there is some variation
across the samples, the two-stage least square estimates are not excessively sensitive
to range of variation exploited in the instrument.
An alternative approach to assessing the representativeness of the two-stage least
squares estimates is to characterize the compliers. My data lack variables that
strongly predict individual earnings benefits, but I can estimate the size of the com-
plier population. The methodology developed by Abadie (2003) applies to binary
instruments, so I construct three binary instruments which are equal to one when the
residualized hiring rate exceeds the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. The estimated
effect on log earnings when using these three binary instruments is 0.44, 0.42, and
0.25, respectively. The fact that these estimates are qualitatively similar to those
obtained using the continuous instrument provides some evidence that the complier
population for these instruments is not fundamentally different. For the three in-
struments, I find that 3.6, 2.8, and 16 percent of the population is in the complier
population, respectively.44 Given that 5.6 percent of individuals in the estimation
sample work for their parent’s employer, the compliers represent a meaningful per-
43The distribution of the residualized hiring rate is both symmetric and smooth (see Figure A.9).
44Table A.12 presents estimates of the size and characteristics of the complier population.
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centage the treated population.45 Thus, the results provide additional evidence that
the instrumental variables estimates are informative of the ATT.
1.6 Intergenerational Persistence in Earnings
The results from Sections 1.4 and 1.5 show that individuals with higher-earning par-
ents are both more likely to work for the employer of a parent and benefit more
when the do. This suggests that the intergenerational transmission of employers in-
creases the intergenerational persistence in earnings. This section implements the
methodology described in Section 1.2 in order to quantify the difference between the
observed measure of the intergenerational persistence in earnings and a measure that
correspond to a counterfactual world in which no one works for the employer of a
parent.
Panel A of Table 1.7 presents estimates of the IGE. Columns 1-3 present estimates
for daughters, sons, and the full sample. The elasticities, which range from 0.13 to
0.16, are substantially lower than typical estimates of IGE from the literature (Black
and Devereux, 2011). To investigate this discrepancy, I produce alternative estimates
of the IGE, which measure the earnings of the children in 2016 (when the children
are between the ages of 24 and 35). In Table A.13, columns 1-3 of Panel A present
estimates based on samples that include children with zero earnings in 2016 (by taking
the hyperbolic sine of earnings) and the estimates of the IGE are closer to 0.4, which
is comparable to other estimates from the United States. Thus, the low estimates of
45These estimates suggest that 49, 25, and 69 percent of the individuals who work for their parent’s
employer are in the complier population, respectively.
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the IGE appear to be an artifact of focusing on labor market outcomes at the time
of entry. Panel B of Table A.13 presents estimates of the IGE for a subsample of the
children with strictly positive earnings in 2016. Within this sample, the estimated
IGE for the full sample is 0.235, which is much closer to the estimates based on initial
labor market outcomes. These results highlight the fact that the IGE is sensitive to
how observations with zero earnings are dealt with and suggests that my estimates
of the IGE based on initial labor market outcomes are lower primarily because they
condition on positive earnings.46
The intergenerational transmission of employer leads to a modest reduction in the
IGE. Panel B of Table 1.7 indicates that the IGE would be 5 percent lower if no one
worked for the employer of the parent who is the primary earner.47 The intergen-
erational transmission of employers has a larger effect on the IGE for sons because,
relative to daughters, both the probability of working for a parent’s employer and the
earnings consequences are more strongly related to parental earnings. Columns 1 and
2 indicate that the counterfactual IGE for daughters and sons would be 2 percent and
11 percent lower, respectively. Panel C of Table 1.7 indicates that the IGE would be
about 10 percent lower if no one worked for the employer of either parent. For the
case of working for the employer of the secondary earner, I am unable to estimate
46To further investigate these patterns, Figure A.10 plots the avergae log earnings of children
against parental earnings and illustrates that the strength of the intergenerational relationship in
earnings is dampened in the lower parts of the distribution. This may be explained by the fact that
I focus on the earnings at the first stable job, when many workers are earning the minimum wage.
47Estimates of the ATT can be found in Table 1.6. I allow all estimates of the ATT to vary by
parental earnings quintile. For the counterfactual estimates presented in column 3 of Table 1.7 I
use the pooled estimates of the ATT presented in Panel A of Table 1.6. For the counterfactual
estimates presented in columns 1 and 2, I use the appropriate sex-specific estimates. Estimates of
the proportion of individuals who work for the employer of the primary earner, secondary earner, or
both parents are presented in Figure A.11.
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IGE 0.1565 0.1298 0.1430
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
B. No Transmission with Primary Earner
percent change in IGE -2.04% -10.79% -4.73%
(6.52) (5.02) (3.30)
C. No Transmission with Either Parent
percent change in IGE -3.87% -23.09% -9.68%
(12.25) (9.39) (6.16)
observations 8,416,000 8,591,000 17,010,000
Notes: The results in columns 1-3 corresopnd to daughters, sons, and all children, respectively.
Panel A presents the observed intergenerational elasticity of earnings (IGE), which is denoted
ρ(yijt, yp) and is estimated with sample weights via weighted least squares. Panels B and C
present the percent by which the IGE estimates in Panel A would change if no children were
to work for the employer of the parent who is the primary earner or either parent, respectively.
The percent change is defined as,
ρ(yijt,yp)−ρ(yi(j0)t,yp)
ρ(yijt,yp)
× 100. The treatment effects used to con-
struct the counterfactual estimates are estimated via two-stage least squares and are estimated
separately by the quintile of the parental earnings distrbution for the results in column 3 and
are estimated separately by quintile of the parental eanrings distribution and the sex of the child
for columns 1 and 2. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are calculated using the
delta method and take into account the uncertainty in the estimated earnings consequences.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
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heterogeneous effects by both parental earnings and sex. Thus, I assume that the
effect of working for the employer of the secondary earner is the same as working for
the employer of the primary earner. As previously discussed, this appears to be true,
at least in the full sample.
The standard errors, presented below in parentheses, indicate that uncertainty in
the estimates of the ATT create some uncertainty regarding the magnitude of these
effects. Table A.14 replicates the analysis but uses the point estimates and standard
errors from Table 1.2, which assumes no heterogeneity in effects by parental earnings
or sex. Here the magnitudes are smaller, suggesting a 2 percent decline in IGE if no
one worked for a the employer of either parent, but they are also much more precisely
estimated (standard error is 0.20). While there is some uncertainty around the exact
magnitude, both sets of results suggest that the transmission of employers leads to a
modest decrease in the IGE.
In addition to the IGE, I consider an alternative measure of the intergenerational
persistence in earnings: the conditional expected rank (CER). The CER is defined as,
E[rij|rp], where rij is the percentile rank of the earnings of the child, calculated within
cohorts and using sample weights. Figure 1.2 presents the average earnings benefits–
defined as E[Diβi]–by sex, race/ethnicity and parental earnings.48 The benefits are
largest for non-Black males whose parents are in the top two quintiles of the earnings
distribution. The results by race/ethnicity should be interpreted with some caution
since I do not have sufficient power to estimate earnings consequences by parental
48The two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of working for the employer of the primary











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































earnings, sex, and race/ethnicity and instead assume that, within groups defined by
sex and the parental earnings quintile, average treatment effects do not differ by
race/ethnicity.
Section 1.4 found that Black sons are less likely to work for the employer of a
parent relative to other sons in the same parental earnings percentile. This result is
interesting in light of recent work by Chetty et al. (2020), who find that, conditional
on parental income, Black males have lower expected income compared to White
males. The solid lines in Figure 1.3 present the CER measures for Black and White
sons and replicate the finding of Chetty et al. (2020): Black sons earn less on average
relative to White sons with parents in the same earnings percentile. The dashed lines
below represent the counterfactual CER. Black sons benefits less from working for a
parent’s employer. Panel B of Figure 1.3 presents the proportion of the Black-White
gap (vertical distance between the solid lines in Panel A) that is explained by the
intergenerational transmission of employers at each percentile of the parental earnings
distribution. On average, the transmission of employers explains about 10 percent
of the conditional Black-White earnings gap. While other factors clearly play an
important role in determining this earnings gap, my results suggest that young Black
males are at a relative disadvantage in part because they are less likely to have an
employed father who can help them find work.
The difference in the average benefits of the intergenerational transmission of
employers between sons and daughters varies across the parental earnings distribution.
Panel A of Figure 1.4 plots the observed and counterfactual CER.49 Estimating a



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































linear regression using the results in Panel A reveals that, if no one worked for the
employer of either parent, the slope of the rank-rank relationship would be 13 percent
and 3 percent lower for sons and daughters, respectively.50 While sons are more
likely to work for the employer of either parent, daughters experience larger earnings
benefits conditional on doing so. Panel B illustrates how this plays out across the
parental earnings distribution and plots the expected benefits of working for a parent’s
employer–which corresponds to the difference between the observed CER and the
counterfactual CER–against the parental earnings percentile. Daughters benefit more
from working for a parent’s employer in the bottom two quintiles of the parental
earnings distribution while sons benefits more in the top quintile and both benefit
equally elsewhere. Averaging these effects across the parental earnings distribution
indicates that the earnings gap between sons and daughters would be 4 percent larger
if no one worked for the employer of either parent.
1.6.1 Key Insights from Stylized Model
I synthesize my findings by developing a stylized model of intergenerational mobility
in which parents affect the earnings of their children by shaping the development of
their human capital and by providing access to higher-paying employers. I summarize
the key insights from the model in this section and refer the reader to Appendix A.4
for the details. Relative to other models of intergenerational mobility, the novel
features of my model are that I (1) incorporate an employer-specific component into
50Panel A of Figure A.12 plots analogous results for the pooled sample of sons and daughters.
The counterfactual slope of the rank-rank relationship is 2 percent and 5 percent lower for the
scenario in which no individual worker for the employer of the primary earner and secondary earner,
respectively.
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individual earnings and (2) explicitly model the choices that lead individuals to work
for a parent’s employer.51
The key aspects of the model setup are as follows. Motivated by my finding
that parents provide access to higher-paying employers as well as the literature on
imperfect competition in the labor market, I depart from existing models of inter-
generational by allowing earnings to depend on not only the human capital of the
child, but also the pay premium associated with the employer to which they match.
I assume that: there is a positive correlation between parental earnings and human
capital, children with higher levels of human capital tend to match to higher-paying
employers absent parental contacts, and working at the parent’s employer affects
earnings solely through the effect on the employer pay premium. Individuals will
work for the employer of their parent if and only if the employer makes an offer and
the child accepts the offer. The employer’s decision to make a job offer depends on
the human capital of the child and the parent, whereas the child’s decision to accept
the offer depends on the earnings benefits.
There are two insights from the model. First, the effect of the intergenerational
transmission of employers on the intergenerational persistence in earnings is theoret-
ically ambiguous in sign. On the one hand, higher-earning parents are better able
to produce high-paying job offers. On the other hand, children of lower-earning par-
51Magruder (2010) and Corak and Piraino (2012) and the only two papers that have developed
models of intergenerational mobility that incorporate parental contacts. Neither paper considers
the role of employer pay premiums and neither paper considers the endogenous use of social con-
tacts. Magruder (2010) assumes that parental contacts produce a positive correlation between the
employment status of parents and children. Corak and Piraino (2012) assume that the earnings of
the parent have a direct positive effect on the earnings of the child. In both papers the effect of
parental contacts on intergenerational mobility is determined by the sign of a single parameter.
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ents have lower levels of human capital and may be more reliant on their parents to
find a decent-paying job. Thus, while I find that the intergenerational persistence in
earnings would be lower if no one worked for their parent’s employer, this conclusion
might differ in other contexts.
Gaining access to higher-paying employers is the direct effect of working for a par-
ent’s employer. However, parents might account for this direct effect when investing
in the human capital of their children; I refer to this as the indirect effect. The second
insight of the model is that the indirect effect has a theoretically ambiguous effect on
the intergenerational persistence in earnings. On the one hand, working for a parent’s
employer increases the marginal returns to human capital investments by providing
access to higher-paying employers. On the other hand, the marginal returns decline
because higher-ability individuals are less likely to work for their parent’s employer
and benefit less when they do. Thus, parental investment decisions could either am-
plify or dampen the direct effect of the intergenerational transmission of employers
on the intergenerational persistence in earnings. The counterfactual exercise analysis
should therefore be viewed as a partial equilibrium analysis, which does not account
for the possibility that individuals might adjust their investments in human capital
if there was no option to work for their parent’s employer. While it would be inter-
esting to explore the implications of the indirect effect, quantifying the importance
of the direct effect is the obvious starting point, as the indirect effect is unlikely to
be important if direct effect is negligible.
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1.7 Conclusion
My paper combines survey and administrative data to investigate how the earnings
of young workers are affected by the intergenerational transmission of employers. I
start with a descriptive analysis, and find that 7 percent of individuals work for
the employer of a parent at their first stable job and 29 percent do so at some point
between the ages of 18 and 30. This tendency is best explained by parents influencing
the hiring or job search process to help children who have limited options in the labor
market. I then use an instrumental variables strategy, which exploits exogenous
variation in the availability of jobs at the parent’s employer, and find that working
for the employer of a parent increases earnings by 31 percent. These large earnings
benefits are explained by parents providing access to higher-paying employers: Young
workers who find their first stable job at the employer of a parent start their careers
on a higher rung of the job ladder.
Individuals with higher-earning parents are more likely to work for the employer
of a parent, and benefit more when they do, and thus the intergenerational transmis-
sion of employers increases the intergenerational persistence in earnings. I develop
a new methodology that allows me to quantify this effect using descriptive statistics
and causal estimates. I find that the elasticity of the initial earnings of an individual
with respect to the earnings of their parents would be 10 percent lower if no one
worked for the employer of a parent. Examining patterns by family background, sex,
and race/ethnicity reveals that non-Black males with high-earning parents benefit the
most from the intergenerational transmission of employers. My results likely under-
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state the importance of parental labor market networks more broadly defined since
parents may also provide access to jobs at other employers through social contacts,
such as friends, former co-workers, or classmates. This is especially true for the im-
plications for intergenerational mobility if higher-income parents are more likely to
have contacts outside of their current employer.
My results relate to the normative assessment of whether rates of intergenerational
mobility are too low in the United States, an assessment which depends on whether
the economic system that produces the intergenerational persistence in earnings is
equitable and efficient. While equity depends on subjective moral values, a core
ideal in the United State is that of equality of opportunity, which requires that an
individual’s success be a function of their hard work and ability rather than the
circumstances into which they were born.52 Thus, from an equity standpoint, my
finding that individuals from high-income families disproportionately benefit from
their parents’ connections should raise concerns about the relatively low levels of
intergenerational mobility in the United States. My results do not speak directly to
the implications for efficiency and future research should aim to understand whether
the use of parental labor market networks leads to gains or losses in productivity.
My results are also informative of the positive assessment of what would be re-
quired to achieve equality of opportunity. One view is that the United States is a
meritocracy, where economic rewards are determined by hard work and ability. Ac-
52According to Roemer (1998), equality of opportunity requires that the outcomes of individuals
are not systematically determined by factors for which they are not responsible. Defining what to
hold someone responsible for is a subjective judgment. But most people in the United States would
likely agree that individuals should not be responsible for their parents’ lack of connections in the
labor market.
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cording to this view, efforts to expand economic opportunity should aim to equip
everyone with the skills they need to succeed in the labor market. Government pro-
grams such as Head Start, which provides access to early childhood education, and
the Pell Grant program, which helps students pay for college, are both examples of
programs that promote the development of skills for individuals from disadvantaged
backgrounds. However, my results challenge a purely meritocratic view of the labor
market, as individuals from high-income families are likely to earn more not only
because they are more skilled, but also, because their parents are able to provide
access to high-paying firms. If the labor market plays a direct role in propagating
intergenerational disadvantage, then achieving equality of opportunity in terms of
education will not necessarily produce equality of opportunity in the labor market.
Rather, individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds may require additional support
throughout their early careers. Gaining a better understanding of the mechanisms
through which parents help their children find high-paying jobs may offer ideas for
how to help young workers who cannot rely on the connections of their parents to
more successfully navigate the labor market.
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Chapter 2: The Children of HOPE VI Demolitions: National Evi-
dence on Labor Market Outcomes
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2.1 Introduction
The concern that placement in subsidized housing, especially large public housing
projects in high-poverty neighborhoods, could negatively affect children has been the
focus of a substantial literature.1 Based partly on this rationale, the last 30 years of
federal assisted housing policy has sought to deconcentrate subsidized housing partici-
pants, mainly through the provision of Housing Choice Vouchers (hereafter, vouchers)
that subsidize low-income families to live in market-supplied housing. A significant
effort to spur the dispersion of these households has focused on the demolition of
public housing projects paired with support for existing residents to find alternative
housing, most notably under the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment’s (HUD’s) HOPE VI program.2 Despite the growing availability of vouchers
and the continued funding of programs intended to reduce the population living in
low-quality public housing projects, there is little representative evidence about how
these demolitions affect short- or long-term outcomes for exposed children and adults;
much of the existing research on subsidized housing is conducted in a limited num-
ber of large metropolitan areas and it is not clear how these findings apply to other
contexts in the U.S.
This paper explores how the HOPE VI Demolition program affected the adult la-
bor market outcomes of children who resided in demolished projects. Using a unique
1For example, Oreopoulos (2003), Jacob (2004), Chetty et al. (2016), Andersson et al. (2018a),
and Chyn (2018).
2The HOPE VI program, originally known as the Urban Revitalization Demonstration, was the
sixth of the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere Grants, funded by P.L. 102-389 (HUD
2007).
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dataset available at the U.S. Census Bureau–which links administrative data on earn-
ings and participation in subsidized housing–we identify approximately 18,500 chil-
dren exposed to 160 HOPE VI demolitions in diverse environments across the U.S.
Our empirical strategy for estimating the causal impacts of the program is based
on the observation that even though the HOPE VI program systematically targeted
the “worst” public housing projects, there were many similarly distressed projects in
equally disadvantaged neighborhoods that were not demolished. We leverage the rich-
ness and size of the data by using a stratification with regression estimator (Imbens
and Rubin 2015), which combines features of both matching and regression in order
to flexibly account for observable differences between the 160 HOPE VI projects and
8,800 public housing projects unaffected by the program.
Our main finding is that exposure to the HOPE VI Demolition program between
the ages of 10 and 18 produced substantial long-run labor market benefits, increasing
age 26 earnings by 14.2 percent relative to comparable children from non-HOPE VI
projects. Interestingly, we find that the positive impacts are driven by children from
projects in neighborhoods served by the larger housing authorities typically located
in large metro areas. For example, we estimate that HOPE VI increased earnings by
19.5 percent in large (greater than 2,500 units) Public Housing Authorities (PHAs),
compared to a statistically insignificant 4.5 percent increase in smaller PHAs.
We start our investigation of mechanisms by studying the short- and medium-term
impacts of the program. The demolitions led to large changes in housing circum-
stances, forcing most HOPE VI households out of their initial projects and into other
public housing projects or the voucher program. While households exited subsidized
69
housing at a higher rate in the year after the demolition, there is no evidence that
the program displaced households from subsidized housing entirely in later years.3
Despite the changes in project and subsidy type, the HOPE VI-induced moves did
not produce measurable changes in school quality, neighborhood economic and de-
mographic characteristics, or the labor market outcomes of parents. Furthermore, we
find no evidence of larger impacts for children who were younger at the time of a de-
molition. Together, these results suggest that the long-term labor market benefits of
HOPE VI demolitions are not driven by increased exposure to better neighborhoods
during childhood, at least as such neighborhood effects are characterized elsewhere
in the literature (Chetty et al. 2016).
Rather, the strongest evidence suggests that HOPE VI improved long-run labor
market outcomes by affecting the characteristics of the neighborhoods where the
children moved to and ended up living as adults. Specifically, we find that HOPE
VI led to a significant improvement in measures of the geographic proximity of job
opportunities–jobs per person, average commute time, and a job proximity index
constructed by HUD–in the neighborhoods that the children were living in 2010, 7-
13 years after the demolitions.4 Improved job proximity can reduce job search and
commuting costs and therefore reduce job search duration (Andersson et al. 2018b)
and encourage individuals on the margin between working and not working to increase
3While it is quite common for residents of HOPE VI projects to exit subsidize housing, they
are no more likely to do so relative to residents of other similarly distressed projects that were not
exposed to the HOPE VI program.
4Our results point to a spatial concept of job accessibility which we refer to as job proximity.
While it is also possible that the program could have moved children into neighborhoods that
provided better access to jobs through labor market networks, we find no evidence that this is the
case.
70
search effort and participate in the labor market (Smith and Zenou 2003). Consistent
with job accessibility being an important mechanism, we find that an important
part of the observed earnings gains are driven by an extensive margin labor supply
response.
The data suggest that improvements in job accessibility occurred through two
distinct channels. First, the demolitions transformed the neighborhoods in which the
HOPE VI projects were originally located. Public housing projects, particularly those
served by large PHAs, often provide housing to many individuals in geographically
concentrated areas. This results in neighborhoods that provide limited access to jobs,
with many job searchers competing for nearby jobs. The demolition of public housing
projects drastically reduced population density with no corresponding decrease in the
number of jobs in the neighborhood. Thus, on average, children that remained near
the location of their original project, experienced an improvement in job proximity.
Second, HOPE VI increased the likelihood that households moved, and destination
neighborhoods provided better access to jobs, even though these neighborhoods were
typically geographically close (within the same county) and similarly poor. This
pattern of moves is explained by two features in the data: 1) HOPE VI projects
in large PHAs were located in neighborhoods that were especially disadvantaged in
terms of both poverty rates and job accessibility relative to surrounding areas; and
2) housing prices increase sharply with reductions in neighborhood poverty but there
is no similar price gradient with respect to job accessibility. Together, this suggests
that while local moves induced by HOPE VI were likely to generate improvements in
job accessibility, financial constraints may have prevented reductions in neighborhood
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poverty. The latter observation is consistent with existing research on the Voucher
program (Patterson et al. 2004; Eriksen and Ross 2013; Jacob, Ludwig, and Miller
2013; Collinson and Ganong 2018; Andersson et al. 2018a).
In relation to previous work, an important contribution of this paper is to obtain
estimates of the long-term impact of a large assisted housing program that are more
representative of the full population of affected projects. Much of the relevant prior
empirical research relies on data from a limited set of large metropolitan areas. Figure
B.1 plots the distribution of the size of PHAs that participated in three important
randomized controls trials including the HUD Moving to Opportunity (MTO) ex-
periment (Ludwig et al. 2013), the Gautreaux program (Rosenbaum 1995), and the
Effects of Housing Choice Voucher on Welfare Families project (Mills et al. 2006).5
Approximately half of all public housing units are located in small PHAs but only
two of the ten PHAs in this previous research are located in small PHAs. In con-
trast, over two thirds of the PHAs that received HOPE VI funding are located in
small PHAs. Thus, our results are likely to be more representative of the effects for
the broader population in public housing. Chicago is the third largest PHA and is
shown separately in Figure B.1 as it is the setting for Chyn (2018), the closest exist-
ing paper to our work. Chyn (2018) studies the long-term earnings impacts of public
housing project demolitions in Chicago and also finds substantial long-term benefits;
5Similarly, non-experimental research on the consequences of changes in access to vouchers or
increases in voucher generosity, identifies treatment effects for a small set of non-representative cities,
as in Collinson and Ganong (2016). An exception is a companion paper–Anderson et al. (2018a)–
which uses a household fixed-effects identification strategy and finds long-term benefits of time spent
in public and voucher housing between the ages of 13 and 18. Anderson et al. (2018a) use data from
nearly the universe of assisted housing participants so that the results capture the typical effect of
participating in the public housing or voucher program. In contrast, the current paper focuses on a
population that is more disadvantaged relative to the subsidized housing population as a whole.
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estimating that demolitions increased earnings for children in affected buildings by
16 percent relative to unaffected children who resided in the same projects.6 Our
results provide additional evidence on the long-term benefits of the demolitions of
distressed public housing projects in contexts beyond Chicago and provide more in-
sight into the mechanisms through which these demolitions affected long-term labor
market outcomes.
Our results also shed light on an open puzzle in the existing literature: Does
inducing households to move to new neighborhoods have to occur while children
are still young in order to have long-run benefits? Chyn (2018) and the results in
our paper suggest that demolitions do produce long-run benefits for older children
(older than 13 at the time of the demolition). Conversely, in their analysis of the
MTO experiment, Chetty et al. (2016) find no evidence of long-run gains for older
children who transitioned from public to voucher housing.7 One explanation for this
discrepancy suggested by Chyn (2018) is that the projects in his study were in much
more disadvantaged neighborhoods relative to those in MTO. If older children only
benefit when the origin neighborhood is especially distressed, this could reconcile
the findings from MTO, Chyn (2018), and this paper. We exploit the variation in
pre-demolition neighborhood characteristics and find that HOPE VI had the largest
6Chyn (2018) measures earnings between the ages of 19 and 32 whereas we focus on labor market
outcomes measured at age 26. Some of the projects studied in Chyn (2018) and Jacob (2004),
who studied the short-run impacts of the same demolitions, were demolished under the HOPE VI
program.
7The MTO study randomly assigned 4,600 households living in public housing projects to a
control group, a “Section 8” group which was offered standard vouchers, or an experimental group
which was offered vouchers that could only be used in census tracts with a 1990 poverty rate below
10 percent. The primary comparison made by Chetty, et al. (2016) is between this experimental
group and the control group. Their results thus rely on moves to lower poverty neighborhoods, a
case in which it makes sense that younger children should benefit more. Survey and administrative
data have provided means of evaluating the impact of the two treatments (Ludwig et al. 2013).
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impact on age 26 earnings for projects located in neighborhoods that had higher
poverty rates, were more densely populated and had lower measures of job proximity.
Intuitively, large distressed public housing projects create an environment in which
there are many more people looking for work relative to the jobs available nearby, and
this creates barriers to employment. The children located in these neighborhoods–
even if they were exposed to the program only later in adolescence–still benefited
from the HOPE VI intervention.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides background on the HOPE
VI program and related research and discusses the potential mechanisms through
which public housing demolitions could affect the long-term well-being of children in
displaced households. Section 2.3 describes the data sources and sample construction.
Section 2.4 highlights challenges for the identification of unbiased treatment effects
and discusses the stratification with regression estimator. Section 2.5 presents the
empirical results, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background and Anticipated Impacts of the Program
HUD launched the HOPE VI initiative in response to the report by the National
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH), which, in 1992, found
that 86,000 of the 1.4 million public housing units nationwide qualified as “severely
distressed” (NCSDPH 1992, HUD 2007). HOPE VI consisted of two main programs
designed to address this issue: (1) the Demolition program, which provided funding for
the demolition of public housing projects and the relocation of affected residents, and
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(2) the Revitalization program, which provided funding to redevelop neighborhoods
with public housing into low-density, mixed-income communities. The focus of our
paper is strictly on the Demolition program and unless otherwise noted, any mention
of HOPE VI refers solely to this program.8 Between 1996 and 2003, HUD awarded
$392 million through 285 HOPE VI grants for the demolition of more than 57,000
public housing units. Displaced households were typically either offered an apartment
in another public housing project, a voucher, or they were forced out of subsidized
housing altogether (Popkin et al. 2004).9 Research tracking the former residents
of a limited set of demolished public housing projects estimates that about half of
displaced households moved to a new public housing project, a third were provided
with a voucher and the remainder exited subsidized housing altogether (Kingsley et
al. 2003; Popkin et al. 2009).
HOPE VI Demolition grants were awarded based on a competitive process in which
HUD posted a notice of funding availability, PHAs submitted applications and HUD
selected a limited set of awardees (Murphy 2012). Any PHA was eligible to submit
an application for the demolition of severely distressed public housing developments
(using the NCSDPH criteria). However, at least in the earliest year, HUD explicitly
differentiated between PHAs of various sizes in their call for funding (2,500 units
or less, between 2,501 and 10,000 units, and over 10,000 units); applicants were
8There is some overlap between the Revitalization and Demolition programs so that some re-
cipients of a Demolition grant later received a Revitalization grant. However, the Revitalization
intervention typically began years after the demolition occurred. As we discuss in Appendix B.2,
we find no evidence that our estimated impact of the Demolition program is affected by the Revi-
talization program.
9Displaced households could also be offered a unit in a revitalized HOPE VI site, but substantial
lags were involved.
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evaluated within these groups and group size determined the amount of funding for
which PHAs were eligible. Our analysis often differentiates between large (more than
2,500 units) and small (2,500 or fewer units) PHAs based on these cutoffs.10 Each
year, HUD classified applicants into one of four priority groups, and grants were
awarded (conditional on eligibility and approval) on a first-come, first-served basis by
priority group until funds were exhausted.11 Given limited funding, both the number
of applicants and eligible projects exceeded the number of awards.12 Furthermore,
many eligible projects never applied for funding while some non-distressed projects
received funding, leaving many distressed-projects unaffected by HOPE VI. Indeed,
Turner et al. (2007) estimate that there were between 47,000 to 82,000 severely
distressed units that remained in public housing inventory as of 2007 (four years after
the last demolition grant award). We return to these points later in our discussion of
the empirical strategy.
It is not obvious how we should expect HOPE VI to affect the long-term labor
market outcomes of displaced children. A primary goal of the program was to move
families out of environments characterized by a “high incidence of crime,” physical
deterioration “that renders the housing dangerous to the health and safety of its res-
10We do not further differentiate the large PHA sample because there are too few HOPE VI
projects in PHAs that exceed 10,000 units in our sample to analyze separately.
11Different sources give slightly different accounts of the award process. However, the Congres-
sional Research Service Report RL32236, describes the first-come, first-served process and notes that
the “priority groups are, in order of priority, (1) approved for a 202 conversion, (2) applied for a 202
conversion, (3) approved for a Section 18 demolition, or (4) approved for a HOPE VI revitalization
grant. Section 202 Mandatory Conversion is the conversion of public housing developments to Sec-
tion 8. If it costs less to give the residents a Section 8 voucher, rather than maintain the low rent
public housing building, the building is shut down and the residents are given Section 8 vouchers.”
12On average only 53 percent of applicants were funded each year. The percentage is based on the
authors’ calculation using publicly available data (HUD 2007) and the statistic excludes data from
1996, for which we do not know the number of applicants.
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idents” and “limited opportunities for meaningful employment of residents.”13 Based
on these stated objectives, demolitions could have shaped the development of chil-
dren by improving the home and neighborhood environments they were exposed to
while young. This would be consistent with recent empirical evidence suggesting that
neighborhood conditions in childhood can affect the development of human capital,
which in turn affect long-term labor market outcomes (Chetty et al. 2014, 2016;
Chetty and Hendren 2018). Alternatively, the program could have affected adult la-
bor market outcomes by changing access to jobs in the neighborhoods where children
end up living as young adults. Theory highlighting the potential importance of job
accessibility dates back to Kain (1968), arguing that the geographic location of jobs
and job seekers can have important implications for labor market outcomes; recent
empirical evidence in Andersson et al. (2018b) supports this hypothesis.
The program also could have had an adverse effect. Home and neighborhood
environment could have worsened if the program forced people from their homes
without providing proper relocation support. In addition, by dispersing residents
that previously lived close to one another, the program could have disrupted social
networks. Indeed, this was a major concern for residents like George Moses, a former
long-time resident of public housing and the Chair of the Board of Directors of the
National Low Income Housing Coalition, who spoke in objection to the HOPE VI
program at a congressional hearing in 2007: “in my neighborhood, people would
gather to talk, watch one another’s children, and form strong bonds. When we tear
these neighborhoods apart, [. . . ] the impact is both immediate and long-lasting.”
13Quotes are from NCSDPH (1992).
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The existing empirical research on HOPE VI is largely descriptive but it suggests
that the program had limited success in achieving its short-term goals. Popkin et al.
(2004; 2009) find that households affected by HOPE VI experienced large changes
in housing and most households moved to neighborhoods with lower poverty rates
and less crime, and reported being more satisfied with their new neighborhoods,
particularly if they received vouchers. However, most research finds little evidence
that HOPE VI affected the short-term labor market outcomes of adults (Goetz 2010;
Jones and Paulsen 2011; Popkin et al. 2009) or the health, education or behavioral
outcomes of the children (Gallagher and Bajaj 2007). A limitation of this research is
that it primarily documents how outcomes changed over time for households exposed
to the program. This is particularly problematic in the HOPE VI setting because,
even in absence of demolitions, households in public housing exhibit a high degree of
residential mobility (McClure 2018). Jacob (2004) is an exception to this descriptive
work, obtaining credible causal estimates of the demolition of public housing projects
by comparing outcomes for children who resided in buildings that were demolished to
children who resided in buildings that were not demolished but were located within
the same project. Jacob (2004) finds no evidence of short-term gains in educational
outcomes. In the only research on the long-term outcomes of demolitions for children,
Chyn (2018) uses a similar empirical strategy and finds positive impacts on adult labor
market outcomes. These results suggest that a lack of short-term impacts does not
preclude the possibility of longer-term effects on labor market outcomes. However,
the results from Jacob and Chyn may not be representative of the HOPE VI program
as a whole since their sample is limited to public housing residents in Chicago. An
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important contribution of our paper is to obtain more representative estimates of
the impact of the HOPE VI program by studying 160 demolitions that occurred in
diverse environments across the U.S. In contrast to Jacob (2004) and Chyn (2018), we
observe a great deal of variation in project and neighborhood characteristics within
our empirical sample. This enables us to empirically assess how the impact of the
HOPE VI program differed across projects located in heterogeneous pre-program
contexts.
2.3 Description of the Data
The data requirements for this project are substantial. We need to be able to identify
children and parents affected by public housing project demolitions, track exposed
and non-exposed residents as they move across subsidized housing programs and
neighborhoods, and match the children’s housing and residential experiences to their
labor market outcomes as adults. We overcome these challenges by combining two
key data sources: (1) HUD-PIC (Public and Indian Housing Information Center)
administrative records of participation in subsidized housing, and (2) the Census
Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Infrastructure Files,
an administrative records system for employer-employee matched data. Below, we
describe these sources and discuss how we integrate them to construct our sample.
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2.3.1 Data Sources
HUD-PIC tracks public housing and voucher recipients during our study period. As
part of their housing occupancy verification process, PHAs provide HUD with the
identities of residents, which HUD then compiles into an annual relational database.
Absent the coverage limitations we discuss below, these files record every individ-
ual participating in public or voucher housing in each year between 1997 and 2010.
Our analysis makes use of the individual- and household-level files, which include
indicators of housing type (public or voucher), identifiers for housing authorities and
projects, as well as some individual- and household-level demographic information.
HUD provides a public use summary of these data through the HUDUSER web tool,
which we use to calculate PHA-level characteristics.
Data from the LEHD program are based on two sources provided by states on a
quarterly basis: (1) unemployment insurance (UI) wage records, providing the earn-
ings of each worker at each employer, and (2) employer account reports providing
establishment-level data, also known as the Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages (and formerly as the ES-202 program).14 The state-provided data cover more
than 95 percent of wage and salary civilian jobs, including both private sector and
state and local government workers. Some omissions remain, including the armed
forces, earnings through self-employment, the postal service, family workers, federal
14The LEHD program, a partnership that has been established between the Census Bureau, all 50
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, produces public use
data tabulations that are widely used by state and local governments such as: Quarterly Workforce
Indicators, LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (LODES), and Job-to-Job Flows. For
a description of the LEHD Infrastructure Files, see Abowd et al. (2004). For a description of files
available in the Federal Statistical Research Data Centers, see Vilhuber (2018).
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workers, and some non-profit and agricultural workers (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics 1997, 2017). Nevertheless, the LEHD earnings data enable us to track a large set
of children into adulthood and measure their earnings and employment outcomes as
well as these outcomes for the parents of these children.15 The coverage extends from
the beginning of state reporting through the last quarter of 2016.16
Another strength of our data is our ability to track the residential location of
households who leave subsidized housing. We do this using two sources of data. First,
we use a measure of annual residential location from the Composite Person Record
(CPR), a Census Bureau file created from several federal administrative datasets,
which begins in 1999.17 We identify a residence census tract for each child and adult
from 1999-2010 where available (approximately 10 percent of children are missing
a CPR residence in each year). Second, we use responses from the 2010 Decennial
Census to identify where individuals lived in April 2010. These responses provide
an additional data source covering geographic residence of each individual, and also
allow us to determine whether that individual is incarcerated in 2010.
We also draw on a number of different publicly available data sources. Most impor-
tantly, we characterize the neighborhoods in which individuals live and projects are
15Specifically, we measure outcomes for the head of households as identified in the HUD-PIC data.
Most children (92 percent) grow up in single-parent households in the HOPE VI sample.
16We code earnings as missing if the state in which their project is located was not yet reporting
in the LEHD. However, the vast majority of states are reporting to the LEHD by 2005, which is
the earliest year in which we measure age 26 earnings for the children. For the small fraction of
children who have missing age 26 earnings, we impute these values using earnings from later years.
Specifically, we use a panel of non-missing earnings data for all children between ages 18 and 30 to
estimate a regression of annual earnings on an individual fixed effect and a third order polynomial
in age interacted with gender. We use the estimates to impute missing earnings data at ages 18-26.
17The LEHD uses the CPR for imputation models and for the residence component of the LEHD
Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (LODES) data (for more information on the sources con-
tributing to the CPR, see Graham et al. 2017).
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located using a number of different files including: census tract-level characteristics
drawn from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Decennial Censuses and five-year-average data
from the American Community Survey collected between 2008 and 2012;18 county-
level unemployment rates from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Un-
employment Statistics program; area median income and characteristics of PHAs in
1997 from HUD USER; the number of jobs per census tract in 2010, by workplace and
residence, from LODES; school proficiency and jobs proximity indexes constructed
using data from 2013-2014 and provided through HUD Open Data (the job proximity
index is based on LODES); land areas as well as crosswalks between various measures
of geographies from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Geography Relationship Files; and the
Census Bureau Gazeteer files to measure the latitude and longitude of the centroid
of census tracts.19 We use the Consumer Price Index-Urban to convert all dollar
amounts into 2000 dollars.
2.3.2 Integration and Sample Selection
Our sample construction begins by using the HUD-PIC records to identify children
between the ages of 10 and 18 who lived in public housing between 1997 and 2001.
The range of years is selected because 1997 is the earliest year when reliable HUD
microdata are available and 2001 is the date of the last HOPE VI demolition.20 The
18Obtained from the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS) from IPUMS;
see Ruggles et al. (2019).
19In a small number of cases, neighborhood-level data are missing for certain variables. In order
to avoid changes in the sample composition based on the variables used in the analysis, we impute
using higher levels of geography. For example, if a variable is missing for a given census tract, we
impute the value with county-level value.
20As discussed later in this section, we set the “demolition date” two years prior to the award
date.
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age range is chosen to allow us to observe earnings up through age 26 for all children
in the sample.21 We choose to focus on age 26 earnings in our main results since
most children will have completed their education by this date and work by Chetty et
al. (2014) finds that outcomes measured at this age are strongly predictive of later-
life measures of labor market success. We then attach data from the LEHD, CPR
and 2010 Decennial Census to each record from the HUD-PIC data.22 An analogous
dataset is constructed using the household heads of the children in the sample.
We construct a dataset of public housing projects that describes characteristics of
the residents and the neighborhoods in which they are located. To identify the set of
projects that received a HOPE VI demolition grant, we start from publicly available
data that lists all 285 HOPE VI demolition grant awards.23 We make several sample
restrictions to the full list of projects to exclude those that are not well-suited for our
study design (such as excluding senior housing). These sample restrictions, described
in Table B.1, reduce the analysis sample to about 160 projects that received HOPE
VI demolitions awards.24 Implementing a similar set of restrictions produces a sample
of about 8,800 non-HOPE VI projects.25
21There is one cohort of children, 10-year-olds who appear in public housing in 2001, for whom we
do not observe age 26 earnings because our earning data are only available through 2016. For this
cohort, we use observed earnings up through age 25 to impute their earnings at age 26. Specifically,
we use a panel of non-missing earnings data for all children between ages 18 and 30 to estimate
a regression of annual earnings on an individual fixed effect and a third order polynomial in age
interacted with gender. We use the estimates to impute missing earnings data at age 26.
22Individuals are identified by a “Protected Identification Key” (PIK) generated by the Census
personally identified information, allowing us to attach LEHD data to other data sources. PIKs are
linked to approximately 98 percent of person records in the HUD-PIC member file for our study
period and we drop the 2 percent of individuals that are not assigned a unique PIK.
23For the HOPE VI demolition grant list, see: HOPE VI DEMOLITION GRANTS: FY 1996 -
2003 (available at https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DOC 9890.PDF, dated October 2004).
24Throughout the paper we often report rounded numbers to limit risk of disclosure.
25Specifically, based on the restrictions defined in Table B.1, we apply the following sample restric-
tions to the non-HOPE VI projects: 1, 5, 6, and 7. Data from HUDUSER indicate that in 1997 there
were about 13,400 projects in the U.S. (excluding territories) and about 10,100 projects that were
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Our primary analysis dataset combines the project- and individual-level data to
create a file in which the unit of observation is at the individual-year level, where an
individual will appear in the sample for every year that they appear in public housing.
We define the “reference year” as the year in which the individual appears in public
housing. We drop individual-year observations that appear in the HOPE VI projects
in years in which the demolition did not occur whereas we retain all observations
from non-HOPE VI projects.26 Thus, the reference year for the HOPE VI sample is
simply the year of the demolition. This produces a sample with 1,682,000 child-year
observations and 1,023,000 household head-year observations.
To identify treated individuals, we need to determine who was living in the project
at the time of the demolition. However, identifying the timing of the demolition is
complicated by the fact that the PHA may have started to move households out of the
project prior to the physical demolition of the building. To address this possibility,
we classify households as treated if they resided in a HOPE VI project two years
prior to the award date.27 To simplify language, we refer to the two years prior to
the award date as the year in which the demolition occurred. We view this definition
of timing as conservative as it minimizes the chances that our estimated treatment
within our size range (between 15 and 3,000 occupied units) that were not senior citizen housing.
Thus, even though we lack data on some PHAs that participated in the Moving To Work (MTW)
demonstration, our sample appears to cover most of the comparable public housing projects.
26We drop projects that received a HOPE VI Revitalization grant but did not receive a HOPE
VI Demolition grant, as households in these projects were treated by a different, but closely related
program. For the non-HOPE VI sample, we drop individual-year observations who previously ap-
peared in a HOPE VI project. This restriction prevents us from using individuals who moved out
of HOPE VI projects and into other public housing projects as control observations.
27Because the HUD-PIC data start in 1997, any HOPE VI projects that have an award date prior
to 1999 are assigned a demolition year of 1997. The decision to retain the early awardees is in part
motivated by reports that there were longer delays between grant awards and demolitions for these
projects (GAO 2003). In Appendix B.2 we show that our results are robust to how we treat projects
that received HOPE VI grants prior to 1999.
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effects are contaminated by selection out of the project prior to the demolition while
potentially underestimating the effect if the demolition does not occur until a later
time. To evaluate this definition, Figure 2.1 presents changes in project size relative
to this demolition date.28 The figure shows similar trends in project size for HOPE
VI and non-HOPE VI projects prior to demolition, with HOPE VI projects declining
in size for several years thereafter.
Another related issue apparent from Figure 2.1 is that some of the projects were
only partially demolished. While a substantial portion of the households in HOPE VI
projects were forced out within five years of the demolition, our sample does include
some households who resided in undemolished units and remained in their original
housing units. We include these households in the sample as our view is that they
are still “treated” by the program since the demolition could have affected the people
or characteristics of the neighborhood in which the HOPE VI project was located.29
2.4 Empirical Strategy
Our primary goal is to estimate the average effect of HOPE VI demolitions on young
adult (age 26) labor market outcomes for children affected by the program–the average
treatment effect on the treated. The challenge is that, by design, the projects demol-
ished under HOPE VI were systematically different from those that were not. This
is readily apparent from Table 2.1, which presents the mean and standard deviations
28We measure changes in project size using the number of occupied units in the HUD-PIC house-
hold file.
29Indeed, in Section 2.5 we find that the neighborhood in which the project was located is affected
in important ways by the demolitions. Furthermore, we find no evidence that the impacts on adult
earnings are different for complete versus partial demolitions (see Appendix B.2).
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Figure 2.1: Changes in Project Size Relative to Year of Demolition
Notes: The figure plots the average DHS growth rate (see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh
1996) in project size between the reference year and x years after the reference year, where
x corresponds to the value on the horizontal axis. The growth rate in project size between




. For HOPE VI projects, the reference
year is the year of the demolition, which is defined as the greater of two years prior to the
award year and 1997. Averages are calculated using the child-year dataset, implying that
the averages are weighted by project size.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics,
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
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of baseline characteristics for projects and residents of HOPE VI and non-HOPE VI
projects as well as the differences between two samples. Along almost every observ-
able dimension, children growing up in HOPE VI projects are more disadvantaged.
For example, HOPE VI projects are in census tracts with 52 percent higher poverty
rates, the residents have 20 percent lower total annual household income and are
almost 50 percent less likely to have a married head of household.
Given these pronounced observable differences and the lack of experimental vari-
ation, our empirical strategy aims to estimate causal impacts by accounting for ob-
servable baseline differences between HOPE VI and non-HOPE VI projects. We
argue that this is a reasonable approach in our context because the number of dis-
tressed, eligible projects greatly exceeded the number of HOPE VI awardees and our
data infrastructure enables us to observe and characterize the conditions in nearly all
public housing projects in the U.S. Thus, there is a large sample of non-HOPE VI
projects that are informative of what would have happened to the residents of HOPE
VI projects had there been no demolitions. In order to estimate the causal impacts
of the Demolition program, we employ the stratification with regression estimator
proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1984) and discussed at length in Imbens
and Rubin (2015) and Imbens (2015). The method combines features of both match-
ing and regression in the following steps: (1) nearest-neighbor matching to trim the
sample, (2) groups similar observations into distinct strata based on an estimated
propensity score, (3) estimates strata-level treatment effects using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regressions with controls within strata, and (4) calculates aggregate
treatment effects as a weighted average of the stratum-level estimates.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Baseline Characteristics
HOPE VI All Non-HOPE VI Control
mean mean t-stat ∆ mean t-stat ∆
Panel A. Neighborhood
median household income/1,000 22.0 27.9 -6.68 -0.520 22.9 -0.936 -0.085
[11.1] [11.5] [10.3]
poverty rate 0.374 0.247 7.84 0.724 0.346 1.60 0.146
[.206] [.14] [.181]
log(population density) 0.033 -1.24 11.2 0.703 -0.153 1.43 0.122
[1.42] [2.13] [1.63]
Panel B. Household Head
household income/1,000 9.00 11.3 -6.93 -0.515 9.65 -1.77 -0.174
[6.63] [8.63] [7.31]
age 38.6 39.3 -2.36 -0.167 38.6 -0.096 -0.054
[10.1] [10.1] [10]
female 0.904 0.869 2.46 0.409 0.899 0.338 0.044
[.294] [.338] [.301]
married 0.078 0.133 -4.52 -0.436 0.081 -0.241 -0.014
[.268] [.34] [.273]
has disability 0.113 0.121 -1.64 -0.063 0.111 0.284 -0.003
[.316] [.326] [.314]
number of dependents 2.76 2.54 4.24 0.454 2.63 2.27 0.273
[1.56] [1.4] [1.46]
white non-Hispanic 0.064 0.207 -12.0 -0.709 0.079 -1.16 -0.034
[.244] [.405] [.27]
black non-Hispanic 0.684 0.522 3.67 0.660 0.692 -0.151 0.041
[.465] [.5] [.462]
Hispanic 0.161 0.184 -0.575 -0.083 0.152 0.206 -0.056
[.368] [.387] [.359]
Panel C. Children
age 13.6 13.6 -2.33 -0.288 13.5 0.300 -0.232
[2.58] [2.57] [2.58]
female 0.509 0.507 0.431 -0.137 0.512 -0.631 -0.124
[.5] [.5] [.5]
has disability 0.020 0.027 -2.79 -0.077 0.020 -0.011 -0.020
[.14] [.161] [.14]
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the baseline variables listed in the rows. The variables in Panel
A, B and C are characteristics of: (A) the census tract in which the projects were located measured in 1990, (B)
the households or head of households and (C) the children. Column 1 presents the mean for the HOPE VI sample.
Columns 2-4 (5-7) present statistics calculated from a sample that include all non-HOPE VI (control) projects.
Columns 2 and 5 present the mean of the non-HOPE VI projects. Columns 3 and 6 present the t-statistic from
a regression of the baseline variable in the row on an indicator for HOPE VI. Standard errors are clustered at
the project level. Columns 4 and 7 present the normalized difference of the row variable between the HOPE VI
and non-HOPE VI observation. Normalized differences are calcualted from data collapsed to the project level and




0)/2), where x̄d and sd is the sample average and variance for HOPE VI
(d=1) and non-HOPE VI (d=0) observations, respectively. The standard deviation for each sample is presented
in brackets below the mean.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, Department of Housing
and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
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There are three principal advantages of the stratification with regression estimator
over the more traditional OLS estimator. First, trimming the sample and using the
stratification structure helps us relax the linear functional form assumptions implicit
in OLS. As a rule of thumb, linear regression techniques will tend to be sensitive
to the specification when the value of normalized differences between the treatment
and control groups exceed one-quarter (Imbens and Woolridge 2009).30 Table 2.1
demonstrates that many important baseline variables have normalized differences
that exceed this threshold.31 Second, many choices on how to adjust for observable
differences between HOPE VI and non-HOPE VI projects are governed by the data,
which helps mitigate concerns that the choice of specification is influenced by ex-post
analysis of results. Third, the stratification with regression methodology presents a
number of ways in which we can evaluate the plausibility of the identifying assump-
tions, some of which are specific to the method and have no clear analogue under
OLS. These are discussed in Section 2.5.3.
Construction of the strata is implemented in three steps. First, we trim the sam-
ple of non-HOPE VI projects to reduce the observable differences between the HOPE
VI and non-HOPE VI samples. To do so, we start with a project-level dataset that
includes all projects after imposing the restrictions mentioned in Section 2.3.32 We
use a project-level, as opposed to an individual-level dataset because the treatment
30Let x̄d and sd be the mean and standard deviation of the variable x for the HOPE VI (d=1)






31The solid line in Figure B.2 makes a similar point by presenting the distribution of the normalized
differences for all baseline variables calculated on the full sample.
32Project-level characteristics are measured in the year of the demolition for HOPE VI projects,
whereas for non-HOPE VI projects they are equal to the average of observed values between 1997
and 2001.
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is assigned at the project-level. For each HOPE VI project, we use nearest neighbor-
hood matching to identify and retain the five nearest neighbors among the non-HOPE
VI projects. Matching is conducted with replacement; distance is measured using the
Euclidean distance metric based on observable project and neighborhood character-
istics (see Appendix B.4 for list of variables used in matching); and we require exact
matching on the size (large or small) of the PHA. The resulting dataset, which we
refer to as the matched sample, contains all 160 HOPE VI projects and a subsample
of 570 matched non-HOPE VI projects, which we refer to as control projects.
We thus drop non-HOPE VI projects that are fundamentally different and unlikely
to be informative of counterfactual outcomes for HOPE VI residents. The dashed line
in Figure B.2 illustrates the success of this trimming by presenting the distribution
of the normalized differences of all baseline variables in the matched sample. The
differences are much smaller relative to those calculated in the full sample with nearly
all smaller than one-quarter. The final three columns of Table 2.1 make a similar point
by presenting summary statistics and difference measures for HOPE VI and matched
controls for a subset of important baseline variables. This step does not reduce the
external validity of the estimates since we retain all HOPE VI projects and our goal
is to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated.
In the second step, we estimate a project-level propensity score defined as the
probability that a project receives a HOPE VI Demolition grant, conditional on ob-
servable characteristics. To determine the covariates included in the propensity score
model, we use a data-driven method described by Imbens and Rubin (2015). Specif-
ically, we start by estimating a logistic regression of receipt of HOPE VI on a set of
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covariates that we think are important for predicting treatment (average household
income and the proportion of household heads who are black non-Hispanic). Next,
we estimate a separate logistic regression for each baseline variable that we consider
adding to the model and calculate the log likelihood for each logistic regression. If the
value of the log likelihood ratio test statistic for a given set of covariates is larger than
it is for the models with the other potential covariates and sufficiently greater than
the initial log likelihood, then we include the covariate in the model.33 We iteratively
apply this procedure until no more covariates are selected. We then create interac-
tion terms between all the selected covariates and repeat this process to determine
which second-order terms to include in the model. Figure 2.2 plots the distribution of
the linearized estimated propensity score for HOPE VI and control projects.34 The
figures indicate that there is good overlap between the estimated propensity scores of
the treated and control projects.
In the third step we use a data-driven method to group projects into distinct strata
based on the estimated propensity score. We start by separating the projects into
two strata based only on PHA size (small and large). This distinction is motivated
by the fact that HUD differentiated between these PHAs in the application process.
However, it also has the added benefit of avoiding comparisons between individuals
who reside in fundamentally different economic environments (e.g., a comparison
of someone living in a rural county to an individual living in major metropolitan
area). We then expand the number of strata for each initial large- and small-stratum.
33We include additional first-order (second-order) terms only if the likelihood ratio statistic for
the test of the null hypothesis that the additional covariate is equal to zero exceeds 2.5 (4.21).
34As a confidentiality protection measure, we Winsorize each distribution at the 5th and 95th































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The adequacy of the existing strata is assessed by calculating a t-statistic for each
stratum where the null hypothesis is that the average value of the estimated linearized
propensity score is the same for the treated and control projects in that stratum. If
the null hypothesis is rejected (i.e. the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeds 1.645),
then the stratum is split into two new strata by grouping projects above and below
the median linearized propensity score.35 The newly generated strata are required to
have at least 3 HOPE VI and control projects and 50 total projects in order to prevent
issues related to small sample sizes in the analysis.36 The process is then repeated until
either the null hypothesis of no difference between treatment and control projects in
the linearized propensity score is not rejected for any stratum, or splitting the stratum
at the median treatment project’s linearized propensity score would result in too few
projects in one of the newly generated strata. This process divides the sample into
seven distinct strata. On average, each stratum contains about 18,000 unique children
from 100 different projects, 15 percent of whom reside in HOPE VI projects. The
boundary points of the strata are depicted by the vertical lines in Figure 2.2 and
Table B.2 presents the sample size within each stratum.
This procedure does an excellent job of eliminating differences in observable char-
acteristics between control and treatment groups within each stratum. To demon-
strate this point, we regress 92 different baseline variables on an indicator for HOPE
VI within each of the seven strata and calculate a t-statistic to summarize the dif-
ferences between control and treatment observations (standard errors are clustered
35Let p denote the propensity score, then the linearized propensity score is defined as ln(p/(1-p)).
36We require 50 total projects in each stratum because we cluster standard errors at the project
level.
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at the project level). We plot the distribution of the absolute value of the resulting
644 t-statistics in Figure B.3 and compare it to the distribution one would expect
from the absolute value of t-statistics from a standard normal distribution. The fig-
ure illustrates that, if anything, there is more balance within stratum than would
be expected from random assignment. Table B.3 provides a more detailed view by
presenting the proportion of test statistics that have a p-value of less than 0.10 for
neighborhood-, project- and individual-level characteristics. If balance were good, we
would expect that the share of significant test statistics would be approximately 10
percent. For the most part, we find that this pattern applies. For example, column 6
of Table B.3 suggests that only 12 percent of the 276 p-values calculated within the
large PHA sample had a p-value of less than 0.10 and only 6.2 percent of 368 p-values
calculated within the small PHA sample had a p-value of less than 0.10.37
An advantage of this methodology is that many of the choices about how to
adjust for observable differences between HOPE VI and non-HOPE VI projects are
determined by the data. However, the method does depend on six tuning parameters,
which must be defined by the researcher.38 We chose a set of tuning parameters
37Without making any adjustments for multiple hypothesis testing, we should observe slightly
more than 10 percent of tests rejected at the 10 percent level.
38These parameters are: (1) the number of matches to use when trimming the sample, (2) the
threshold for the likelihood ratio test to include first-order terms for the estimation of the propensity
score, (3) the threshold for the likelihood ratio test to include second-order terms for the estimation
of the propensity score, (4) a threshold for the test statistic used to determine whether the esti-
mated propensity scores of control and treated projects are sufficiently similar within strata, (5) the
minimum number of control projects that must be included in each stratum and (6) the minimum
number of treated projects that must be included in each stratum. We view the first three tuning
parameters as both the most consequential, since they determine which projects serve as controls
for each HOPE VI project, and the most likely to require values specific to applications that differ
in number of observations and heterogeneity within the sample. Thus, we use standard values for
the fourth through sixth tuning parameters but select “optimal” values for the first through third
parameters.
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that robustly eliminates baseline differences between HOPE VI and control projects
within strata.39 There are two important considerations to note here. First, the
criteria used for selecting tuning parameters are only based on how well the method
eliminates observable differences between HOPE VI and control projects and do not
use the outcome variables. Thus, we avoid concerns of specification search. Second,
in practice our main findings are robust to alternative choices of tuning parameters
(see Appendix B.2).
Using the stratification structure, we implement our estimator in two steps. First,
we separately estimate the following OLS specifications within each of the strata:
yitps = αs +Dpδs +Xitpsβs + εitps (2.1)
where y is a labor market, neighborhood, or household outcome; i is the individual;
t is the year in which that individual appears in public housing; p is the project; s is
the stratum the project was assigned to in the first stage; D is an indicator equal to
one if the project received a HOPE VI demolition award; X is vector of observable
individual-, household-, project-, and neighborhood-level characteristics; and ε is an
error term which we cluster at the project level.40 Because the specifications are run
39To do this, we implement the stratification 33 different times using different values of the number
of matches (3, 5 or 7) and different values of the second and third tuning parameter. (As a rule
of thumb, Imbens and Rubin (2015) find 1.00 and 2.71 work well for the values of the second and
third tuning parameters. We vary the value of the second tuning parameter from 1.0 to 6.0 and set
the value of the third tuning parameter to 1.71 higher than the second.) We then create a score for
each iteration based on the resulting balance of all baseline covariates across HOPE VI and control
observations. We find balance is achieved most robustly when using five matches. Thus, we opt to
use the specification that delivers the best balance of baseline covariates (lowest-ranked score) when
using five matches.
40There are a small number of cases in which the outcome variable is missing. To avoid disclosure
issues related to releasing results from multiple sample, we impute these missing values with the
mean value in the control group and then include an interaction between an indicator for this
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within each stratum, all of the estimated coefficients are stratum-specific.
All specifications include controls for the year in which the individual appears in
public housing (with the HOPE VI individuals only appearing in one year), and a stan-
dard set of project-level controls that include characteristics of the project (average
total income of resident households, proportion black non-Hispanic, and proportion
of household heads that are female); area median income in 1990; characteristics of
census tract in 1990 (proportion on public assistance, median income, and poverty
rate); and the county-level unemployment rate in 1996.41 The standard vector of
individual-level covariates included in the specifications estimated on the child-level
dataset includes the interaction between sex and mutually exclusive race/ethnicity
categories (black non-Hispanic, white non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and other race or race
not specified non-Hispanic); the number of dependents in the household; household
size; an indicator for disability; a fixed effect for age at the time of appearing in public
housing; an indicator for whether the head of household has a disability; an indicator
for whether the household head is female; the marital status of head of household; the
age of the head of household, and total household income.42 While individuals from
HOPE VI projects only appear once in the sample, individuals from control projects
may appear multiple times in the sample with an observation for each year they ap-
imputation and treatment status in the regression. In this way imputed values do not contribute to
the identification of the treatment effect. In unreported results we estimate all specifications with
missing data without this imputation and confirm that the results are not materially different.
41The large number of individuals within each stratum allows us to include a large set of individual-
level controls in our stratum-level regressions. Since the number of projects per stratum is more
limited, we are careful to include a smaller number of project-level controls in the regression analysis.
42The standard vector of individual-level covariates included in the specifications estimated on the
household head-level dataset includes age, race, sex, number of dependents, household size, disability
status, marital status, and total household income.
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pear in public housing between 1997 and 2001. Nearly all of these individuals appear
in the same project and thus clustering standard errors at the project level allows us
to take these “duplicate” observation into account when calculating standard errors
with each stratum.43
The stratum-specific treatment effects are then aggregated across strata, using the
stratum’s share of the total of treated individuals as weights. Let N st be the number
of treated individuals in stratum s and Nt be the total of treated individuals across all
strata including both the large and small PHA groups. The weight for each stratum
is given by ws = N
s
t /Nt , and the estimate of the average treatment effect on the









where the weighted averages are taken across all S strata (S=7 for the main specifi-
cation).44
Our methodology will produce unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect
on the treated under the Conditional Independence Assumption; conditional on the
covariates and stratification in the model, assignment of a HOPE VI demolition is
43Appendix B.2 shows that our main results are robust to dropping all observations that appear
in more than one project and shows that the standard errors are not significantly affected by the
presence of these individuals.
44The implicit assumption needed to construct the standard errors is that observations across
strata are independent. We argue that this is reasonable based on the fact that no project appears
in more than one stratum and standard errors are clustered at the project level.
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as good as random. While this assumption is not empirically testable, we conduct
a number of analyses to assess its plausibility. Our method successfully eliminates
observable differences between HOPE VI and control projects, which provides some
initial support for the Conditional Independence Assumption. After presenting the
main results we discuss other checks intended to assess the validity of the empirical
approach.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Long-Run Effects on Children
Table 2.2 presents the main finding of the paper. On average, exposure to a HOPE
VI demolition led to substantial improvements in the long-run labor market outcomes
of the children who resided in those projects. Panel A presents the results pooling
across large and small PHAs. Columns 1-4 correspond to the estimates for four
different labor market outcomes measured in the year that the child turns 26: the
number of quarters worked, an indicator equal to one if earnings are strictly positive
in all four quarters, total earnings divided by 1,000, and the inverse hyperbolic sine
(IHS) of annual earnings.45 All coefficients are estimated using the stratification
with regression methodology, and the standard set of covariates used in the stratum-
level regressions. We find that, on average, the HOPE VI program increased age 26
earnings by 14.2 percent, annual earnings by $622, the number of quarters worked
45We use the IHS of earnings rather than the more traditional log of earnings because estimated
coefficients can be interpreted in the same way as with a log-transformed dependent variable but,
unlike with the log of earnings, IHS is defined for zero earnings. The IHS is defined as log[yi + (1 +
y2i )
0.5)] where yi is total earnings for individual i (see Burbidge et al. 1988).
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by 0.057, and the probability that an individual worked all four quarters by 1.6
percentage points. HOPE VI clearly had important positive impacts on adult labor
market outcomes.
While the overall impact of the program was positive, there is heterogeneity across
different housing environments. Panels B and C of Table 2.2 present results separately
for large and small PHAs. The positive impacts are generally stronger in large PHAs,
with differences that are often economically important in size. For example, the IHS
earnings specification suggests a 19.5 percent increase in age 26 earnings for children
in large PHAs and only a 4.5 percent increase for those in small PHAs.46 We provide
additional evidence below that there is meaningful heterogeneity by PHA size in the
effect of the program.
We explore heterogenous effects by child age at the time of the demolition, race,
and sex by estimating a model in which the indicator for HOPE VI is interacted with
these characteristics. Table 2.3 presents the resulting estimates for large PHAs.47
Column 1 indicates that the impacts of the program are no different for older and
younger children.48 Specifically, children exposed to HOPE VI when they were 10
years old experienced an earnings gain of 20.5 percent while this gain is 18.9 percent
for 18-year-olds; a difference that is neither economically or statistically significant.
46The long-run benefits found in large PHAs are robust to measuring earnings at alternative times.
Figure B.4 in Appendix B.1 presents estimates of the effect of HOPE VI on the IHS of earnings
measured between ages 18 and 26. The effect of the program grows over time, starting around zero
at age 18 and rising to about 0.2 by age 23, after which point the effects stabilize through age 26.
47Not surprisingly, we also find little evidence of heterogeneous effects in small PHAs. The one
exception is that there is some evidence that white children may have benefited more than non-white
children in small PHAs. See Appendix B.2 for details.
48In unreported results we also find that the lack of heterogeneous effects by age is robust to
estimating alternative specifications that employ project or household fixed effects.
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Table 2.2: Earnings Outcomes
qrtrs worked worked 4 qrtrs earnings / 1,000 IHS earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. All PHAs
HOPE VI 0.057*** 0.016*** 0.622** 0.142**
(0.021) (0.006) (0.282) (0.056)
control mean 2.16 0.404 8.33 6.3
[1.73] [0.482] [34] [4.53]
observations 258,000 258,000 258,000 258,000
Panel B. Large PHAs
HOPE VI 0.076*** 0.019*** 0.529* 0.195***
(0.027) (0.007) (0.287) (0.073)
control mean 2.14 0.4 8.44 6.24
[1.73] [0.481] [40.5] [4.55]
observations 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000
Panel C. Small PHAs
HOPE VI 0.022 0.009 0.794 0.045
(0.035) (0.009) (0.601) (0.087)
control mean 2.2 0.41 8.12 6.4
[1.72] [0.483] [16.4] [4.48]
observations 109,000 109,000 109,000 109,000
Notes: Panels A, B, and C present estimates from the stratification with regression estimator for
all, large, and small Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), respectively. All outcome variables are
annual labor market outcomes measured in the year in which the child turns 26. In columns 1-4
the outcome variables are: the number of quarters worked, an indicator equal to one if the child
had positive earnings for all four quarters, earnings/1,000 winsorized at the 99th percentile, and
the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of earnings. All stratum-level regressions control for the base
year in which the child appears in public housing, the year in which the child turns 26, and the
standard vector of individual- and project-level covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the
project level and are presented in parentheses. The mean and standard deviation, presented in
brackets, of the outcome for the control group are a weighted aggregate of stratum-level statistics,
where the weights are proportional to the number of treated individuals in a strata.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10.
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This offers some initial evidence that the impacts of the program are not driven by
differences in human capital accumulation from exposure to neighborhoods of varying
quality, at least through the exposure model typically considered in this literature (as
in Chetty et al. 2016; Chetty and Hendren 2018). Column 2 indicates that males
experience significantly larger earnings benefits while column 3 suggests that non-
white children also benefit more. While we do not have enough power to estimate
a model with the full set of interactions between race and sex, column 4 presents
estimates from a specification in which we compare the effects for non-white males to
all other children. We find that non-white males appear to be the primary beneficiaries
of the program.
2.5.2 Short- and Medium-Term Effects for Head of Households
To better understand the mechanisms through which HOPE VI demolitions affected
long-term labor market outcomes, we explore the short- and medium-term effects of
the program, starting with housing outcomes for households one, three, and five years
after the demolition. In Table 2.4, column 1 shows that HOPE VI led to a 15 and 18
percentage point reduction in the probability that the household head lives in the same
housing project five years after the demolition in large and small PHAs, respectively
(relative to 33 percent and 28 percent of control households remaining in their original
project). Column 2 and 3 indicate that HOPE VI pushed households into both
voucher and other public housing with a slightly larger shift into voucher housing.
Five years after the demolition, HOPE VI households in large housing authorities
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Table 2.3: Heterogeneous Effects by Demographics, for Large PHAs
IHS of Earnings at Age 26
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HOPE VI 0.189 0.071 -0.194 0.059
(0.119) (0.085) (0.236) (0.085)












observations 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000
Notes: The table presents estimates from the stratification with regression estimator for large
Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) only. The outcome variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine
(IHS) of annual earnings measured in the year the child turns 26. Each column presents results
from a seperate regression in which the inidcator for HOPE VI is interacted with a different
individual-level variable. Note that there are four mutually exclusive race/ethnicity categories,
including: white (non-Hispanic), black (non-Hispanic), Hispanic, and other non-Hispanic. All
stratum-level regressions control for the base year in which the child appears in public housing,
the year in which the child turns 26 and the standard vector of individual- and project-level
covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the project-level and are presented in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10.
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are 9.8 percentage points (98 percent) more likely to be in voucher housing and 5.9
percentage points (70 percent) more likely to be in a new public housing project;
the analogous figures in small housing authorities are 10.7 percentage points (106
percent) and 9 percentage points (134 percent) for voucher housing and new public
housing projects, respectively.
Column 4 of Table 2.4 illustrates that while there is evidence that households
were displaced from assisted housing one year after the demolition in large PHAs,
HOPE VI did not push households out of subsidized housing in the longer-run.49 We
emphasize that many households in HOPE VI projects did end up leaving subsidized
housing within a five-year period, but that the rate at which they did so was similar in
the control group–48.5 percent and 54.9 percent of control household heads departed
assisted housing within five years in large and small PHAs, respectively. This finding
is consistent with other work that finds high rates of turnover in low-quality public
housing projects (McClure 2018).
In addition to altering the type of housing, HOPE VI also increased the likelihood
of migration to new neighborhoods. Column 6 of Table 2.4 indicates that HOPE
VI increased the probability of moving to a new census tract five years after the
demolition by 13.0 and 17.2 percentage points in large and small PHAs, respectively.
49The category “other public” refers to individuals who appear in the HUD-PIC files but are not
in the same project or in voucher housing. The vast majority of these individuals are actually in
public housing but there may be a small percentage who participate in the Section 8 Moderate
Rehabilitation Program, which is the other assisted housing program covered by the HUD-PIC files.
In addition, the category “non-subsidized” refers to individuals who do not appear in the HUD-PIC
files. The HUD-PIC files cover both the public housing and voucher programs, which are by far the
largest programs subsidizing housing costs for renters. Thus, while there may some households in
this group that participate in other subsidized housing programs not covered in the HUD-PIC data,
the numbers are likely to be very small.
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Table 2.4: Household Head Housing Outcomes
Housing Type Moved to New
same project voucher other public non-subsidized county tract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Large PHAs
A1. 1 year after
HOPE VI -0.115*** 0.014*** 0.023* 0.077***
(0.028) (0.005) (0.013) (0.024)
control mean 0.754 0.026 0.035 0.185
A2. 3 years after
HOPE VI -0.135*** 0.085*** 0.062*** -0.011 -0.018** 0.085***
(0.024) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.033)
control mean 0.479 0.073 0.068 0.379 0.100 0.535
A3. 5 years after
HOPE VI -0.150*** 0.098*** 0.059*** -0.007 -0.029*** 0.130***
(0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.028)
control mean 0.332 0.099 0.084 0.485 0.142 0.646
observations 87,000 87,000 87,000 87,000 87,000 87,000
Panel B. Small PHAs
B1. 1 year after
HOPE VI -0.019 0.016*** 0.017** -0.014
(0.022) (0.006) (0.008) (0.020)
control mean 0.697 0.027 0.027 0.248
B2. 3 years after
HOPE VI -0.207*** 0.092*** 0.106*** 0.009 0.016 0.125***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.011) (0.030)
control mean 0.416 0.071 0.056 0.458 0.134 0.523
B2. 5 years after
HOPE VI -0.184*** 0.107*** 0.090*** -0.013 0.021 0.172***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.025)
control mean 0.283 0.101 0.067 0.549 0.171 0.621
observations 66,000 66,000 66,000 66,000 66,000 66,000
Notes: Panels A and B present estimates from the stratification with regression estimator for
large and small Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), respectively. Outcomes are measured: one
year after the refernce year in panels A1 and B1, three years after the reference year in panels A2
and B2, and five years after the reference year in panels A3 and B3. The outcomes in columns
1-4 are indicator variables with a value equal to one if the head of household appears in the
same project, other public housing, voucher housing, or other housing after the reference year
(categories are mutually exclusive). In columns 5-7 the outcomes are indicators equal to one
if the head of household moved to a new state, county, and census tract, respectively. Each
stratum-level regression contains a fixed effect for the base year in which the household appears
in public housing as well as the standard set of project- and individual-level covariates. Standard
errors are clustered at the project-level and are presented in parentheses. The mean and standard
deviation, presented in brackets, of the outcome for the control group are a weighted aggregate
of strata-level statistics, where the weights are proportional to the number of treated individuals
in a strata.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10.
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Column 5 indicates that these moves to new neighborhoods were typically occurring
without moves across county boundaries. The HOPE VI-induced residential mobility
is therefore extremely local.
Given this increased mobility of HOPE VI households, we examine the average
characteristics of the neighborhoods in which they resided between one and five years
after the demolition.50 Table 2.5 illustrates that, in both large and small PHAs,
HOPE VI did not lead households to move to higher quality neighborhoods as mea-
sured by census tract school quality and poverty rate, or to demographically distinct
neighborhoods as measured by the share of residents that are White non-Hispanic.
The estimated impacts on the school proficiency index are not statistically distin-
guishable from zero and less than 1 percent of the magnitude of a control group
standard deviation; similarly, while the point estimates for census tract poverty rates
are negative in both small and large PHAs, we are unable to reject the null of no effect
and they are only around 4 percent of the control group mean poverty rate in both
PHA size groups. This is partially consistent with existing evidence from Chicago:
Chyn (2018) finds evidence of short-term moves to more advantaged neighborhoods,
but he also finds that these effects fade quickly over time.
Finally, we estimate the effect of HOPE VI on labor market outcomes for the
head of household. Table 2.6 presents estimates of the impact of the program on
the number of quarters worked and the IHS of annual earnings measured five and
ten years after the demolition for the heads of household. We find no evidence that
50We find similar patterns if we instead use the timing as in Table 2.5 and measure characteristics
of neighborhoods 1, 3, and 5 years after the demolition.
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Table 2.5: Household Head Neighborhood Outcomes
school proficiency poverty rate share white
index non-Hispanic
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Large PHAs
HOPE VI 0.084 -0.017 0.022
(1.660) (0.012) (0.017)
control mean 23.900 0.416 0.192
[16.900] [0.181] [0.235]
observations 87,000 87,000 87,000
Panel B. Small PHAs
HOPE VI -0.497 -0.012 0.020
(2.130) (0.011) (0.022)
control mean 30.500 0.289 0.367
[20.200] [0.116] [0.303]
observations 66,000 66,000 66,000
Notes: Panels A and B present estimates from the stratification with regression estimator for
large and small Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), respectively. All outcomes are an average
characteristic of the census tracts in which the head of household resided in 1-5 years after the
reference year. The characteristic in column 1 is the school proficiency index, which measures
of the quality of the public schools in that area. In columns 2 and 3 the characteristics are the
share of residents who are below the poverty line and white non-Hispanic, respectively. Each
stratum-level regression contains a fixed effect for the base year in which the household appears
in public housing as well as the standard set of project- and individual-level covariates. Standard
errors are clustered at the project-level and are presented in parentheses. The mean and standard
deviation, presented in brackets, of the outcome for the control group are a weighted aggregate
of strata-level statistics, where the weights are proportional to the number of treated individuals
in a strata.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10.
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HOPE VI improved or depressed labor market outcomes for the parents. Together,
none of the results in this section suggest that the long-run benefits for children are
driven by measurable improvements in the home or neighborhood environment that
would be likely to affect human capital accumulation while young.
2.5.3 Assessing the Validity of the Empirical Strategy
As stated above, our ability to interpret the estimates as causal relies on the Condi-
tional Independence Assumption. While we have previously shown that the methodol-
ogy does a good job eliminating observable differences between HOPE VI and control
projects, it is still possible that the results are biased by unobserved differences or
functional form assumptions implicit in the stratum-level regressions. In this section
we implement three types of analyses to address these concerns: “pseudo treatment,”
“pseudo outcome,” and “sensitivity/robustness” analyses.
First, we implement a pseudo treatment analysis in which we define a group
of projects that were not affected by HOPE VI as pseudo treatment projects. We
then estimate pseudo treatment effects by re-implementing the full trimming and
stratification with regression method with the pseudo treatment group in place of
the true treatment group and omitting the true treatment group from the sample.
Estimating null effects for projects that, a priori, should not have systematically
different potential outcomes for resident children from comparable projects provides
evidence that the methodology is able to adequately correct for baseline differences.
This analysis is most convincing if the pseudo treatment projects are, absent exposure
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Table 2.6: Household Head Earnings Outcomes
5 Years After 10 Years After
qrtrs worked IHS earnings qrtrs worked IHS earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Large PHAs
HOPE VI -0.001 -0.065 -0.043 -0.134
(0.036) (0.092) (0.032) (0.082)
control mean 1.960 5.650 1.700 4.840
[1.810] [4.800] [1.840] [4.950]
observations 87,000 87,000 87,000 87,000
Panel B. Small PHAs
HOPE VI -0.005 0.011 0.001 0.004
(0.039) (0.099) (0.041) (0.109)
control mean 2.070 5.880 1.790 5.050
[1.810] [4.750] [1.860] [4.940]
observations 66,000 66,000 66,000 66,000
Notes: Panels A and B present estimates from the stratification with regression estimator for
large and small Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), respectively. All outcomes are annual
labor market outcomes of the head of household measured 5 and 10 years after the reference
year for columns 1-2 and 3-4, respectively. In odd and even numbered columns the outcome
variables are the number of quarters worked and the inverse hyperbolic since of annual earnings,
respectively. Each stratum-level regression contains a fixed effect for the base year in which the
household appears in public housing as well as the standard vector of project- and individual-level
covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the project-level and are presented in parentheses.
The mean and standard deviation, presented in brackets, of the outcome for the control group
are a weighted aggregate of strata-level statistics, where the weights are proportional to the
number of treated individuals in a strata.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10.
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to the HOPE VI program, more similar to the true HOPE VI treatment projects
than the full set of control projects. Thus, we implement the pseudo treatment
analysis using the set of projects that applied for but never received funding for the
HOPE VI Demolition or Revitalization programs.51 Table B.4 presents the estimated
effects of the pseudo treatment, which are never statistically different from zero and
standard errors are similar in size to those from our main results in Table 2.2. The
results indicate that after the matching methodology is applied to the group of failed
applicants, there is no evidence of positive bias.52 Thus, the pseudo treatment analysis
bolsters confidence in the validity of our methodology.
Second, we implement pseudo outcomes analyses. Here we select a variable mea-
sured prior to the demolition, designate it as a pseudo outcome, and re-implement
the trimming and stratification process after excluding any variable that is derived
from the pseudo outcome from being included in any other part of the matching or
regression analysis. For example, if household income were the pseudo outcome, we
would implement the matching and estimation of the propensity score without using
51There were too few failed applicants identified in the public data for only the demolitions pro-
gram, so we pooled applicants across the two programs. However, given that the two programs
targeted a similar group of projects and that the projects look similar along observable characteris-
tics at baseline, we argue that this is an informative exercise. Figure B.5 provides evidence to show
that failed applicants had similar observable characteristics to the HOPE VI demolition awardees
at baseline. Note that failed applicants were subject to the same set of restrictions as all other
non-HOPE VI projects.
52If anything, there appears to be a negative pseudo treatment effect, which could suggest that
HOPE VI projects are negatively selected relative to counterfactual projects and our main estimates
may provide lower bounds on the true effect of HOPE VI. Alternatively, these negative (statistically
insignificant) associations could be explained if the applicant projects were exposed to alternative,
less effective programs in place of HOPE VI. The fact that they might have been exposed to other
programs complicates the interpretation of the estimated effect of HOPE VI when the failed appli-
cants are included in the set of controls. While we include the failed applicants in our set of potential
controls, in practice they make up only small portion of the matched sample used to estimate the
main results. Indeed, our results are robust to excluding failed applicants from the set of matched
controls.
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the average income at the project level. We then use the stratification with regression
estimator to estimate a pseudo outcome effect in which the pseudo outcome is the
outcome variable and we include the full set of controls (excluding the pseudo out-
come). The results from these analyses are displayed in Table B.5. Each row presents
the results for one of the 18 pseudo outcomes, with columns 1-3 presenting estimates
for the large, small, and pooled samples, respectively. Overall, the results confirm
the ability of the methodology to remove differences between HOPE VI and control
projects. Column 3 indicates that only 2 of the 18 pseudo outcome estimates are
statistically significant when pooling across housing authority sizes. We do, however,
reject the null of no pseudo outcome effect for household income. This likely indicates
that household income is a critical variable in the matching process for which there
is not a close substitute.
Third, we assess the robustness of the estimates to alternative variables used in
the regression adjustment. Table B.6 presents estimates of the effect of HOPE VI
for four different specifications that either (1) use the baseline stratification structure
or simply define two strata by large and small PHAs and (2) do or do not include
covariates in the model. Column 3 and 4 use the baseline stratification structure
but do and do not include covariates in the model, respectively. For large PHAs,
the estimated effect of HOPE VI on the IHS of earnings at age 26 is 0.157 without
controls compared to 0.195 with controls.53 For small PHAs, estimates with and
without controls are similarly small across the two specifications (0.005 and 0.045).
53While the point estimate is smaller in column 3 (the specification that uses the stratification
structure without covariate adjustment) relative to column 4 (the baseline specification), the estimate
would be statistically significant if the standard error from the main specification were used to
conduct the hypothesis test.
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Thus, once the stratification structure is implemented, the main role of the covariates
in the model is to increase precision. This finding suggests that the choice of which
covariates are included in the stratum-level regressions and how they are included
(functional form) are not driving the results. In addition, the similarity between the
standard errors in column 2 and 4 mitigates concerns related to inadequate sample
sizes for clustering standard errors at the project level within strata and to individuals
in control projects appearing in multiple projects across distinct strata.54
2.5.4 Mechanisms
What are the mechanisms through which HOPE VI affected long-run labor market
outcomes? In other research that finds long-term labor market benefits of exiting
public housing when young, Chyn (2018) and Chetty et al. (2016) find evidence of
an exposure model: environment shapes the development of human capital with an
influence that is increasing in the duration of exposure and particularly important for
young children. However, the evidence presented in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 is inconsis-
tent with the exposure model in our context. Specifically, we find no direct evidence
that HOPE VI improved childhood environment by increasing the earnings of parents
or improving neighborhood quality along the dimensions typically considered by the
literature. Furthermore, we do not find larger impacts for children that were younger
at the time of the demolition, a finding that is central to the exposure model. While
the evidence suggests a different mechanism than is highlighted in the existing lit-
54Appendix Table B.7 shows that the main results are also robust to using OLS and restricting
the sample of control projects to: 1) projects in the same PHA as a HOPE VI project, or 2) projects
that applied for but did not receive HOPE VI funding. See Appendix B.2 for details.
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erature, our results do not conflict with the exposure model findings. Our analysis
focuses on older children–between the ages of 10-18 at the time of the demolition–for
which prior research has found limited potential for exposure effect-type mechanisms.
Additionally, MTO provided assistance for households to facilitate moves to lower
poverty neighborhoods and explicitly required moves to lower poverty neighborhoods
in the experimental treatment arm. No similar incentives existed for the households
affected by the HOPE VI program. It is possible that we would see exposure effects
for younger cohorts of children, or if the program at study had included more encour-
agement for beneficiaries to move to higher quality neighborhoods, as was the case
with MTO.
Changes in the exposure to, or involvement in, criminal activity is another mech-
anism that both motivated the creation of the HOPE VI program and has been
explored in the literature on neighborhood effects. While our measures related to
crime are admittedly limited, we do not find any evidence that HOPE VI affected the
likelihood of incarceration. Following the methodology of Andersson et al. (2018a),
we link individuals to the 2010 Decennial Census File to determine whether they
reside in an adult correctional facility at the time of the survey. Table B.8 indicates
that the effect of HOPE VI increased the probability of being incarcerated in 2010
by 0.001 and 0.005 in large and small PHAs, respectively. These effects are both
economically and statistically insignificant.55
Rather than affecting the environment in which the children grew up, HOPE VI
55In unreported results, we show that this null result also holds when limiting the sample to males,
who are at higher risk of being incarcerated.
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could have affected labor market outcomes by instead influencing where they live
as young adults. We investigate this possibility by studying residential outcomes
of the children measured in 2010.56 As a starting point we estimate a number of
specifications in which the outcome variable is an indicator equal to one if the distance
between the project and the location of residence in 2010 exceeds some threshold. The
results are presented in Figure 2.3. In both large and small PHAs, HOPE VI pushed
children away from the neighborhoods in which their projects were located, but the
resulting moves were quite local. About one-half of all children lived within five miles
of their project in 2010, and HOPE VI increased the likelihood of moving to a new
neighborhood within a 5-mile radius of the project but had no discernible effect on
moving farther away. Thus, while HOPE VI induced households to move, it did not
increase the likelihood that they moved far from their original locations.
It is possible that HOPE VI could have affected labor market outcomes by dis-
persing residents and breaking apart peer groups. Such disruptions could be either
beneficial or detrimental, depending on the characteristics of the network. To in-
vestigate this, we use residential location in 2010 to measure the distance between
adult children and each of their former public housing co-residents. We create four
variables to characterize network dispersion: the average log distance to all former
56We focus on 2010 because we are best able to measure residential location by combining data
from both the 2010 Decennial Census and the CPR. The children are between the ages of 19 and
31 in 2010 and thus these measures of residential location may not correspond exactly to where
children are living when we measure their earnings at age 26. However, we do not think this is a
major concern because most children will be in their mid-twenties at this time and, as shown in
Figure B.4, the effect of the program in Large PHAs starts at around zero at age 18 but increases
to about 0.2 by age 23, after which point the effects stabilize through age 26. The longitude and
latitude from the internal points of the census tract (the centroid) are from Census Bureau Gazetteer

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































co-residents and the share of former residents who live within a 1-, 3-, and 5-mile
radius. The results, presented in Table B.9, suggest that HOPE VI did not disperse
residents geographically in large PHAs. While these are coarse measures, the results
provide no evidence that HOPE VI improved labor market outcomes by disrupting
peer groups formed in public housing. Note that these results are not inconsistent
with those presented in Figure 2.3 since affected households could have remained
spatially close if they moved to a nearby neighborhood after the demolition.
HOPE VI could also have influenced children’s subsequent labor supply decisions
by affecting the probability that children live in subsidized housing or with their
parents as young adults. However, the results in column 3 of Table B.8 indicate that
HOPE VI had no detectable effect on the probability of being in subsidized housing
in 2010; similarly, columns 4 and 5 show that the program had no detectable impact
on living near or with parents.
We do find, however, that the program led to a meaningful change in some of the
characteristics of the neighborhoods where the children lived as young adults. We
estimate the effect of HOPE VI on six characteristics of the census tract in which the
individual resided in 2010 including poverty rate, employment rate, a measure of labor
market networks (observed network isolation), and three measures of the geographic
proximity to jobs (the log of the ratio of jobs to people, the average commute time and
a job proximity index that captures the “the accessibility of a given neighborhood as a
function of its distance to all job locations within a [Core-Based Statistical Area]”).57
57For a description of the job proximity index see: http://hudgis-
hud.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/jobs-proximity-index. The underlying measure is the same
as Shen (1998) and Wang (2007) and is similar to that in Andersson et al. (2018b), though it uses
distance for the impedance function rather than travel time. The values of this underlying measure
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The results, presented in Table 2.7, illustrate that, within large PHAs, HOPE VI
lead to an improvement in the geographic proximity to jobs along all three measures
considered. In contrast, there is no evidence that HOPE VI moved children to better
neighborhoods in terms of poverty, employment rate, or network isolation. In small
PHAs, there is no evidence that HOPE VI improved geographic proximity to jobs, and
even some evidence that it led individuals to live in areas with lower job proximity.
Were HOPE VI-induced moves substantial enough to plausibly generate the im-
provements in job proximity? While these moves tended to be to nearby neighbor-
hoods, moving short distances could still lead to large improvements in job proximity;
the housing projects in the sample were often located in neighborhoods that were es-
pecially geographically isolated from jobs, even relative to nearby neighborhoods.
This can be seen in Figure 2.4, which presents the average commute time, poverty
rate and population density in 1990 (before all demolitions) for housing projects by
treatment status (HOPE VI and control), PHA size (large and small), and distance to
a sample project (whether HOPE VI or control). In large PHAs, the public housing
residents (of both HOPE VI and control projects) had substantially higher commute
times, poverty rates, and population densities relative to residents of surrounding
neighborhoods.58 Thus, it is plausible that even the local moves induced by HOPE
are percentile ranked with values ranging from 0 to 100 and higher values indicates neighborhoods
with better access to jobs. The job proximity index is constructed by HUD using data from LODES
(based on LEHD) for 2014. The observed network isolation index measures, for employed residents
of a tract, the share of their co-workers who are also neighbors, where high values of this variable
could arise if information on job opportunities disseminate through local networks (see Hellerstein
et al. 2011 and Hellerstein et al. 2019).
58The average commute time is the best available measure of job proximity prior to the demolitions.
The job proximity index is not available during this time period since the LEHD data used to




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































VI could have shifted children into neighborhoods with better access to jobs.
HOPE VI neighborhoods were outliers in terms of both job proximity and poverty.
An important question then is how the program could have induced moves to new
neighborhoods that were better in terms of job accessibility but not poverty. One
potential explanation is that neighborhood poverty is more strongly (and negatively)
associated with housing prices than job accessibility. For the households participating
in public housing, meaningful housing price increases are likely to preclude them
from moving to a neighborhood. To assess this possibility, we use publicly available
data to identify all counties that contained a HOPE VI project. Within each of
these counties we construct population-weighted percentile ranks of neighborhoods
based on median rent, average commute time, and poverty rate as measured in 1990.
Columns 1-2 of Table B.10 present estimates from bivariate OLS regressions of average
commute time on median rent and neighborhood poverty on median rent. There are
two key findings from the estimates. First, poverty and median rent are strongly
negatively correlated; within a city, neighborhoods with a one percentile higher rank
in terms of median rent have a 0.53 and 0.41 percentile lower poverty rate rank in
large and small PHAs, respectively. The R-squared values from these regressions are
0.18 (in large PHAs) and 0.11 (in small PHAs). In contrast, there is no evidence that
neighborhoods with higher levels of job proximity are more expensive. In large PHAs
the R-squared from a regression of the average commute time rank on the median rent
rank is 0.003, and the point estimate is small, negative (-0.0189), and not statistically
distinguishable from zero.59 While the average commute time is an imperfect measure








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of job proximity, the lack of relationship between housing costs and job proximity is
robust to using the job proximity index constructed by HUD, which is available only
in 2010 (see columns 3-4 of Table B.10). The cross-sectional associations therefore
support the idea that while moves to neighborhoods with better job accessibility were
likely financially feasible for HOPE VI-affected households, higher housing prices may
have made moves to lower poverty neighborhoods more difficult. This is consistent
with evidence from of quasi-experimental (Collinson and Ganong 2018; Andersson
et al. 2018a), experimental (Patterson et al. 2004; Eriksen and Ross 2013; Jacob,
Ludwig, and Miller 2013), and observational (Susin 2002; Carlson et al. 2012) studies
on the Voucher program. An important caveat is that homes with similar rents in
more job-accessible neighborhoods may be lower quality (e.g. smaller), but absolute
housing cost may still be the most relevant decision factor for our sample.
In addition to forcing people to move to new neighborhoods, HOPE VI could
have also improved job accessibility for households that remained in their original
neighborhood or moved extremely short distances by altering the characteristics of
the original neighborhoods themselves. To explore this possibility, we measure the
average job proximity index of census tracts within half-mile radius bands from zero
to five miles around the project. We then attach these neighborhood-level measures to
the child-level dataset and implement the stratification with regression methodology
as before to estimate the effect of HOPE VI on the characteristics of these neighbor-
hoods. The results for large and small PHAs are presented in Figure 2.5. We see
no significant impacts on job proximity in small PHAs at any distance. For large
costs.
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PHAs, HOPE VI produced substantial improvements in the job proximity index for
the census tract in which the project was located, but these effects dissipate quickly
and there appears to be no impact on neighborhoods located farther than half a mile
away.60 That the effects dissipate quickly with distance is reassuring since we would
not expect the demolition of a public housing project to drastically transform the
population or job density in more distant neighborhoods.61
To investigate the origins of the effect on these neighborhood-level measures of job
proximity, we estimate the effect of HOPE VI on three characteristics of the census
tract in which the project was located: the log of the ratio of jobs to people, the
log of the density of jobs, and log of population density.62 The results, presented
in Table B.11, imply that, HOPE VI increased the ratio of jobs to people in large
PHAs by 22 percent, and that this impact was driven primarily by a reduction in
population density: HOPE VI reduced in population density by 62 percent, a finding
that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. HOPE VI is also associated
with a statistically insignificant 4.5 percent increase in job density. A reduction in
population density will increase job accessibility by reducing the number of competing
searchers in the local labor market (more competing searchers lower the job proximity
60The finding that the neighborhood in which the project was located underwent large changes
supports our choice to include all, and not just partial, demolitions in the analysis. Household
in units that were not demolished were still treated by the program by changes in neighbors and
changes in the existing neighborhood.
61The fact that HOPE VI affected both the census tract in which the project was located and
census tracts within a half mile radius could reflect the fact that projects may have been located in
multiple census tracts though we assign each project to a unique census tract. Other research on
HOPE VI has generally found that spillover effects of the demolitions dissipate within a mile (e.g.
Sandler 2017).
62Density is calculated by dividing the number of jobs (or population) by the land area of the
census tract, so both measures use the same land area for normalization. Land area cancels out in
the job/population ratio.
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Figure 2.5: Effect of HOPE VI on Surrounding Neighborhoods
Notes: The black line with diamond markers and the grey line with circle markers plot the es-
timated effect of HOPE VI for large and small Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), respectively.
Each point corresponds to results from a separate specification estimated via the stratification
with regression methodology. The outcome for the points at the value of zero on the horizontal
axis is the job proximity index (measured in 2010) for the census tract in which the project is
located. The outcome for the remaining points correspond to the average job proximity index for
other census tracts that are within the number of miles denoted on the horizontal axis (exclusive)
and half a mile less than this value (inclusive). All stratum-level regressions are estimated on the
child-year dataset and control for the base year in which the child appears in public housing, the
year in which the child turns 26, and the standard vector of individual- and project- level covari-
ates. Standard errors are clustered at the project level and are 95% confidence interval is depicted
by the dashed light grey lines.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
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index) as long as the number of jobs in the neighborhood does not also decline. In
the case of a public housing demolition, the reduction is for a population likely to
compete for a similar set of jobs (Lens 2014; Lens et al. 2019). In small PHAs, we
find no effect of HOPE VI on job or population density. This is likely due to the
fact that public housing projects typically had far fewer residents in small PHAs, and
the demolitions therefore did not displace as many households or lead to meaningful
reductions in population density.
The preceding analyses suggest that HOPE VI improved geographic proximity
to jobs in large PHAs both by transforming the neighborhood in which the project
was located and by moving former residents to new neighborhoods with better ac-
cessibility. To investigate the quantitative importance of each channel, we estimate
specifications that replace the true measure of job proximity with a counterfactual
measure that discards all variation due to changes in the HOPE VI neighborhoods. In
order to calculate this counterfactual measure, we use the stratification with regres-
sion method to estimate the effect of HOPE VI on the job proximity index, limiting
the sample to census tracts within a half-mile radius of the original project; note
that these are the areas where HOPE VI directly impacted job proximity, as shown
in Figure 2.5. We obtain a predicted value of the job proximity index for HOPE VI
neighborhoods in the absence of changes to the original neighborhood by setting all
covariates to their true value except for the HOPE VI indicator, which is set to zero
instead of one. The counterfactual measure of the job proximity index is equal to this
predicted value for all children who resided in HOPE VI projects and still lived within
a half-mile of their project in 2010–i.e. children whose neighborhood job proximity
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was directly affected by the demolitions-induced changes–and is set to the true value
of the job proximity index for all other children. Intuitively, we impute the job prox-
imity for individuals from HOPE VI projects who remained within a half-mile of their
original project (and therefore benefited from changes in the neighborhood of origin)
using the job proximity for individuals from observably similar control projects. Any
estimated improvements using this counterfactual measure of job proximity will thus
be entirely driven by HOPE VI-induced moves to new neighborhoods. We then esti-
mate the impact of HOPE VI on this counterfactual job proximity measure for large
PHAs. The original estimates, presented in Table 2.7, indicate that HOPE VI in-
creased the job proximity index by 2.11. When the counterfactual value of the job
proximity index is used as the outcome variable, this estimated impact falls to 1.16,
suggesting that improvements in the neighborhood in which HOPE VI projects were
located explain about 45 percent of the total impact on the job proximity index in
large PHAs. This back-of-the-envelope calculation therefore suggests that, within
large PHAs, HOPE VI improved access to jobs by moving children to new neigh-
borhoods and by improving the original neighborhoods that contained the HOPE VI
projects, with both channels being quantitatively important.
Improvements in job proximity could affect earnings by reducing job search and/or
commuting costs and encouraging individuals on the margin between working and not
working to participate in the labor market. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find
that an important part of the earnings gains occurs through an extensive margin
labor supply response. Using the estimates from Table 2.2, the control means from
columns 1 and 4 indicate that the average working child from the control group earns
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$3,944 per quarter whereas column 1 indicates that HOPE VI increased quarters
worked by 0.076. Using the effect on quarters worked and average earnings per
quarter in control projects we calculate that the effect on annual earnings would be
$300 (3,944*0.076=$300) if the entire effect were driven by an increase in labor force
participation. This is about 57 percent of the estimated effect in column 3, suggesting
that extensive margin labor supply responses are the main avenue through which the
earnings impacts occur.
As discussed earlier, we find no effect of HOPE VI demolitions on earnings for
the heads of household. Given that many of these heads of household are single
mothers who qualify for public support and have especially high opportunity costs
for time supplied in the labor market, a likely explanation for this discrepancy is
that the heads of household have higher reservation wages. Figure B.6 presents the
distribution of earnings for household heads and the adult children. Consistent with
the theory that household heads have a higher reservation wage, there is a hollowing
out of the distribution of labor market earnings for household heads relative to the
adult earnings of the children in our main sample; household heads are more likely
to have zero earnings (48 percent compared to 35 percent) and less likely to have low
levels of strictly positive earnings (10 percent of households heads have earnings in
the bottom quartile compared to 18 percent of the adult children).
In sum, there are three reasons that support the job accessibility mechanism
as an important driver of our main results. First, we find systematic evidence of
improvements in measures of job proximity within large PHAs, where differences in
job proximity should be larger and more meaningful. Second, the effect on earnings
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appears to have a substantial extensive margin component, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that HOPE VI primarily affected the costs associated with finding a
job and not the rewards from work. Third, the difference in the effect of HOPE VI on
earnings in large PHAs versus small PHAs is precisely mirrored by the differences of
the effects on the various measures of job accessibility. In the next section we expand
upon this last point and show that even within the large PHAs the impacts on earnings
are largest in places where we would expect job accessibility to be particularly low
absent the intervention.
2.5.5 Reconciling Different Effects in Different Environments
Why does HOPE VI produce substantial long-run labor market gains for children
living in large but not small PHAs? One possible explanation is that the program
interacted in important ways with local environments. In particular, poor geographic
access to jobs might affect labor market outcomes more in the worst neighborhoods.
Figure 2.6 presents kernel density plots of the average commute time, poverty rate,
and population density in 1990 in the census tracts containing projects in the sam-
ple, separately by PHA size (large or small) and HOPE VI treatment status. The
figure illustrates that prior to the demolitions, projects in large PHAs, regardless
of whether they subsequently received a HOPE VI grant, had significantly higher
average commute times, poverty rates, and population densities.63
Figure 2.6 also illustrates that there is substantial variation even within the large
63Komogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distribution tests confirm that the differences between HOPE
VI projects in the large and small PHAs are statistically significant while the differences between




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































PHAs in terms of these baseline characteristics of neighborhoods. We make use of
this variation by estimating three specifications in which we interact the indicator
for HOPE VI with pre-demolition measures of neighborhood average commute time,
poverty, and population density. The results for large PHAs, presented in Table 2.8,
suggest that demolitions had stronger effects for projects in neighborhoods that were
more densely populated, where commutes were longer, and where the poverty rate
was higher in 1990.64 The heterogeneity is economically meaningful. For example, the
results suggest that HOPE VI increased age 26 earnings by 37 percent for children in
neighborhoods that had baseline poverty rates one standard deviation above the mean
poverty rate among HOPE VI projects. In comparison, children in neighborhoods
with poverty rates one standard deviation below the mean only experienced a 10
percent increase in earnings.
Together, the heterogeneity in the effect of HOPE VI both across and within
large and small PHAs suggests that the program produced larger labor market gains
for children originally residing in high-density, high-poverty neighborhoods, with lim-
ited job opportunities nearby. Within these communities, HOPE VI improved labor
market outcomes both by shifting children into neighborhoods with better job ac-
cessibility and by improving the job accessibility of the original neighborhoods. In
contrast, the program offered much smaller (or no) benefits to individuals residing in
neighborhoods with better job accessibility prior to the demolition.
The treatment effect heterogeneity is also informative for interpreting findings
64Table B.11 presents the results for small PHAs. We find no evidence of meaningful interaction
effects here, which is not surprising given that we find no significant effect of HOPE VI in this sample
in general.
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Table 2.8: Heterogeneous Effects by Neighborhood, for Large PHAs
IHS of Earnings at Age 26
(1) (2) (3)
HOPE VI 0.180** 0.189*** 0.233***
(0.072) (0.065) (0.071)
log population density -0.110**
(0.052)
HOPE VI × log population density 0.192**
(0.082)
average commute time 0.080
(0.079)




HOPE VI × poverty rate 0.132**
(0.065)
observations 149,000 149,000 149,000
Notes: The table presents estimates from the stratification with regression estimator for large
Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) only. The outcome variable in all specifications is the inverse
hyperbolic sine (IHS) of annual earnings measured at age 26. Columns 1-3 presents esitmates
from models in which the indicator for HOPE VI is interacted with a characteristic of the census
tract in which the project is located measured in 1990. For columns 1-3 these characteristics
include the log of the popoulation density, the average commute time in minutes and the poverty
rate, all three of which are normalized by substracting by the mean of the control group and
dividing by the standard deviation of the control group. All stratum-level regressions control
for the base year in which the child appears in public housing, the year in which the child
turns 26, and the standard vector of individual- and project-level covariates. Standard errors
are clustered at the project-level and are presented in parentheses. The mean and standard
deviation, presented in brackets, of the outcome for the control group are a weighted aggregate of
stratum-level statistics, where the weights are proportional to the number of treated individuals
in a strata.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10.
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from existing research. As previously discussed, Chyn (2018) and Chetty et al. (2016)
both find long-term labor market benefits from exiting public housing when young.
However, only Chyn (2018) finds that these benefits extend to older children (older
than 13). Our results suggest an explanation for this discrepancy: Chyn (2018)
notes that the projects in his study were in much higher poverty neighborhoods than
those in MTO. His sample thus included public housing projects that were much
more disadvantaged, located in neighborhoods with limited job accessibility. Thus,
moving older children out of these projects produced more immediate labor market
gains, whereas no such gains occurred for older children in the context of Chetty et
al. (2016). Relatedly, while Anderson et al. (2018a) find that time spent in public
and voucher housing when young produces long-term labor market benefits of similar
magnitudes, our paper highlights the fact that these average effects mask substantial
heterogeneity, and that children in the lowest quality public housing projects may
benefit from changes in housing. More broadly, the results from our paper highlight
how housing and neighborhood can affect long-term outcomes through a multitude
of channels that vary in importance with local context.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper uses administrative data on earnings and participation in subsidized hous-
ing to study how the demolition of public housing projects—funded by the HOPE
VI demolitions program—affected the long-run earnings of resident children. We
find that, on average, exposure to a demolition increased earnings at age 26 by 14
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percent. However, the benefits appear to be driven by children who lived in neigh-
borhoods that were denser, poorer, and farther from jobs prior to the demolition.
In terms of potential mechanisms, we find no evidence that HOPE VI improved the
home or neighborhood environment that children were exposed to while young. We
do, however, find evidence consistent with HOPE VI improving labor market out-
comes by increasing the proximity of job opportunities in the neighborhoods in which
the children lived as young adults.
Over the past thirty years, federal housing policy has sought to move families
living in subsidized housing out of especially disadvantaged neighborhoods. The
results in this paper offer evidence that these moves can generate long-term labor
market benefits for children. Interestingly, we find that these moves need not occur in
early childhood to produce improvements in adult labor market outcomes.65 Instead,
our findings highlight the important and immediate impact of reducing barriers to
young adult employment through increasing the accessibility of formal market jobs.
Neighborhoods can affect labor market outcomes through multiple channels, and
severely distressed public housing projects can, in some cases, limit job accessibility
and discourage labor force participation by creating densely populated neighborhoods
with high rates of poverty and a limited number of nearby jobs.
Our results highlight the importance of accounting for the interaction between
subsidized housing policies and local context. Much of the research on assisted housing
has taken place in a limited set of large metropolitan areas. In the case of public
65It is important to emphasize that we are not suggesting that these moves are more beneficial
than earlier moves to higher quality neighborhoods. We are not able to investigate this in our study
as the youngest children exposed to the demolitions are not old enough to measure adult labor
market outcomes.
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housing demolitions, our results indicate that the long-run labor market benefits found
in other work are specific to this setting (at least for older children), which highlights
the possibility that resources may be better spent on alternative interventions in
less urban and disadvantaged environments. Research has convincingly documented
that housing can have important long-run labor market implications but anticipating
the effects of potential interventions requires a more complete understanding of the
mechanisms. Future research should continue to focus on better understanding how
the impacts of housing policies interact with the characteristics of local environments
to produce changes in welfare and contribute to the intergenerational transmission of
economic outcomes.
132
Chapter 3: Cyclical Worker Flows: Cleansing vs. Sullying
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Disclaimer
This chapter is joint work with John Haltiwanger, Henry Hyatt, and Erika McEn-
tarfer. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have




Economists have long sought to understand how business cycles affect the reallocation
of resources. Do recessions promote economic efficiency by “cleansing” out less pro-
ductive firms and redirecting labor to more productive uses? Or, does the decline in
job mobility in recessions “sully” productivity-enhancing worker reallocation, leaving
workers matched to mediocre firms? In this paper we use U.S. linked employer-
employee data to decompose the employment growth of high- and low-productivity
firms into two components: growth accounted for by job-to-job moves and growth
accounted for by flows through nonemployment. We find that job-to-job flows move
workers from less productive to more productive firms and the rate at which work-
ers move up this job ladder is highly procyclical. In contrast, less productive firms
rely heavily on hiring jobless individuals in expansions and are disproportionately
more likely to displace workers back to nonemployment in contractions. In this way,
worker flows through nonemployment shift workers away from low-productivity firms
in contractions.
We thus find empirical evidence of both cleansing and sullying effects of recessions,
which feature in many models of the labor market. Much of the theoretical literature
focuses on either cleansing or sullying effects. Schumpeter (1939) originally proposed
that recessions may be productivity enhancing, driving out less productive uses of
capital and labor and freeing these resources for more efficient use. The notion of
cleansing effects of recessions was later revived in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990), Ca-
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ballero and Hammour (1994), and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).1 Barlevy (2002)
notes that cleansing effects of recessions appear at odds with observed procyclical job
quality. He proposes a model whereby declines in job-to-job moves cause a drag on
productivity in recessions, a sullying effect. Sullying effects of recessions feature more
recently in a set of papers by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013, 2016) (MPV). The
MPV framework in particular yields a rich set of predictions for the cyclical reallo-
cation of workers across the firm productivity distribution that we largely confirm in
our empirical analysis.2 More recent research by Lise and Robin (2017) and Baley,
Figueiredo, and Ulbricht (2020) use models with heterogeneity of both workers and
firms that induce cyclical variation in sorting over the cycle. Within their frameworks,
both of these papers suggest that the cleansing effect dominates the sullying effect.3
Our empirical results suggest that the cleansing effects dominate at the start of a
recession but that the sullying effects continue long into the economic recovery.
In our empirical analysis, we classify firms into high- and low-productivity firms
1Unlike Schumpeter, the more recent literature does not argue that recessions are desireable but
rather that, conditional on the adverse shock occurring, there may be an acceleration of the ongoing
reallocation of resources to more productive uses in recessions.
2The MPV model builds on the job ladder framework of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) but
importantly for our purposes incorporates business cycle dynamics. In their framework, search
frictions prevent workers from immediately moving into desirable job matches and workers move to
better firm matches via job-to-job flows. High-productivity firms are able to offer higher wages and
thus are able to grow faster in expansions than less-productive firms, who must rely on the pool
of unemployed workers in filling vacancies. In recessions, this cyclical job ladder collapses, yielding
a sullying effect. Our empirical results are largely consistent with these predicted dynamics. Our
results build on the findings in Haltiwanger, Hyatt, Kahn, and McEntarfer (2018) and Haltiwanger,
Hyatt, and McEntarfer (2018). This earlier work provides support for a procyclical job ladder in
terms of firm earnings and productivity. The current paper is distinguished by explicitly considering
the sullying and cleansing contributions of flows through the lens of the impact on the share of
employment at high and low productivity firms. This earlier work does not explore decompositions
of productivity growth into cleansing and sullying components. Bertheau, Bunzel, and Vejlin (2020)
report broadly similar patterns on poaching by high-paying and low-paying firms using Danish data.
3However, worker flows across firms ranked by firm productivity are not targeted directly when
they estimate their models. While we do not explicitly consider worker heterogeneity in our empir-
ical analysis, we do provide novel evidence on the patterns of worker flows across firms ranked by
productivity that are relevant for these models of sorting.
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based upon the relative ranking of firms in the measured distribution of firm-level
productivity. We find that high-productivity firms grow faster: the differential growth
rate averages 0.20 percent of employment on a quarterly basis. Decomposing the
growth rate differential into the components due to job-to-job moves versus worker
flows through nonemployment, we find that the propensity of high-productivity firms
to grow faster is driven by their advantage in poaching workers from less productive
firms. This advantage is large: the difference in the growth rates due to job-to-job
moves is 0.61 percent per quarter. Low-productivity firms actually lose workers on
net through poaching, and so hire relatively more jobless workers to sustain growth:
the differential employment growth rate from worker flows through nonemployment
(relative to high-productivity firms) is 0.41 percent per quarter.
We find that these patterns of worker reallocation between low- and high-productivity
firms differ dramatically over the course of the business cycle. In expansions, high-
productivity firms actively poach workers from less productive employers. During re-
cessions, this job ladder collapses yielding a sullying effect. The nonemployment mar-
gin also changes dramatically across the cycle. In expansions, low-productivity firms
grow primarily through hiring jobless workers. In contractions, worker separations to
nonemployment from low-productivity firms spike disproportionately and hires from
nonemployment into low-productivity firms decline disproportionately. This cleans-
ing effect peaks earlier in a downturn compared to the collapse of the job ladder that
lingers into the early stages of a recovery. Cleansing effects are stronger than sullying
effects when the unemployment rate surges during recessions, but they are almost
completely absent in the times of high unemployment that follow recessions.
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What are the implications of these business cycle dynamics on aggregate produc-
tivity growth? To answer this question we use an accounting decomposition of an
index of aggregate productivity growth that is the employment-weighted average of
a firm-level measure of productivity, which is measured in logs. On average, worker
reallocation through job-to-job flows contributes 0.1 log points to the index of overall
productivity growth each quarter. This is a substantial contribution to the average
quarterly rate of aggregate productivity growth, which is 0.33 based on our data.
However, during recessions there is clear evidence of a sullying effect. This is par-
ticularly true during the Great Recession. Prior to the recession, in 2006:1, worker
reallocation via job-to-job flows contributed 0.13 log points to quarterly aggregate
productivity growth but this contribution declined to 0.02 by 2009:2. Acting against
this is a cleansing effect that operates via worker flows through nonemployment. In
2006:1, worker reallocation via nonemployment contributed -0.1 log points to quar-
terly aggregate productivity growth but this increased to 0.08 in 2009:1. We show
that the during periods of rising unemployment the cleansing impact on productivity
outweighs the sullying impact. However, during periods when unemployment is above
trend the sullying impact on productivity outweighs the cleansing impact.
Our primary analysis uses revenue per worker to measure relative productivity
within the firm’s industry. This has the advantage of allowing us to measure pro-
ductivity within most industry sectors, but has two key disadvantages.4 First, we
cannot easily compare productivity across sectors and so our main analysis abstracts
4Total factor productivity measures are available for only handful of sectors that are a shrinking
share of the U.S. economy.
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from productivity-enhancing reallocation from less to more productive sectors. Sec-
ond, revenue per worker reflects both “innate” firm productivity as well as sorting
of workers across firms. We assess these issues using the AKM decomposition of
earnings.5 The AKM firm fixed effect represents the pay-premium workers receive
independent of worker quality and while not a direct measure of productivity, the
relative ranking should reflect productivity differences within and across industries.
We find that the cyclical patterns of hires and separations via poaching and nonem-
ployment are very similar whether we rank firms based on the direct measure of labor
productivity (revenue per worker) or the indirect measure (AKM firm fixed effect).
Thus, our results are do not appear to be driven by cyclical sorting of worker types
across firms.6
Finally, we consider the implications of the worker flows across firms ranked by
productivity for worker earnings. We find that worker movements from low- to high-
productivity firms move workers into higher-paying firms, both measured by firm
average earnings as well as the AKM firm fixed effect. These earnings changes move
strongly with their productivity analogues but are roughly half of the magnitude.
These results imply that workers obtain a substantial fraction of the gains from worker
movements onto and up the firm productivity job ladder, but that there is suggestive
evidence of an incomplete pass-through of gains to workers.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section 3.3 presents
5AKM refers to the decomposition developed by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999).
6Haltiwanger, Hyatt and McEntarfer (2018) and Crane, Hyatt, and Murray (2020) do examine
cyclical sorting of heterogeneous workers across heterogeneous firms. Both papers find evidence that
the assortative matching of workers and firms is countercyclical: a greater share of low-productivity
workers are able to match to better firms in expansions.
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evidence on worker movements onto, up, and off of the firm productivity job ladder
over the cycle. Section 3.4 quantifies the implications of the cyclical worker flows
for cyclical variation in productivity. Section 3.5 discusses implications for earnings.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
A key contribution of our paper is the matching of U.S. Census Bureau linked
employer-employee data to new productivity measures also developed at Census. We
will first describe the linked employer-employee data, and how we use it to decompose
firm growth via job-to-job moves versus flows through nonemployment. The Longitu-
dinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data contain quarterly earnings records
collected by state unemployment insurance (UI) programs, linked to establishment-
level data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). LEHD
employment coverage is quite broad, covering over 95 percent of private sector workers
and almost all state and local government employment.7 State-level data availability
varies by year, as states began sharing UI and QCEW data with the Census Bureau
at different times. In this paper we use LEHD data for private-sector employers in
28 states from 1998-2015.8 Our 28 states include many of the largest states so that
our sample accounts for 65 percent of U.S. private sector employment.
7For a full description of the LEHD data, see Abowd et al. (2009).
8Our 28 states are CA, FL, GA ,HI, ID, IL, IN, KS, ME, MD, MN, MO, MT, NC, NJ, ND,
NM, NV, PA, OR, RI, SC, SD, TN, VA, WA, and WV. While we restrict our analysis to employers
located in our 28-state sample, we use the complete set of available states to construct worker job
histories. As described later in this section, our productivity measures reflect the labor productivity
of the national firm.
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The LEHD data allow us to decompose firm employment growth by worker hires
and separations. We use the decomposition developed in Haltiwanger, Hyatt, and
McEntarfer (2018) (HHM) and Haltiwanger, Hyatt, Kahn, and McEntarfer (2018)
(HHKM) that yields an exact decomposition of firm employment growth due to work-
ers switching jobs (what we call net job-to-job or net poaching flows) and growth due
to flows between employment and nonemployment (what we call net nonemployment
flows). A challenge for the identification of job-to-job flows in the LEHD data is
that the data do not provide information on why a worker left one job and began
another. We only have quarterly earnings, from which we infer approximately when
workers left and began jobs. HHM and HHKM develop three alternative measures of
job-to-job flows, and demonstrate that key findings on the nature of job ladders are
robust to different approaches for identifying job-to-job moves in the LEHD data. We
use the within/adjacent approach from HHM in this paper. This approach defines
job-to-job transitions as those where the new job begins in the same or following
quarter as the job separation. Based upon the robustness analysis in HHM, we are
confident our main results are not sensitive to the specific rules we use amongst the
set of rules they considered.9
To measure firm productivity, we use a relatively new firm-level database on pro-
ductivity from Haltiwanger et al. (2017) based on the revenue and employment data
from the Census Business Register and the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD).
9They also consider job-to-job flows restricted to those where the transition occurs within the
same quarter and those with minimum disruptions in earnings. They find results that are very
robust across these alternatives. Each of the different measures is highly correlated with the alter-
natives (pairwise correlations of about 0.98) and each of the LEHD based job-to-job flow series has
a correlation of about 0.96 with CPS based job-to-job flows.
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Since the underlying revenue and employment data are from the Census Business
Register, this database offers much wider coverage of labor productivity at the firm
level than earlier studies that focused on sectors like manufacturing or retail trade.
These data allow us to measure the log of real revenue per employee on an annual
basis for a wide coverage of the private, non-farm, for-profit firms. Revenue is deflated
with the Gross Domestic Product price deflator. This measure of productivity is a
standard gross output per worker measure of productivity that is commonly used to
measure productivity at the micro and macro level but is a relatively crude measure
compared to using total factor productivity (TFP). However, in the empirical litera-
ture, this revenue labor productivity measure has been shown to be highly correlated
with TFP based measures of productivity across businesses within industries. That
is, within detailed industry year cells, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) and
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) find that the correlation between TFP and
gross output (revenue) per worker across businesses is about 0.6 within industries in
the manufacturing sector. This finding is consistent with the implications of models
with labor market adjustment frictions which motivate our analysis.10 In our analysis
below, we use this revenue labor productivity measure deviated from industry by year
means.
The gross output per worker data while offering much wider coverage than earlier
studies has some limitations. The data only cover about 80 percent of firms in the
Census LBD. The latter cover all firms with at least one paid employee in the private,
10See for example Decker et al. (2020). In their calibrated model of labor adjustment frictions,
they obtain a correlation of TFP and revenue labor productivity of 0.90.
142
non-farm sector. One reason is that the revenue data are not available for non-profits.
For another, the revenue data derive from different administrative sources than the
payroll tax data. Most of the matches between the payroll tax and revenue data are
via Employer Identification Numbers (EINs) but firms can use different EINs for filing
income taxes and filing quarterly payroll taxes.11 For such firms, name and address
matching is required. Haltiwanger et al. (2017) also show that the missingness of
revenue is only weakly related to industry, firm size, or firm age characteristics.12 We
are able to construct measures of labor productivity at the firm (operational control)
level given that the Census Business Register has a complete mapping of all EINs
owned by any given parent firm. Even with these limitations, we have revenue per
worker for more than 4 million firms in each calendar year which we integrate with
the LEHD data infrastructure via EINs. For the remaining private-sector employers
in the LEHD data for which we cannot match to our productivity data, we impute
labor productivity using the size, age, and relative wages paid by the employer within
their industry.13
11Another source of mismatch is sole proprietors file income taxes on their individual income tax
returns while payroll taxes are filed via their EIN. Administrative data are available that links the
EINs to the filers via the SS-4 form (application for EINs). While this information is incorporated
in the Census Business Register, it is imperfect.
12The productivity data explicitly excludes North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) 81 which is Other Services. This industry is very heterogeneous, including non-profits
such as religious organizations where productivity is not well defined.
13The latest year for which we have firm productivity data is 2015, so we end our time series there
although the LEHD data are more current. We investigated imputing post-2015 productivity using
lagged productivity and other covariates but were not satisfied this 100 percent imputation was of
sufficiently high quality. In unreported results, we have found that the patterns of worker flows are
robust to excluding the imputed cases. Including the imputed cases facilitates our quantification of
shares of employment at high and low productivity firms and in turn the productivity decomposition
we use in the analysis.
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3.2.1 Productivity, Growth, and Survival
Our measure of firm productivity–based on revenue per worker–exhibits a number of
the key features that Syverson (2011) emphasized are common in the literature on
firm productivity and dynamics. First, we find tremendous dispersion of revenue labor
productivity within narrowly defined sectors. The within industry/year standard
deviation of log real revenue per worker is about 0.80. This is in the range of labor
productivity dispersion indices reported by Syverson (2004). Second, we find that log
real revenue per worker is highly predictive of firm growth and survival, as shown in
Table 3.1.14 We consider two dependent variables for all incumbents in period t-1.
The first dependent variable is the Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) firm level
growth rate of employment that is inclusive of firm exit from t-1 to t.15 The second
dependent variable is an exit indicator that takes on the value of one if the firm exits
between t-1 and t and is zero otherwise. We use a linear probability model for this
second specification. Firm exit and growth is organic growth and exit in the manner
defined by Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) (i.e., it abstracts from changes
in ownership or M&A activity). We regress these two outcomes on log productivity
in t-1 and on log size in t-1 (log of firm employment in t-1). While these are simple
reduced form specifications, these specifications are consistent with standard models
of firm growth and survival since these are proxies for the two key state variables for
the firm in making growth and survival decisions. The canonical model implies that
14For this analysis, we do not restrict the sample to those firms in our LEHD data sample. These
regressions use all firm-year observations from the revenue-enhanced Census Business Register.
15This measure is given by git = (Eit −Eit−1)/(0.5 ∗ (Eit +Eit−1)). It is a second order approxi-
mation to a log first difference that accommodates entry and exit.
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holding initial size constant a firm with higher productivity is more likely to grow and
less likely to exit. We find overwhelming evidence in support of these predictions in
Table 3.1. A one standard deviation increase in within-industry productivity yields
a 20 percentage point increase in net employment growth and 5 percentage point
decrease in the likelihood of exit.16
These descriptive results give us confidence to proceed with our measure of rev-
enue labor productivity since we produce patterns that others have found using TFP
measures in sectors such as manufacturing. In line with the existing literature, our
findings of a tight relationship between firm productivity, growth, and survival are
consistent with the hypothesis that there are intrinsic differences in productivity
across firms that help account for the high rate of reallocation of jobs across firms.
In addition, such intrinsic differences in productivity have implications for worker
reallocation including the potential role of a productivity job ladder.
3.2.2 Defining High- and Low-Productivity Firms
To help mitigate remaining concerns about measurement error, we use robust mea-
sures of the ranking of firms by productivity. We construct time-invariant measures
of productivity, defined as the employment-weighted average of firm productivity over
the life of the SEIN (the state tax identifier number, the key employer identifier in
LEHD data). This approach is broadly consistent with the rank preserving equilibria
assumption in the Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) framework. We then compute
16Decker et al. (2020) develop a simple model of firm dynamics with adjustment frictions that
shows that the relationship between growth and survival from t-1 to t with realizations of labor






















































































































































































































































































































































































































the employment-weighted and within-industry quintiles of the productivity distribu-
tion. Using these quintiles, we define high-productivity firms as those in the top two
quintiles and low-productivity firms as those in the bottom three quintiles. In unre-
ported analysis, we have found that results are robust to permitting firms to change
ranks over time. This robustness is not surprising given the large differences between
high- and low-productivity firms. For example, the within-industry differences in av-
erage gross output per worker between high- and low-productivity firms are typically
in excess of 85 log points.
As a robustness check on our productivity measure, we also rank firms by the
AKM firm fixed effect and average earnings. To construct this measure we estimate
an AKM specification by regressing log earnings on person fixed effects, firm fixed
effects, and controls for time and worker age.17 To solve this model, we implement
the iterative method proposed by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010). The AKM firm
fixed effect abstracts from observable and unobservable individual characteristics and
in canonical models, the firm specific pay premia should be closely related to pro-
ductivity differences across firms. As an additional robustness check, we consider
simple non-parametric measures of relative earnings by ranking firms based on the
average earnings of full-quarter workers within their industry. We classify firms into
two groups, high- and low-ranked, based on the AKM firm effect and average earn-
ings. Just as we do for gross output per worker, we construct employment-weighted
within-industry quintiles based on these measures and define high-ranked firms as
17To control for time we include a set of year dummies that capture calendar year effects on
earnings. To control for worker age, we follow the specification of Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016).
We center age around 40, include a quadratic and cubic transformation of worker age, but omit the
linear term.
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those in the top two quintiles and low-ranked firms as those in the bottom three
quintiles. Particularly for the AKM firm premia rankings, we interpret the results
using these rankings as providing an alternative indirect method of ranking firms by
their productivity.
3.3 Worker Flows Over the Business Cylcle
We begin by examining how job-to-job moves and worker flows through nonemploy-
ment reallocate workers across high- and low-productivity firms. To understand how
worker reallocation moves workers from one group of firms to another, we use the
following identity:
Net Job Flows = Ht − St =
∑
i∈{p,n}





(H ijt − S
ij
t ) (3.1)
where Ht is the number of hires and St is the number of separations in quarter t.
The superscripts denote subsamples defined by the type of worker flow, where i = p
denotes poaching (job-to-job) flows and i = n denotes flows through nonemployment,
and the type of firm, where j = h denotes high-productivity firms and j = l denotes
low-productivity firms.18 For example, Hpt denotes poaching hires and H
ph
t denotes
poaching hires at high productivity firms. We convert all flows to rates by dividing
through by employment in time t − 1.19 All of the aggregate series we use in this
18A given type of firm (e.g., high-productivity) may have workers that are hired by that firm via
a job-to-job flow and separate from that firm via a job-to-job flow. We refer to the former as a
poaching hire and the latter as a poaching separation.
19Hires and separations characterize worker mobility between time t− 1 and t. For hires we count
all worker flows into a firm in our sample at time t. For separations, we count all worker flows out
of a firm in our sample at time t− 1.
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section have been seasonally adjusted using the X-12 procedure.
The identity in equation 3.1 decomposes employment growth at high-productivity
firms (Hht -S
h
t ) into net growth due to two components: job-to-job moves of workers
or poaching flows (Hpht -S
ph




20 In the aggregate economy, employment growth is entirely attributable to net
worker flows through nonemployment since poaching hires and poaching separations
aggregated over both high- and low-productivity firms are equal. However, for any
subset of firms in the economy, net poaching need not be zero, as some firms will be
more successful poaching workers away from other employers. This “net poaching
flows” component of growth captures the comparative growth advantage one group
of firms has over another in their ability to attract workers away from other firms.
Figure 3.1 shows our decomposition of net job flows for high- and low-productivity
firms. As discussed previously, a key prediction of job ladder models is that job-to-job
moves should reallocate workers away from less productive to more productive firms.
Figure 3.1(A) shows that this prediction from the theory holds true in the data. The
most productive firms have overall positive net employment growth on average and
net poaching (Hpht - S
ph
t ) is strongly positive. The average net employment growth
of high-productivity firms is 0.33 percent per quarter with net poaching (the rate at
which job-to-job moves reallocate workers to high-productivity firms) averaging 0.27
percent per quarter. In other words, during the 1998-2015 period, job-to-job moves
of workers from less-productive employers account for most (80 percent) of the net
employment growth of high-productivity firms.
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Poaching hires Poaching separations
Hires from nonemployment Separations to nonemployment
Notes: High-productivity indicates that the firm is in the top two quintiles of the within-
industry productivity distribution. Low-productivity indicates the firm is the bottom three
quintiles of the within-industry productivity distribution. Data are seasonally adjusted using
X-12. The shaded regions mark quarters in which there was a recession.
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The results of the decomposition are also striking for the less productive firms in
the industry. In Figure 3.1(B), low-productivity firms grew at a rate of 0.14 percent
per quarter on average from 1998-2015, which is slower than the high-productivity
firms. Low-productivity firms lose -0.34 percent employment per quarter from work-
ers “voting with their feet” and moving to firms ranked higher in firm productivity
distribution. The positive growth rate for less productive firms is entirely due to
strong hiring from nonemployment. In other words, in a typical quarter less produc-
tive firms recruit from the pool of unemployed individuals to replace workers moving
to better firms. This is also consistent with job ladder models of the labor market. In
job ladder models, it is the search and matching frictions that support the presence
of low-productivity firms that primarily hire from nonemployment.
The patterns of hires and separations in Figure 1 are instructive for understanding
the differences in the cyclical dynamics of job-to-job and nonemployment worker
flows. Poaching hires and separations both decline for high-productivity firms in
contractions with the decline in poaching hires larger so that net poaching declines
significantly. Hires from nonemployment decline sharply for low-productivity firms in
contractions accompanied by a surge in separations so that net employment growth
declines sharply for low-productivity firms. There are similar qualitative patterns
for hires from and separations to nonemployment for high-productivity firms but the
magnitudes are smaller.
To more clearly see how worker flows reallocate workers across the productiv-
ity ladder, we decompose the average overall net job flow differential between high-
and low-productivity groups into the net poaching differential and the net flows from
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nonemployment differential. Let Ejt−1 denote employment at firm type j at time t−1.














t−1 are the employment growth
rates at firm type i ∈ {l, h} through net poaching flows and net nonemployment flows,
respectively. Figure 3.2 plots the differential rates between high- and low-productivity
firms–i.e., λht − λlt and δht − δlt. The average net poaching differential between high-
and low-productivity firms is 0.61 percent per quarter. It is also quite cyclical: a
minimum of 0.012 in 2009Q1, and a maximum of 1.01 in 2015Q3. The average net
nonemployment differential is -0.41 percent, but this increase at the onset of economic
downturns.21 The negative contribution of flows through nonemployment to the dif-
ferential growth rates of high- and low-productivity firms implies that search frictions
are a drag on productivity-enhancing reallocation in expansions, allowing mediocre
firms to attract workers flowing through nonemployment who cannot immediately
find better jobs.
For comparison purposes, we also show in Figure 3.2 the differential growth rates
for firms ranked by AKM firm fixed effects and average earnings. To make results
comparable, the rankings are calculated within industries. These patterns are very
similar to those from the job ladder decomposition of growth rates when firms are
ranked by productivity, both in levels and business cycle dynamics. The striking sim-
ilarity between these three measures is again consistent with job ladder models of the
labor market, where high-productivity firms offer higher wages, and grow faster than
less-productive firms in expansions by poaching workers away from less-productive,
21Not shown in Figure 2 is the overall net job flow differential between high and low productivity
firms, which is the sum of the poaching and nonemployment margins, and averages 0.20 percent per
quarter. It reaches a maximum of 0.58 in 2008Q4 and a minimum of -0.13 in 2004, an expansion
year. In the set of regressions in Table 2 we will test the cyclicality of this overall redistribution.
152

















2000 2005 2010 2015
Poaching (productivity) Nonemployment (productivity)
Poaching (AKM) Nonemployment (AKM)
Poaching (wages) Nonemployment (wages)
Notes: Differential growth rates are the difference in quarterly employment growth rates
between firms in the high category (top two quintiles) and those in the low category (bottom
three quintiles). The different series present results in which the high and low categories
are defined by productivity, wages (earnings per worker), and the AKM firm effect. For
all measures, the quintiles are calculated within NAICS 4-digit industry codes. Results are
presented separately for poaching and nonemployment flows. Data are seasonally adjusted
using X-12. The shaded regions mark quarters in which there was a recession.
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lower-paying firms. The strong similarity between the productivity and AKM fixed
effects results also provides reassurance about measurement error concerns about the
revenue productivity measure. The latter is a relatively crude measure of productiv-
ity so the finding that using AKM firm fixed effects yields the same patterns reduces
concerns about the use of this measure.
Figure 3.2 also shows pronounced cyclical patterns that differ across the compo-
nents of net job flows. We quantify the nature of that variation in Table 3.2. Table
3.2 presents the results from regressions where each component of the differential
growth rate (net job flows, net poaching flows, and net nonemployment flows) is the
regressed on a cyclical indicator and a time-trend. Each column represents the re-
sults of these regressions for firms when they are ranked by productivity, AKM firm
fixed effects, and average firm earnings per worker. Because the results for all three
columns are very similar (as suggested by Figure 3.2) we will focus our discussion on
the business cycle dynamics of worker reallocation across high- and low-productivity
firms (column 1). Two cyclical indicators are used: the change in unemployment
and unemployment deviated from a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend. Periods of rising
unemployment correspond closely to NBER defined recessions. In contrast, especially
over our sample period, unemployment remains substantially above trend well into
NBER defined recoveries.
We start by focusing on the net poaching differentials (row B) which shows that
net poaching from low- to high-productivity firms decreases in cyclical downturns.
This occurs in recessions: for every one percentage point increase in the change in
the unemployment rate, high vs. low differential net poaching declines by 0.440
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Table 3.2: Differential Net Job Flows Over the Cycle
High-Low Differential
(1) (2) (3)
A. Net Job Flows
Change in unemployment rate 0.136 -0.179 -0.170
(0.060) (0.084) (0.084)
Deviated unemployment rate -0.086 -0.161 -0.144
(0.023) (0.029) (0.030)
B. Poaching Job Flows
Change in unemployment rate -0.440 -0.544 -0.560
(0.049) (0.063) (0.061)
Deviated unemployment rate -0.097 -0.128 -0.103
(0.027) (0.033) (0.034)
C. Nonemployment Job Flows
Change in unemployment rate 0.576 0.365 0.390
(0.043) (0.047) (0.049)
Deviated unemployment rate 0.011 -0.033 -0.041
(0.033) (0.026) (0.027)
Definition of Job Ladder
Firms ranked by productivity wages AKM firm effect
Firms ranked within industry industry industry
Notes: Each cell presents results from a separate regression estimated on national quarterly
data. The dependent variable is the differential worker flow rate between firms on the high
and long rung of the job ladder, where the type of flow is indicated by the panel label.
The job ladder is defined by productivity, wages, and the AKM firm effect in columns
1, 2, and 3, respectively. The independent variables in each regression include a cyclical
indicator as well as a linear time-trend and a constant, which are not reported. The cyclical
indicators considered include the change in the unemployment rate and the deviations of
unemployment from the Hodrick-Prescott Trend. Aside from the linear trend, all dependent
and independent variables are measured in percentage point units. Standard errors are
presented in parentheses.
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percentage points. Poaching flows are also low in the times of high unemployment
that follow recessions. For every percentage point that the unemployment rate is
above its HP trend, the net poaching differential is lower by 0.097 percentage points.
These findings are consistent with a sullying effect of recessions.
There is also evidence of a cleansing effect that works through flows to and from
nonemployment (row C). The net flows from nonemployment differentials provide
an indication of the reallocation of employment from low- to high-productivity firms
that involves transitions to and from nonemployment. These transitions inherently
involve intervening spells of nonemployment. In that respect, this type of reallocation
is more costly than job-to-job flows since it involves the time and resource costs
of nonemployment. Row C indicates that the reallocation that works through the
nonemployment margin is countercyclical. When the change in the unemployment
rate increases by one percentage point, differential net nonemployment hiring for high
vs. low increases by 0.576 percentage points. This is a cleansing effect of recessions
that is working in the opposite direction of job-to-job flows and primarily occurs
because there is a disproportionately large spike in separations into nonemployment
from low-productivity firms.22 This cleansing effect, however, is almost negligible
in the times of high unemployment that follow recessions. An additional percentage
22The differential net flows from nonemployment (δht −δlt) can be decomposed into the hires compo-
nent (Hnht /E
h
t−1−Hnlt /Elt−1) minus the separations component (Snht /Eht−1−Snlt /Elt−1). Regressing
these components against the change in the unemployment rate and controlling for the time-trend
produces a point estimate of 0.165 for hires and -0.411 for separations (the difference between these
coefficients is 0.576, which is the coefficient found in Table 3.2). Thus, when the unemployment rate
rises, worker reallocation from low- to high-productivity firms through nonemployment increases pri-
marily because of a disproportionate spike in separations to nonemployment from low-productivity
firms but also because a disproportionate decline in the rate at which low-productivity firms hire
jobless workers.
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point of the unemployment rate above its HP trend is associated with only an increase
of 0.011 in the net nonemployment differential.
The coefficient on overall net job flow differentials (row A) is determined by these
cleansing and sullying effects. During recessions, cleansing effects are stronger than
sullying effects. A one percentage point increase in the change in the unemploy-
ment rate is associated with an increase in the relative employment growth of high-
productivity firms of 0.136 percentage points. In the times of high unemployment
that follow recessions, cleansing effects are small and so sullying effects dominate. An
additional percentage point of the unemployment rate above its HP trend is associ-
ated with an increase in the relative employment growth of low-productivity firms of
0.086 percentage points. Thus, Table 3.2 illustrates that the relative importance of
cleansing and sullying effects varies at different phases of the business cycle.
3.4 Implications for Aggregate Outcomes
What are the implications of the business cycle dynamics described in the previous
section on aggregate productivity growth? The decline in productivity-enhancing
reallocation through job-to-job moves in slack labor markets should be a drag in
productivity growth, while higher rates of job destruction at less-productive firms in
downturns ought to free resources for more productive use. The magnitude of the
effect on aggregate productivity growth will depend on both the size of the differ-
ential employment flows as well as the productivity differential between high- and
low-productivity firms. In this section we formalize this intuition and implement a
157
decomposition exercise to quantify how worker reallocation through poaching and
nonemployment flows contributes to aggregate productivity growth, and how these
components of productivity growth vary over the business cycle.
3.4.1 Worker Reallocation and Employment Shares
We begin by focusing on how worker reallocation affects the share of workers at high-
and low-productivity firms. We focus initially on the findings using our gross output
per worker measure of productivity.23 We use the following identity to write changes
in the share of employment at high-productivity firms as a function of the differential








where x̃h = (xh − xl)θht−1θlt−1(Et−1/Et) for x ∈ λ, δ and ∆θht is the change in the
share of employment at high-productivity firms between quarter t and t − 1. This
expression shows that the sign of differential net poaching rate, λht − λlt, determines
whether poaching rates will increase or decrease the share of employment at high-
productivity firms. The magnitude of this effect also depends on the share of workers
at high productivity firms as well as the growth in overall employment. See Appendix
C.2 for details.
23As we have discussed, this is a relative measure for firms within industries. Using a relative
measure within industries somewhat complicates the interpretation of the accounting decomposition
we develop and analyze below. Later in the analysis we consider the AKM firm premia measure
which overcomes these limitations.
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There are two reasons for the existence of the residual term, ε̃h.24 First, some
workers may move to or from an employer located in a state outside of our 28-state
sample. In contrast to the results from the previous section and because we aim to
implement an exact decomposition, the counts of hires and separations in this section
only include worker flows where both the origin and destination employers are in
one of the 28 states in our sample. Second, the administrative code that identifies
the employer, the SEIN, can change over time and create a spurious flow of workers
between the old and new SEIN. We are able to flag when these changes occur and
omit these flows from the poaching and nonemployment flows. However, there is no
straightforward way to account for this issue when measuring productivity. Thus, a
change in an SEIN could lead to a change in the share of workers at high productivity
firms but have no corresponding flow of workers. In unreported results, we directly
measure flows of workers in and out of the states in our sample and show that the
residual term is primarily attributable to changes in the SEIN over time, not migration
in and out of the sample.
Regardless of the source, these residuals flows are both small in magnitude and do
not exhibit a clear pattern across the business cycle. Specifically, the average size of
the differential net poaching and nonemployment growth rates are three and five times
as large as the differential residual flows, respectively. Figure C.1 in Appendix C.1
presents a version of Figure 3.2 that contains the residual flows as well as the poaching
and nonemployment flows constructed with and without the restriction that both
24Empirically, we measure the residual term as the difference between the observed changes in
employment at high- and low-productivity firms and the changes predicted by the poaching and
nonemployment flows.
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origin and destination employers are in the 28-state sample. The results indicate that
the residual flows do not exhibit any notable cyclicality across the business cycle and
the differential net poaching and nonemployment growth rates that exclude workers
moving in and out of our 28-state sample are very similar (in levels and movements
across time) to the results from Figure 3.2. We infer that this residual term is not
important for the main results discussed in this section.
Figure 3.3 shows the time series of the main components of the decomposition
in equation 3.2 and illustrates how worker reallocation affects the percent of employ-
ment at high-productivity firms.25 Figure 3.3(A) presents the observed changes in the
percent of employment at high-productivity firms between the current and previous
quarters (∆θht ). Figure 3.3(B) presents the components of these changes that are
attributable to worker reallocation through poaching flows (λ̃h) and nonemployment
flows (δ̃h). During expansions, worker flows through nonemployment lead to a reduc-
tion in the share of workers at high-productivity firms whereas poaching flows lead to
an increase in the share of workers at high-productivity firms. At the onset of a reces-
sion, the rate at which nonemployment flows contributes to the growth of employment
share of low-productivity firms slows. Indeed, in the Great Recession this change was
large enough such that nonemployment flows briefly contributed positively to the
growth of the employment share at high-productivity firms. Throughout our sample
period, poaching flows always contribute positively to the growth of employment at
high productivity firms, but this largely collapses during recessions, particularly in
the Great Recession. Consistent with our earlier analysis, the results highlight the
25To make the figure more readable, we present the results in percentage point terms.
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staggered nature of the timing of these two effects. The cleansing effect begins at the
onset of a recession where as the sullying effect starts and peaks later on.
3.4.2 Worker Reallocation and Productivity
We now quantify how changes in the share of workers at high-productivity firms affects
an index of aggregate productivity growth using the productivity differential between
the two groups of firms. Our analysis focuses on a measure of productivity that is
the employment-weighted average of a firm-level measure of productivity, which is
measured in logs. Such accounting indices of productivity have been widely used
in the literature to quantify the contribution of reallocation effects to productivity
(e.g., Olley and Pakes, 1996; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2001; and Melitz
and Polanec, 2015). As we discuss in Appendix C.1, an aggregate index based on
employment-weighted firm-level labor productivity indices track official statistics from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) quite well.26
Let, Rt denote the employment-weighted average of the firm-level measure of log








t , where R
i
t denotes the
26See also Figure A.1 in Decker et al. (2017). Conceptually, this aggregate index is consistent
with aggregate productivity in a structural model with a single input (labor), constant returns to
scale, and perfect competition in product markets. While these are strong assumptions (although not
inconsistent with job ladder models), as noted such indices track official statistics closely. Much of the
literature that focuses on misallocation specifies curvature in the revenue function so that there is a
well-defined size distribution even in the absence of distortions. Part of the reason for this is that this
enables a measure of allocative efficiency that is relative to a frictionless/distortionless benchmark
(e.g., Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bartelsman et al., 2013; and Blackwood et al., forthcoming). In
principle, such curvature is not necessary in models with adjustment frictions such as search and
matching frictions. Models with curvature in the revenue function have the property that it is not
optimal to allocate all resources to the most productive firm. While this implies caution in using
weighted average measures of firm-level productivity in quantitative analysis of models with such
curvature, Decker et al. (2020) show that in models with adjustment frictions that this type of
aggregate productivity index tracks structural measures of true productivity well even if there is
curvature in the revenue function.
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Poaching Nonemployment
Notes: Panel (A) presents the first difference of the percent of employment at high-
productivity firms. Panel (B) presents the change in the percent of employment at high-
productivity firms that is attributable to worker reallocation through poaching and nonem-
ployment flows. Data are seasonally adjusted using X-12. The shaded regions mark quarters
in which there was a recession.
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employment-weighted average of the firm-level measure of log revenue per worker
within firm type i in quarter t and θit is the share of employment at firm type i in
quarter t.27 An increase in θht leads to an increase in Rt but the interpretation of a
change in Rt is complicated by the fact that log revenue per worker is a measure of
productivity that is not readily comparable across industries. Let Pt denote an un-
observed measure of productivity that is the weighted average of a firm-level measure
of productivity, which is comparable across industries.
Our goal is to use the observed measure of log revenue per worker in order to
quantify how changes in θht affect Pt. We achieve this goal by making the following
two assumptions:
A1. P it (k) = R
i
t(k) + Ut(k), where R
i
t(k) denotes the employment-weighted average
of the firm-level measure of log revenue per worker within industry k, firm type
i, and quarter t; Ut(k) is an unobserved term that is constant within industry
and quarter; and P it (k) is the employment weighted average of the unobserved









= 0, where θit(k) is the share of employment at firm type
i within industry k and quarter t, R̃it(k) ≡ Rit(k) − (Rlt(k) + Rht (k))/2, and ∆
denotes the difference between quarter t and t− 1.
Assumption A1 states that, up to an additive term that is constant within industry
and quarter, log revenue per worker is a measure of productivity that is comparable
27While the firm type (high- or low-productivity) is time invariant, the firm-level measures of
productivity used to construct Rit are measured in time t.
28Recall that P it (k) is a measure of productivity that is directly comparable across industries.
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across industries. Assumption A2 states that the covariance between the share of
employment at high-productivity firms and the dispersion of log revenue per worker
does not change over time. Appendix C.2 presents empirical evidence that supports
the plausibility of assumptions A1 and A2.
Assumptions A1 and A2 allow us to isolate productivity growth that arises from
worker reallocation between high- and low-productivity firms. By an accounting
identity we can rewrite the unobserved measure of aggregate productivity as an









t (k)]. Combining this accounting identity with assumptions A1 and A2 implies
the following expression for this index of aggregate productivity growth,
∆Pt = (R̃
h














where P̄t(k) ≡ [P lt (k)+P ht (k)]/2. The first term, (R̃ht−1− R̃lt−1)∆θht , is the component
of productivity growth attributable to worker reallocation between high- and low-
productivity firms.29 The remaining terms capture other aspects of productivity
growth, which include productivity growth driven by firm-level innovations unrelated
to worker reallocation. See Appendix C.2 for a details.
We can further decompose the component of productivity growth attributable
to worker reallocation between high- and low-productivity firms into the components
attributable to poaching, nonemployment, and residuals flows. Specifically, combining
29While our classification of high- and low-productivity firms is based on a within-industry ranking
of log revenue per worker, our worker flows data are not restricted to within-industry job flows.
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equation 3.2 with the first term in equation 3.3, yields,
(R̃ht−1 − R̃lt−1)∆θht︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker Reallocation
= (R̃ht−1 − R̃lt−1)λ̃ht︸ ︷︷ ︸
Poaching
+ (R̃ht−1 − R̃lt−1)δ̃ht︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nonemployment
+ (R̃ht−1 − R̃lt−1)ε̃ht︸ ︷︷ ︸
Residual
(3.4)
An increase in the share of workers at high-productivity firms increases the index of
aggregate productivity, and the magnitude of the effect is determined by the pro-
ductivity differential between high- and low-productivity firms. The analysis in this
section uses equation 3.4 to decompose productivity growth attributable to worker
reallocation (between high- and low-productivity firms) through poaching and nonem-
ployment flows.
Figure 3.4(A) presents the decomposition of productivity growth into components
attributable to poaching and nonemployment flows and shows clear evidence of the
cleansing and sullying effects of recessions. On average, worker reallocation through
poaching flows contributes 0.1 log points to overall productivity growth each quarter
(all statistics on productivity changes are quarterly and have not been annualized).
This is a substantial contribution to the overall quarterly average rate of productivity
growth of 0.33 when aggregating our micro data.30 However, during recessions there
is clear evidence of a sullying effect. In 2006:1 the poaching contribution is 0.13 log
points but this declines to 0.02 by 2009:2. In contrast, worker reallocation through
nonemployment tends to be a drag on productivity growth, on average, decreasing
productivity by 0.67 log points each quarter.31 However, during recessions there is
30As discussed in Appendix C.1, the comparable average quarterly rate using published BLS
statistics is 0.43. The aggregate index from our data and from published BLS statistics are highly
correlated (0.85).
31This drag on productivity is consistent with job ladder models with search and matching fric-
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evidence of a cleansing effect since during those times nonemployment flows yield
declines in the employment share of low-productivity firms. In 2006:1, the nonem-
ployment component is -0.1 log points but increases to 0.08 in 2009:1. The figure
illustrates the staggered nature of these effects in which the cleansing occurs at the
outset of the recession–when unemployment rate is rising most rapidly–and the sul-
lying effect peaks relatively further on into the downturn–which the unemployment
rate is highest. In addition, the sullying effect lingers well into the recovery.
Figure 3.4(B) presents the combined effect of worker reallocation through poaching
and nonemployment flows. During expansions, the total effect of worker reallocation
through poaching and nonemployment flows contributes 0.04 log points to overall
productivity growth each quarter. In recessions, this increases to 0.08. While this
might suggest that cleansing effects dominate, these calculations neglect the fact that
the sullying effect lingers well into the recovery. Using an alternative indicator of the
cycle which is whether the unemployment rate is above or below trend (using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter), we find that the combined effect is 0.07 on average for quar-
ters where the unemployment rate is below trend and 0.03 on average for quarters
where unemployment is above trend. This reversal is driven by much larger contribu-
tions of poaching flows during periods of low unemployment (0.13) compared to high
unemployment (0.09).
Table 3.3 summarizes these patterns. Here we show results from a set of regres-
sions where different components of productivity growth are regressed on a cyclical
indicator and a time-trend. We use two alternative cyclical indicators: changes in the
tions. Dispersion in productivity is supported by such frictions in equilibrium.
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Figure 3.4: Decomposition of Growth in Productivity Over the Cycle
















































2000 2005 2010 2015
Poaching + nonemployment
Notes: Panel (A) presents the components of quarterly productivity growth that are at-
tributable to worker reallocation between high- and low-productivity firms through poaching
and nonemployment flows and Panel (B) presents the sum of these two components. Data
are seasonally adjusted using X-12. The shaded regions mark quarters in which there was a
recession.
167
unemployment rate and deviations of the unemployment rate from trend. Column
1(B) shows that productivity-enhancing reallocation through job-to-job moves is pro-
cyclical using both measures.32 Column 1(C) shows that productivity-enhancing real-
location through worker flows through nonemployment is counter-cyclical using both
measures. The net effect in Column 1(A), however, does depends on the cyclical in-
dicator. Sullying effects dominate when cyclicality is measured using deviations from
the unemployment rate: this is because it takes a while for productivity-enhancing
reallocation from job-to-job moves to recover in expansions. In contrast, cleansing
effects dominate when cyclicality is measured using changes in the unemployment
rate. Taken together, these results imply that the cleansing effect peaks earlier in a
downturn compared to the collapse of the job ladder that lingers into the early stages
of a recovery. These results also suggest that slow labor market recoveries will be
generally more damaging to productivity growth than V-shaped recoveries as slow
recoveries exhibit an accompanying slow recovery of job-to-job flows.
3.4.3 Robustness to Using the AKM Firm Premium
We assess the robustness of our results to using an alternative measure of firm per-
formance: the AKM firm premium. While the revenue per worker measure has many
strengths, it is not easily comparable across sectors and may partially reflect the
sorting of workers across firms in addition to innate differences in firm productivity.
The AKM firm premium, which is an alternative proxy for firm performance, is not
subject to these same limitations and therefore provides a useful comparison.
32We discuss columns 2 and 3 of this table in the next section.
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Table 3.3: Productivity Growth from Job Flows Over the Cycle
Productivity Growth
(1) (2) (3)
A. Net Job Flows
Change in unemployment rate 0.040 0.010 0.005
(0.015) (0.016) (0.043)
Deviated unemployment rate -0.024 -0.026 -0.084
(0.005) (0.006) (0.014)
B. Poaching Job Flows
Change in unemployment rate -0.052 -0.062 -0.225
(0.010) (0.009) (0.029)
Deviated unemployment rate -0.024 -0.021 -0.073
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013)
C. Nonemployment Job Flows
Change in unemployment rate 0.092 0.072 0.230
(0.009) (0.010) (0.026)
Deviated unemployment rate 0.000 -0.005 -0.012
(0.006) (0.005) (0.015)
Definition of Job Ladder
Firms ranked by productivity AKM firm effect AKM firm effect
Firms ranked within industry industry full sample
Notes: Each cell presents results from a separate regression estimated on national quarterly data.
The dependent variable is the growth in productivity or AKM firm fixed effect as noted by the
second to last row. The independent variables in each regression include a cyclical indicator
as well as a linear time-trend and a constant, which are not reported. The cyclical indicators
considered include the change in the unemployment rate and the deviations of unemployment
from the Hodrick-Prescott Trend. Aside from the linear trend, all dependent and independent
variables are measured in percentage point units. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
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Figure 3.5 decomposes growth in the aggregate firm premium attributable to
worker reallocation across the firm premium ladder through poaching and nonem-
ployment flows. Note that firms are re-ranked into high- and low-premium firms
and the worker flows (i.e., λ̃ht and δ̃
h
t ) and the differentials in the firm premium
(i.e., R̃ht−1 − R̃lt−1) are re-calculated to reflect these new rankings and the alternative
measure of firm performance. Figure 3.5(A) follows the methodology described in
equation 3.4 but uses the AKM firm effect as the measure of productivity instead
of revenue per worker. Importantly, firms are ranked within 4-digit NAICS industry
codes. Unlike the gross output per worker measure, the AKM firm effect is directly
comparable across industries. Thus, Figure 3.5(B) also uses the methodology de-
scribed in equation 3.4 but, in addition to using the AKM firm effect as the measure
of productivity, treats all firms as being part of the same industry. In effect, Figure
3.5(B) ranks firms in the pooled sample and accounts for worker reallocation both
within and across industries.
Regardless of the methodology used, both series in Figure 3.5 present clear evi-
dence of the cleansing and sullying effects that were apparent in worker reallocation
across the firm productivity ladder using revenue per worker. For the within-industry
rankings, we find that, on average, poaching flows to higher-paying firms lead to an
increase in firm premium by 0.09 log points per quarter whereas nonemployment flows
lead to a 0.09 log point decrease in the firm premium per quarter. These estimates are
quite similar qualitatively and quantitatively to the patterns using the direct measure
of within industry productivity differences to rank firms. We also find the cyclical
patterns of these components are very similar to those using the direct measure of
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Figure 3.5: Decomposition of Growth in the Indirect Measure of Productivity Over
the Cycle
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Poaching Nonemployment
Notes: This figure presents the components of the indirect measure of productivity growth–
i.e., the AKM firm fixed effect–that are attributable to worker reallocation between high-
and low-productivity firms through poaching and nonemployment flows. Firms are ranked
based on their AKM firm fixed effects. In panel (A) firms are ranked within their 4-digit
NAICS industry codes. In panel (B) firms are ranked within the full sample. Data are
seasonally adjusted using X-12. The shaded regions mark quarters in which there was a
recession.
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productivity. Figure 3.5(B) presents estimates based on ranking firms in the pooled
sample (not within industry) and finds that, on average, poaching flows contribute
0.3 log points to the growth in the AKM firm premium each quarter whereas nonem-
ployment flows lead a decline by 0.4 log points per quarter. The estimates are about
three times as large as those for the within industry based tabulations. While much
larger in magnitude, the qualitative patterns are very similar.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.3 quantify the cyclicality of the contributions to
this indirect measure of firm performance. As in the first column, we find that the
cleansing contribution outweighs the sullying contribution in response to an increase
in the unemployment rate while the opposite is true in response to a positive deviation
of the unemployment rate from trend. These findings hold regardless of whether we
rank firms within industries (column 2) or in the pooled sample (column 3). Since
the AKM firm premium abstracts from worker heterogeneity, this suggests our main
results by firm productivity are not being driven by variation in the patterns of
sorting of heterogeneous workers across heterogeneous firms over the cycle. The
larger coefficients in column (3) relative to column (2) suggest that cleansing and
sullying effects are larger in magnitude when inter-industry productivity differentials
are accounted for but that the relative contribution of these effects on productivity
growth are qualitatively similar.
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3.5 Implications for Earnings
Whereas Section 3.4 focused on implications for productivity growth, the current
section asks if moving up the firm productivity ladder benefits workers in the form
of higher earnings. We use the same methodology described in equation 3.4, but we
replace the productivity differentials, R̃ht−1 − R̃lt−1, with earnings differentials. We
measure firm-level earnings in two ways: (i) average log earnings of all workers, and
(ii) the AKM firm fixed effect. The earnings differential is the difference between
the employment-weighted average of earnings at high- and low-productivity firms.
Consistent with our core analysis, we deviate earnings from the industry average
when calculating the differentials. Note that the exercise is distinct from the analysis
discussed in Section 3.4.3, since we are investigating the earnings implications of
worker flows across firms ranked by the revenue per worker measure of productivity.
Figure 3.6 shows that worker reallocation up the firm productivity ladder through
poaching and nonemployment flows has meaningful implications for the earnings of
workers. Figures 3.6(A) and 3.6(B) present results in which the earnings differentials
are measured with average log earnings and the AKM firm premium, respectively.
The results in the two figures are quantitatively and qualitatively similar. Job-to-job
transitions add an average of 0.05 log points to average earnings in any given quarter.
The earnings contribution of job-to-job flows is lower during recessions. During the
2007-2009 recession, the earnings contribution of job-to-job flows fell to a series low
of 0.01. The contribution of nonemployment transitions to earnings growth is in the
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opposite direction and similar in magnitude to the contribution of job-to-job flows.33
In the average quarter, worker movements into and from nonemployment subtract
an average of 0.03 log points from earnings. This negative effect of nonemployment
transitions is less present during recessions. During the 2001 recession, the contribu-
tion of nonemployment transitions is close to zero. During the 2007-2009 recession,
the contribution of nonemployment transitions to earnings growth is briefly positive.
Comparing these results to Figure 3.4, we can draw conclusions about the extent to
which the gains from productivity-enhancing reallocation are realized by workers. The
earnings and productivity implications of employment transitions have similar signs,
with job-to-job transitions providing gains, while nonemployment transitions subtract
from each. The magnitudes, however, differ. The proportionate changes in earnings
are approximately half the magnitude of the analogous changes in productivity. This
suggests incomplete pass-through of the gains in revenue productivity from worker
flows into earnings.
3.6 Conclusion
Consistent with the existing literature on firm heterogeneity, we find evidence of large
differences in productivity across firms within the same industry. We also find that
more productive firms in the same industry are more likely to grow and less productive
firms more likely to contract and exit. The dispersion of productivity across firms
33Hahn, Hyatt, and Janicki (2021) consider the implications of employment transitions for earn-
ings growth without considering productivity. They report that job-to-job and nonemployment
transitions move in opposite directions and are roughly similar in magnitude, and follow opposite
cyclical patterns.
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Poaching Nonemployment
Notes: Panel (A) shows the components of earnings growth that attributable to worker
reallocation between high- and low-productivity firms through poaching and nonemployment
flows. We use the differences between the average earnings of workers at high and low
productivity firms in order to quantify the implications of changes in the share of workers at
high-productivity firms. Panel (B) presents the components of firm premium growth that
are attributable to worker reallocation between high- and low-productivity firms through
poaching and nonemployment flows. Data are seasonally adjusted using X-12. The shaded
regions mark quarters in which there was a recession.
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is large in magnitude contributing to a high pace of reallocation of workers across
firms. Using a decomposition of net job flows into those accounted for by job-to-job
flows and those accounted for net flows from nonemployment, we find that much
of the overall reallocation of employment from less productive to more productive
firms is accounted for by job-to-job flows. The pace at which workers move up the
productivity job ladder is highly procyclical. The collapse of the productivity job
ladder is consistent with a sullying effect of recessions. In recessions, we find that
the reallocation of workers away from less productive firms via nonemployment flows
increases. This occurs through a spike in separations to nonemployment along with
a decline in hires from nonemployment at low productivity firms. Thus, we also find
evidence that this component of reallocation is consistent with a cleansing effect of
recessions.
The timing of the cleansing and sullying effects differs across stages of the cycle.
The cleansing effect peaks relatively early in a downturn coincident with the relatively
early spike in separations. The sullying effect peaks later in a downturn but lingers
into the early stages of a recovery when unemployment is falling but remains well
above trend.
Our findings are robust to using a direct measure of productivity based on rel-
ative differences in revenue per worker across firms within the same industry and
an indirect measure of productivity/firm performance based on using the AKM firm
premium to rank firms and quantify the contribution of worker flows to improved
aggregate performance. When we focus on relative differences in the AKM firm pre-
mium across firms within the same industry, the results are very similar qualitatively
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and quantitatively to those using the direct measure of relative productivity. Since
the AKM firm premium abstracts from worker heterogeneity, this suggests our results
are not being driven by variation in the patterns of sorting of heterogeneous workers
across heterogeneous firms over the cycle. This is not to suggest that the latter is
unimportant but rather that there may be additional effects of cleansing and sullying
from sorting above and beyond those we have quantified. We recognize that any
conclusions about the role of sorting over the cycle for productivity fluctuations are
tentative at best. Further theoretical and empirical work is needed in this area.
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Chapter A: Appendix Material for Chapter 1
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A.1 Additional Empirical Results
Figure A.1: Earnings Before and After Entry
(A) Average Earnings
(B) Earnings Categories
Notes: Both figures plot earnings in the 12 quarters before and after entry. Panel A plots the average
quarterly earnings and Panel B plots the proportion of individuals with quarterly earnings in one of
four mutually exclusive categories. All statistics are calculated using sample weights.
Source: Author’s calculations based on matched data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
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Figure A.2: Age-Earnings Profile by Age of Entry
Notes: The figure plots the average annual earnings by age for different groups of workers defined
by the age they were when they entered the labor market. The category, NE, is a group of workers
that never entered the labor market. The sample includes all children who turned 30 by 2016 and
all statistics are calculated using sample weights.
Source: Author’s calculations based on matched data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
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Figure A.3: Age of Entry
Notes: The figure plots the cumulative proportion of children that have entered the labor market by
the age indicated on horizontal axis. For comparison, I also plot results using alternative measures
of entry constructed from the NLSY97. These measures include the first stable job (working at
least 35 hours for 36 consecutive weeks) and the first stable job after all schooling is completed. All
statistics are calculated using sample weights.
Source: Author’s calculations based on matched data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics (LEHD) and 2000 Decennial Census files and data from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1997 cohort (NLSY97).
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Table A.1: Intergenerational Transmission of Employers and Education
works for parent’s employer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
less than high school 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.048*** 0.023* 0.055***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002)
high school 0.043*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.048***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
some college 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
parental earnings quartile first second third fourth all
observations 180,000 183,000 177,000 165,000 705,000
Notes: Each column presents estimates from a separate regression. The outcome variable is
an indicator equal to one if the first stable job is at the employer of either parent. The main
independent variables include indicator variables for the highest level of education: less than high
school, high school or equivalent, and some college or Associate degree. Bachelor’s degree or
advanced degree is the omitted educational category. Each regression controls for the interaction
between the sex of the individual and the percentile of the parental earnigns distribution. All
results are based on the sample of individuals who respond to the American Community Survey
after they turn 25. Columns 1 through 4 present estimates based on the sample of individuals
whose parents are in the first through fourth quartiles of the parental earnigns distribution,
respectively. Column 5 includes all indviduals.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics, 2000 Decennial Census files and responses to the American Community Survey.
*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.01, * p≤0.05
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Table A.2: Intergenerational Transmission of Employers and Unemployment
works for parent’s employer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployment rate -0.068** 0.128*** 0.191*** 0.064*
(0.022) (0.024) (0.032) (0.031)
covariates
age of entry X X X
quarter of entry X
county X
observations 17,010,000 17,010,000 17,010,000 17,010,000
Notes: Each column presents estimates from a separate regression. The outcome variable is
an indicator equal to one if the first stable job is at the employer of either parent. The main
independent variable is the county-level unemployment rate, which ranges from zero to one,
measured in the year in which the child enters the labor market. The different columns include
additional covariates as indicated by the rows below the estimates. The covariates include fixed
effects for: the age of entry, the quarter of entry, the county in which the individual entered the
labor market. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county and quarter of entry.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics and 2000 Decennial Census files and unemployment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.3: Intergenerational Transmission of Employers by Sex
works for employer of
neither parent father mother both parents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Daughters
0.940 0.013 0.040 0.006
A. Sons
0.922 0.042 0.026 0.010
Notes: Panels A and B present results for daughters and sons, respectively. Columns 1 through
4 present the proportion of individuals who find their first stable job at the same employer as
neither parent, the father, the mother, and both parents, respectively. The proportions are
calculated separately by the sex of the child. All statistics are calculated using sample weights.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.5: Household Fixed Effects
log of quarterly earnings
(1) (2)
works for parent’s employer 0.199*** 0.155***
(0.040) (0.045)
fixed effect employer household
control mean 8.757 8.757
observations 4,476,000 4,476,000
Notes: Each column presents estimates from a separate regression estimated by two-stage least
squares. The outcome variable is the log of the first full-quarter of earnings at the first stable
job. The endogenous variable is an indicator equal to one if the individual works for their
parent’s employer (primary earner) at the first stable job. The excluded instrument is the
average quarterly hiring rate at the parent’s employer in the four quarters prior to the quarter
of entry. The specification in column 1 includes a fixed effect for the parent’s employer whereas
the specification in column 2 includes a fixed effect for the parent’s employer by household. Both
specifications are estimated on the same sample (which drop singleton observations) and include
a fixed effect for the year of entry by two-digit industry code of parent’s employer by state of
parent’s employer; and a vector of covariates that includes log annual earnings of the parent in
the year prior to entry, a fixed effect for the cohort of the child and interactions between the
sex of the child and race, ethnicity, and an indicator equal to one if born in the United States.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of parent’s employer and are presented in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynam-
ics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.01, * p≤0.05
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Table A.6: Effect on Timing of Entry
average in three years prior to entry
quarterly quarters quarter of
earnings worked entry
(1) (2) (3)
works for parent’s employer -84.870 -0.066** -3.973***
(61.840) (0.020) (0.570)
control mean 1,269 0.612 13.170
observations 11,460,000 11,460,000 11,460,000
Notes: Each column presents estimates from a separate regression estimated by two-stage least
squares. The outcome variables in columns 1 and 2 are average quarterly earnings and em-
ployment in the three years pior to entry, respectively. The outcome variable in column 3 is
the quarter of entry relative to the expected quarter of high school graduation (based on birth
cohort). The endogenous variable is an indicator equal to one if the child works for their par-
ent’s employer (primary earner) at the first stable job. The excluded instrument is the average
quarterly hiring rate at the parent’s employer in the four quaters prior to the quarter in which
the individual enters the labor market. All specifications include a fixed effect for the parent’s
employer; a fixed effect for the year of entry by two-digit industry code of parent’s employer by
state of parent’s employer; and a vector of covariates that includes log annual earnings of the
parent in the year prior to entry and interactions between the sex of the child and race, ethnicity,
and an indicator equal to one if born in the United States. The specificaitons in columns 1 and
2 also include a fixed effect for the cohort of the child. Standard errors are clustered at the level
of parent’s employer and are presented in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics and 2000 Decennial Census files.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.8: Long-Run Effects
Notes: Each point on the figure represents an estimate from a separate regression. The outcome
is the annual earnings x years after entry, where x refers to the coordinate on the horizontal axis.
The endogenous variable is an indicator equal to one if the child work for their parent’s employer
(primary earner) at the first stable job. The excluded instrument is the average quarterly hiring
rate at the parent’s employer in the four quarters prior to the quarter in which the individual enters
the labor market. All specifications include a fixed effect for the parent’s employer; a fixed effect
for the year of entry by two-digit industry code of parent’s employer by state of parent’s employer;
and a vector of covariates that includes log annual earnings of the parent in the year prior to entry,
a fixed effect for the cohort of the child and interactions between the sex of the child and race,
ethnicity, and an indicator equal to one if born in the U.S. Standard errors are clustered at the level
of parent’s employer and are used to construct the 95% confidence interval, which is denoted by the
dashed lines. All regressions are estimated on a sample of 3,441,000 individuals who are expected to
graduate high school in 2004 or earlier and who entered the labor market between the year in which
they were expected to graduate high school and six and a half years later. The F-statistic from the
first stage is 364.
Source: Author’s calculations based on matched data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
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Table A.9: Effect of Working for Employer of Secondary Earner
works for
parent’s employer log of quarterly earnings
(1) (2) (3)
hiring rate 0.071*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.006)
works for parent’s employer 0.291***
(0.081)
estimator OLS OLS 2SLS
F-statistic 365
mean 0.042
control mean 8.762 8.762
observations 4,447,000 4,447,000 4,447,000
Notes: Each column presents results from a separate regression. The outcome variable in column
1 is an indicator equal to one if the child works for their parent’s employer (secondary earner) at
their first stable job and the outcome variable in columns 2-4 is the log of the first full-quarter
earnings at the first stable job. The main independent variable in column 1 is the average
quarterly hiring rate at the parent’s employer and the main independent variable in columns
2-4 is an indicator equal to one if the individual worked for the employer of their parent. The
results in columns 1-3 are estaimted by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the results in column
4 are estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the instrument is the average quarterly
hiring rate at the parent’s employer in the four quarters prior to the quarter in which the child
enters the labor market. All specifications include a fixed effect for the parent’s employer; a fixed
effect for the year of entry by two-digit industry code of parent’s employer by state of parent’s
employer; and a vector of covariates that includes log annual earnings of the parent in the year
prior to entry, a fixed effect for the cohort of the child and interactions between the sex of the
child and race, ethnicity, and an indicator equal to one if born in the United States. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of parent’s employer and are presented in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.01, * p≤0.05
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Table A.10: Effect of Working for Father’s and Mother’s Employer
log of quarterly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
works for father’s employer 0.522*** 0.326***
(0.102) (0.039)
works for mother’s employer 0.281*** 0.336***
(0.056) (0.075)
sample daughters sons daughters sons
first stage F-statistic 387.900 760.900 760.900 391.800
observations 3,511,000 3,691,000 3,691,000 4,168,000
Notes: Each column presents results from a separate regression. The outcome variable is the
log of the first full-quarter earnings at the first stable job. Columns 1-2 estimate the effect of
working for the mother’s emloyer and columns 3-4 estimate the effect of working at the father’s
employer. The main independent variable is an indicator equal to one if the individual worked for
the employer of their parent. Each specification is estimated by two-stage least squares, where
the excluded instrument is the average quarterly hiring rate at the parent’s employer in the
four quarters prior to the quarter in which the child enters the labor market. All specifications
include a fixed effect for the parent’s employer; a fixed effect for the year of entry by two-digit
industry code of parent’s employer by state of parent’s employer; and a vector of covariates that
includes log annual earnings of the parent in the year prior to entry, a fixed effect for the cohort
of the child and interactions between the sex of the child and race, ethnicity, and an indicator
equal to one if born in the United States. Standard errors are clustered at the level of parent’s
employer and are presented in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.01, * p≤0.05
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Figure A.9: Residualized Hiring Rate
Notes: This figure presents the kernel density of the residuals from a regression of the average
quarterly hiring rate at the parents’ (primary earner) employer in the four quarters prior to entry
on a fixed effect for the parents’ employer; a fixed effect for the year of entry by two-digit industry
code of parents’ employer by state of parents’ employer; and a vector of covariates that includes log
annual earnings of the parent in the year prior to entry, a fixed effect for the cohort of the child and
interactions between the sex of the child and race, ethnicity, and an indicator equal to one if born in
the United States. Standard errors are clustered at the level of parents’ employer. The distribution
is winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles according to the Census Bureau’s rules.
Source: Author’s calculations based on matched data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
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Table A.11: Heterogeneity by Residualized Hiring Rate
log of quarterly earnings
(1) (2) (3)
works for parent’s employer 0.436*** 0.310*** 0.228*
(0.048) (0.029) (0.114)
estimation sample
first tercile X X
second tercile X X
third tercile X X
first stage F-stat 999 1,429 212
observations 7,304,000 7,606,000 7,308,000
Notes: Each column presents estimates from a separate regression estimated by two-stage least
squares. The outcome variable is the log of the first full-quarter earnings at the first stable
job. The endogenous variable is an indicator equal to one if the child works for their parent’s
employer (primary earner) at the first stable job. The excluded instrument is the average
quarterly hiring rate at the parent’s employer in the four quarters prior to the quarter in which
the individual enters the labor market. The sample is partitioned into terciles based on the
residualized hiring rate. The row below the estimates indicates whether observations from a
given tercile are included in the estimation sample. All specifications include a fixed effect for
the parent’s employer; a fixed effect for the year of entry by two-digit industry code of parent’s
employer by state of parent’s employer; and a vector of covariates that includes log annual
earnings of the parent in the year prior to entry, a fixed effect for the cohort of the child and
interactions between the sex of the child and race, ethnicity, and an indicator equal to one if
born in the United States. Standard errors are clustered at the level of parent’s employer and
are presented in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.01, * p≤0.05
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Table A.12: Characteristics of Compliers
works for parent’s employer Characteristics of Compliers
no yes IV(p25) IV(p50) IV(p75)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Individual
male 0.50 0.60 0.54 0.54 0.51
White non-Hispanic 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74
Black non-Hispanic 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.10
Asian non-Hispanic 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Hispanic 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10
other 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
born in United States 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97
B. Parent and their Employer
skilled services 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.48 0.66
unskilled services 0.15 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.10
manufacturing/production 0.35 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.25
tenure of parent 23.96 22.63 24.52 25.27 26.71
earnings rank within employer 68.49 77.93 63.97 51.65 65.40
parental earnings rank 55.47 54.40 58.48 66.39 60.33
Sample Size
proportion of full sample 0.94 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.15
Notes: Each row presents estimates for the variable defined in the first column.Columns 1 and 2
present the average value of the variable for the sample of individuals who do not and do work
for the employer of their parent at their first stable job, respectively. Colummns 3-5 present the
average characteristics of the compliers for the case in which the instrumental variable is a binary
variable equal to one if the residualized hiring rate exceeds the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile,
respectively. The complier characteristics are estimated using the methodology described by
Abadie (2003). I winsorize the estimates of κ at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the
influence of outlier values.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynam-
ics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
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Table A.13: Intergenerational Elasticity of Earnings Using Long-Run Earnings
earnings of child in 2016
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Including Zero Earnings
log of parental earnings 0.378 0.417 0.396
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
sample daughters sons all
observations 8,416,000 8,591,000 17,010,000
Panel B. Excluding Zero Earnings
log of parental earnings 0.2499 0.2203 0.2348
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
sample daughters sons all
observations 7,412,000 7,706,000 15,120,000
Notes: Columns 1 through 3 present results based on a sample of daughters, sons, and all
children, respectively. The estimates in Panel A are the coefficients from a regression in which
the independent variable is the log of parental earnings and the dependent variable is the inverse
hyperbolic sine of the earnings of the child in 2016. The samples used to estimate the regressions
in Panel A include children who have zero earnings in 2016. The estimates in Panel B are the
coefficients from a regression in which the independent variable is the log of parental earnings
and the dependent variable is the log of the earnings of the child in 2016. The samples used to
estimate the regressions in Panel B do not include children who have zero earnings in 2016. All
regressions are estimated via weighted least squares using sample weights.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
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Figure A.10: Log Earnings of Parents and Children
Notes: The figure plots the average log earnings of the children against the average log earnings of
the parents. Each point represents the average outcome of individuals and their parents for a given
percentile of the parental earnings distribution. The horizontal and vertical axes correspond to the
average value of log parental earnings and the average value of the log of the first full-quarter of
earnings at the first stable job of the child, respectively. All statistics are calculated using sample
weights.
Source: Author’s calculations based on matched data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
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IGE 0.1565 0.1298 0.1430
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
B. No Transmission with Primary Earner
percent change in IGE -0.95% -1.14% -1.05%
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
C. No Transmission with Either Parent
percent change in IGE -1.94% -2.34% -2.14%
(0.18) (0.22) (0.20)
observations 8,416,000 8,591,000 17,010,000
Notes: The results in columns 1-3 corresopnd to daughters, sons and all children, respectively.
Panel A presents the observed intergenerational elasticity of earnings (IGE), which is denoted
ρ(yijt, yp) and is estimated with sample weights via weighted least squares. Panels B and C
present the percent by which the IGE estimates in Panel A would change if no children were to
work for the employer of the parent who is the primary earner or either parent, respectively. The
percent change is defined as,
ρ(yijt,yp)−ρ(yi(j0)t,yp)
ρ(yijt,yp)
× 100. The treatment effects used to construct
the counterfactual estimates are estimated via two-stage least squares and are estimated for the
entire sample, pooling sons and daughters and children from all five quintiles of the parental
earnings distrbution. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are calculated using the
delta method and take into account the uncertainty in the estimated earnings consequences.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.2 Details on Data
A.2.1 Sample Frame
The Hundred Percent Census Edited File (HCEF) is an edited version of the Hun-
dred Percent Census Unedited File, which contains all household and person records
included in the 2000 Decennial Census. Edits are applied to remove duplicate ob-
servations and to ensure consistency between the long and short-form files. While
the Decennial Census surveys aim to interview everyone who resides in the United
States, in practice, the sample frame considered in my paper does not include all
children (within the appropriate age range) living in the United States in 2000. In
addition to coverage issues in the 2000 Decennial Census discussed in the text and by
Mulry (2007) and the technical report “Coverage Evaluation of Census 2000: Design
and Methodology”, some children do not live with their parents. Specifically, 91%
of individuals younger than 18 lived with their parents in 2000. The remaining 9%
individuals will be excluded from my sample since I require that the parent is the
head of household.1
Panel A and B of Figure A.13 depict the share of individuals whose relationship to
the household head is defined as a child by age in 2000 and race/ethnicity, respectively.
While my sample frame excludes some individuals for these two reasons, it does
include the vast majority of children who fall within the age range. Nevertheless, I
point out that the results in this paper aim to be representative of the sample frame
and I make no attempts to adjust for additional differences between the sample frame
and other populations.
1This statistic is based on the authors own calculations using a 5% sample of the 2000 Decennial


















































































































































































































































































































































I make several key sample restrictions in the move from the sample frame to the
analysis sample, all of which are summarized in Table A.16. First, I implement a
number of restrictions to ensure that I can accurately link the records of the children
from the HCEF to the data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics
(LEHD) program. Individuals are identified by a Protected Identification Key (PIK),
which the Census Bureau generates using personally identifiable information.2 I use
the PIK to link person records between the HCEF and the LEHD and to attach em-
ployer characteristics to jobs. Various types of measurement error in the HCEF may
prevent a PIK from being accurately assigned to an individual. In order to ensure
that each child is accurately assigned a PIK, I require that a unique PIK be assigned
to the individual and the year and month of birth recorded in the Individual Charac-
teristic File (ICF) match those recorded in the HCEF.3 The decision to retain only
observations with unique non-missing PIKs and matching year and month of birth
between the HCEF and the LEHD is conservative, in the sense that it may drop some
individuals who could accurately be linked across the two datasets. The justification
for doing this is to limit measurement error in intergenerational relationships, which
would arise if PIKs were incorrectly assigned to the child or either parent. While
these restrictions reduce sample size, they do not introduce bias to the extent that
the sample weights account for the selected nature of the sample. 79% of the children
in the sample frame satisfy these restrictions.
Second, I implement a number of restrictions to ensure that I accurately measure
the relationship between children and parents and link parental records to the LEHD.
2See Wagner and Layne (2014) for a description of the methodology by which PIKs are assigned
to individual observations.
3The ICF contains a record for every individual that ever appears in the LEHD and contains
basic observable characteristics such as race, sex, and date of birth. The primary source for the date
of birth variable is the Person Characteristic File (PCF), which is drawn from information recorded
from transactions with the Social Security Administration.
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To ensure that the relationship between children and parents is accurately measured
in the HCEF, I require that the household contains no more than 15 individuals in the
HCEF. To ensure that I am able to link the records of the parents to the LEHD files,
I require that a unique PIK be assigned to both parents and the year and month of
birth recorded in the ICF match those recorded in the HCEF for both parents.4 62%
of the children in the sample frame satisfy the restrictions in this and the preceding
paragraph.
I construct sample weights in order to address the possibility that the first two sam-
ple restrictions produce a selected sample. Specifically, using a dataset that includes
every child in the sample frame, I estimate the propensity score as the probability
of satisfying the first two sample restrictions as a function of observable character-
istics that include: sex, relationship to head of household (biological child, adopted
child or step child), race (White, Black, Native American, Asian, or other), Hispanic
ethnicity, number of parents in the household in 2000, and a vector of observable
characteristics of the census tract in which the household resided in at the time of the
2000 Decennial Survey (share of parents that are single parents, median household
income, poverty rate, proportion of residents who were living in the same house five
years ago, urban/rural, proposition of households receiving public assistance). The
sample weights are the inverse of the estimated propensity score.
Third, I implement a set of restrictions to ensure that the measurement of key
labor market outcomes are not impacted by coverage issues in the LEHD. Since
much of the analysis focuses on the labor market outcomes associated with first
stable jobs, I drop children if their first stable job is likely to not be covered in
the LEHD. Specifically, I identify the state in which children reside in in the year
they are expected to graduate from high school and retain observations only if the
state was participating in the LEHD for more than a year prior to that year and the
4Parents are defined as the household head and either their spouse or unmarried partner. Note












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































year child entered the labor market. Since an important dimension of the project
is to study differences across the parental earnings distribution, I also drop parents
for whom I cannot reliable measure earnings. Specifically, I construct a long-run
measure of parental earnings (discussed in detail in Appendix Section A.2.4) and I
drop parents whose earnings is below the 5th percentile. The percentile is calculated
on a dataset with all previously discussed sample restrictions and also conditional on
the child entering the labor market. For parents below this threshold, it is difficult
to distinguish between low earnings and earnings missed in the LEHD and I find
that measures of earnings and other economic indicators (such as the poverty rate
of median value in the census tract in which the household lived in 2000) start to
diverge for these households. These two sets of restrictions drop an additional 1.9
million children, which leaves 57% of the sample frame.
Lastly, much of the analysis is restricted to a set of children who enter the labor
market. I define entry as the first quarter in which the individual earns at least
$3,300 per quarter for three consecutive quarters and receives positive earnings from
the same employer for those three quarters. 46% of the children in the sample frame
satisfy the restrictions in this and the preceding paragraphs.
A.2.3 Edits to Individual Earnings Records
Earnings data in the LEHD come from Unemployment Insurance (UI) records, which
report total amount paid to each worker per employer per quarter. In measuring
quarterly earnings, I sum earnings records across employers within a quarter for each
individual to construct a measure of total individual earnings per quarter. While the
administrative data are not subject to various types of measurement error that plague
survey data, they are not error free. A key issue is that data errors can produce very
large outlier observations. Researchers typically deal with these by winsorizing the
data–editing or dropping earnings records above some percentile of the distribution.
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The issue with this methodology is that it incorrectly impacts the earnings of workers
who truly have earnings in the top percentiles.
In order to retain top earners in my sample, I use an alternative methodology to
deal with outliers. The methodology, which I have also employed in Fallick et al.
(2019), is based on the fact that outliers often appear in the form of a large spike for
a single quarter for an individual. Let zi = max{median(yit), 10000} be the greater
of the median of earnings observed for individual i over the entire sample and 10,000.5







where t is the quarter and y is the earnings. The growth rate, ∆it, captures the extent
to which earnings in a given quarter exceeds the typical earnings of that individual.
The choice to set a minimum value of z is motivated by the desire to avoid editing the
earnings of low earners, since the outliers are driven by very large levels of earnings.
I define outliers as earnings records that produce growth rates that exceed the
95th percentile of the distribution. Let ∆(p95) denote the 95th percentile, then the
earnings variable used in this paper is defined as:
ỹit =









if ∆it > ∆(p95)
(A.2)
This methodology edits outlier observations so that if the growth rate were calculated
on the edited value it would be equal to the 95th percentile. The advantage of this
methodology over the traditional winsorization method is that it retains the earnings
records of individuals who consistently have high levels of earnings.
5The median is calculated from a sample that contains strictly positive earnings.
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A.2.4 Measuring Parental Earnings
The ideal dataset would contain earnings data for each worker over their entire work-
ing life, and lifetime earnings would simply be calculated as the sum of all observed
earnings. However, the LEHD fall short of the ideal data because some sources of
earnings are not included in the data and because they do not cover the full working
life of all parents in the sample. Thus, I require an alternative method to estimate
lifetime earnings.
A common approach in the literature is to calculate parental earnings as the av-
erage earnings over a limited number of years. For example, recent work by Chetty
et al. (2014) measure parental earnings as the average earnings measured across five
years. Even using comprehensive income data derived from the 1040 tax forms, there
are various issues with their approach (see Mazumder 2016 for a detailed discussion).
The first is related to the number of years over which the earnings are averaged. A
large literature inspired by Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) finds that measuring
parental earnings over a short time periods introduces measurement error and leads to
artificially low estimates of the intergenerational relationship in economic outcomes.
Mazumder (2005) suggest that even fifteen years of data may not be enough to accu-
rately measure lifetime earnings. The second issue, is that parental earnings measured
at different points in the life cycle may not be comparable (see Jenkins 1987; Solon
1992; Grawe 2006; Bohlmark and Lindquist 2006; Haider and Solon 2006). For ex-
ample, two individuals aged 35 and 55 might have similar earnings in a given year
but very different levels of lifetime earnings.
There are also a number of additional issues that are specific to the LEHD. The
main challenge is that it is not clear how to interpret missing data because it is diffi-
cult to distinguish between zero earnings and missing earnings. There are two main
reasons why earnings data from the LEHD might be missing for a given individual in
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a given quarter. First, data availability in the LEHD varies on a state-by-state basis.
While all states are currently reporting, coverage is less complete for years further
in the past. Figure A.14 illustrates when the different states entered the program.
While the residential data in the LEHD can be used to identify whether workers
are living in a state that participates in the LEHD, imperfect coverage of these data
and workers who commute across state boundaries make it difficult to accurately flag
workers whose earnings are missing due to a lack of state reporting.
Second, while most earnings (96% of salary employment) are covered under the
UI system, the LEHD systematically misses some sources of earnings. Measurement
issues at the bottom of the wage earnings distribution are of particular concern.
Figure A.15 demonstrates this point by using data from the CPS to plot average total
household income by source against percentiles of parental wage earnings distribution.
For most of the distribution, wage earnings (which are accurately measured in the
LEHD) are the primary source of both income and earnings. However, this is not true
at the bottom of the distribution. Below the vertical line marks the set of households
with no wage earnings (12% of household in this sample have no reported wage
earnings). Below the 25th percentile, alternative sources of income start becoming
an increasingly more important source of total household income, so much so that
households with zero reported wage earnings actually have higher average total income
relative to households who have positive, but little, wage earnings. Most importantly,
since my focus is on earnings, self-employment (not captured in the LEHD) is a
main source of earnings for parents at the bottom of the wage earnings distribution.
Wage earnings is the primary source of income for households with total income (as
opposed to total wage earnings) that is above the 10th percentile. The same is not
true for households with income below the 10th percentile, for whom transfer income
is relatively more important. While Figure A.15 seems to indicate that wage earnings
represent the primary source of earnings at the top of the distribution, Smith et al.
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(2019) find that non-wage earnings become increasingly important in the top 1% of
earners. Taken together, the measure of parental earnings constructed using earnings
data from the LEHD should be seen as representative of working families, which
excludes roughly the bottom 10% and top 1% of earners.
In order to address the measurement issues in the LEHD, I use an estimation pro-
cedure that leverages all of the available data. In particular, I estimate the following
regression:
yit = αi + β
gXit + uit (A.3)
where is is the individual, t is the quarter, y is total quarterly earnings, α is an
individual fixed effect and X is vector that consists of a third order polynomial in age.
To allow for a flexible age earnings profile, I estimate this specification separately for
groups, g, defined by the interaction between sex, race/ethnicity (White non-Hispanic,
Black non-Hispanic, Asian non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and other), and state of residence
in 2000. The data are a panel that include all strictly positive earnings records
between 2000 and 2016 for the parents in the sample. I further restrict the panel to
individuals between the ages of 30 and 60 and drop individuals that have fewer than
4 quarters of strictly positive earnings over the entire time period.
I use the estimates from this model to construct a measure of lifetime earnings for
each parent. I predict the value of earnings for each quarter between the ages of 35
and 55 and define lifetime earnings as the average of these values. Individuals with
either missing or negative values are assigned a lifetime earnings of zero. For single-
headed households parental earnings is simply the lifetime earnings of the parent.
For two-parent households, parental earnings is the average of the lifetime earnings
of both parents.6
Much of the analysis relies on percentile ranks of parental earnings. Thus, it is
6The choice to take the average earnings across parents is in line with the assumptions made by
Chetty et al. (2014).
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Figure A.14: States Participating in the LEHD Program
Notes: The figure plots the number of states that are reporting to the Longitudinal Household-Employer Dynamics
(LEHD) program in a given year. The abbreviations below the solid line represent the states that begin reporting in
that year.
Figure A.15: Source of Earnings Across the Wage Earnings Distribution
Notes: The figure presents the average household earnings by the percentile of total household wage earnings. Income
is broken out into five sources that include: capital/interest, transfer, non-farm business, other and wages. Percentiles
below the vertical line have zero wage earnings. The sample includes all households that have at least one child
present and excludes the households in the top percentile of the wage earnings distribution due to outlier values.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the the 2000 March supplement to the Current Population Survey












































































































































































































































































critical that the estimates of lifetime earnings preserve the rank of the true values
of lifetime earnings. While I do not have an objective measure of lifetime earnings
against which to validate my measure, I do have other proxies. In particular, I use the
HCEF to identify the census block group in which all households reside in 2000 and
measure characteristics of those neighborhoods. I focus on poverty rate and median
income, since these are likely to be correlated with lifetime earnings. Figure A.16 plots
the average value of these neighborhood level variables against the percentile of the
lifetime earnings distribution (percentiles are calculated within cohorts of children).
If all measures are proxies of lifetime earnings then there should be a monotonic
relationship between the variables. The figure illustrates that this is true for most of
the distribution. The one exception is that very bottom of the distribution, where
parental earnings may be measured with more error. But overall, the figure indicates
a strong relationship between the measure of parental earnings used in this paper
and other measures of economic status and thus should alleviate concerns related to
measurement error.
If the imputed measure of parental earnings is a multiple of the true lifetime earn-
ings value, then the estimates of IGE will be unaffected. However, if the error is
not multiplicative, or differs across individuals, then measurement error may affect
the estimates of IGE. A main concern is that my measure is unable to account for
differences in labor force participation. By failing to account for periods of nonem-
ployment, my measure will produce artificially high levels of lifetime earnings for
parents who have many periods of zero earnings. This may reduce the elasticity of
the initial earnings of a child with respect to parental earnings in the lower parts of
the distribution. For this reason, it is useful to compare the results with elasticities
to those using percentiles. It is worth pointing out that the issue of measuring the
earnings of low-income households is not unique to my setting. For example, Chetty
et al. (2014) find that their estimates of the IGE are sensitive to the inclusion of the
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households below the 10th percentile.
A.2.5 Grouping Industries into Sectors
I group two-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry
codes into three distinct sectors, which are defined below. The unskilled service sec-
tor includes: retail trade (44,45); administrative and support and waste management
and remediation services (56); arts, entertainment and recreation (71); accommoda-
tion and food services (72); and other services (81). The skilled service sector includes:
information (51); finance and insurance (52); real estate and rental and leasing (53);
profession, scientific and technical services (54); management of companies and en-
terprises (55); educational services (61); health care and social assistance (62); and
public administration (92). The manufacturing/production sector includes: agricul-
ture, forestry, fishing and hunting (11); mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction
(21); utilities (22); construction (23); manufacturing (31,32,33); wholesale trade (42);
and transportation and warehousing (48,49).
A.2.6 Employer and Industry Pay Premiums
In order to estimate the earnings-premium associated with specific employers, I use
the methodology developed by Abowd et al. (1999), or commonly referred to as the
AKM model. Specifically, I estimate the following specification,
yit = αi + Ψj(i,t) +Xitβ + εit (A.4)
where i is the individual; t is the year; y is the log of average quarterly earnings; Xit
is a vector of time varying controls that include a fixed effect for the year and a third
order polynomial in age interacted with sex and education; αi is an individual fixed
effect; Ψj(i,t) is a fixed effect for the employer of i in time t; and εit is a regression
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residual.7 The estimate, Ψ̂j(i,t), is a time-invariant measure of the employer pay
premium (measured in quarterly earnings).
I estimate this specification using a national sample that includes all earnings
records from the LEHD measured between the years 2000 and 2016 and workers
between the ages of 25 and 40. I retain jobs that provide over half of the earnings for
that year and calculate quarterly earnings as the average of full-quarter earnings for
a given employer within the year.8 Due to computational constraints, I estimate the
specification separately within 15 mutually exclusive samples defined by the 9 census
divisions and the six largest states (CA, TX, FL, NY, PA, IL). As is standard in
the literature, I restrict the sample to the largest connected set within each of these
samples. In order to account for the fact that the level of firm pay premiums are
not comparable across estimates from distinct samples, I follow Gerard et al. (2018)
and normalize all employer fixed effects by subtracting the mean value of the fixed
effect for employers in the accommodation and food services industry. Intuitively,
this normalization assumes that employers in this industry offer a pay premium of
zero, on average.
I am unable to compute the employer pay premium for employers that lie outside
of the largest connected set within each of the 15 mutually exclusive samples. In
practice this happens in a very small fraction of cases. In order to avoid disclosure
issues related to releasing results on multiple samples, I impute missing data with the
mean value of individuals who do not work at the employer of a parent and include
a control for imputed values in the empirical specification.
7Identification of the age and time effects in the presence of individual fixed effects is achieved by
following Card et al. (2013) and omitting the linear age term in for each sex by education group and
using a cubic polynomial in age minus 40. This normalization assumes that the age-earnings profile
is flat at age 40. While the normalization affects the estimates of the individual fixed effects and
the covariate index Xitβ, the employer fixed effects are invariant to the normalization used. Data
on education comes from the individual characteristics file and is sourced from various surveys and
is imputed for many observations.
8Outliers in the earnings data are dealt with using the same methodology described in Appendix
Section A.2.3.
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I estimate the industry-level premium using the same data and methodology ex-
cept I replace the employer fixed effect with a fixed effect for the industry code. Be-
cause all industries are connected through worker mobility, estimation is performed
on the national sample but to ease computational burden, I take a random 10%
subsample of workers. I am able to estimate an industry-level pay premium for all
industries, and thus there are no missing data for this variable.
A.2.7 Employer- and Firm-Level Variables
A.2.7.1 Poaching Hires
For each employer I calculate the share of new stable hires that are acquired through
poaching flows as opposed to nonemployment flows. In order to explain how poaching
rates are constructed, it is useful to establish the following terminology. Each worker
with positive earnings in quarter t can have one of four types of employment spells
defined in Table A.17, where “+” denotes positive earnings and “0” denotes zero
earnings at the employer at quarter t.
Table A.17: Classification of Employment Spells
earnings at employer
t-1 t t+1
beginning of quarter + + 0
end of quarter 0 + +
middle of quarter 0 + 0
full quarter + + +
A worker with a beginning of quarter employment spell is relatively attached to
the employer at the start of quarter t but separates from the employer at some point
during quarter t. Similarly, a work with an end of quarter employment spell joins the
employer at some point during quarter t and experiences a stable spell of employment
that continues into the following quarter. Middle of quarter employment spells repre-
sent spells that begin and end within the quarter and, following the conventions used
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to construct the Job-to-Job Flows statistics, I do not use them when constructing
poaching rates.
Workers who experience an end of quarter employment spell in quarter t are
defined as stable new hires. These workers begin their employment spell at some point
during quarter t, and I define the hire as a poaching hire if the worker also left their
previous employer in quarter t. In other words, a poaching hire is an individual who
switches employers and begins their new job no later than one quarter after leaving
their old job. In practice, I identify poaching hires as individuals who experience an
end of quarter employment spell in quarter t and experience either a full quarter or
end of quarter employment spell (at a different employer) in quarter t-1. All stable
new hires that do not meet these criteria are defined as hires from nonemployment.
For each employer, I calculate the total number of stable hires made through
poaching and nonemployment flows between 2000 and 2016. I then calculate an
employer-level poaching rate as the proportion of stable new hires made through
poaching flows over the entire period. Lastly, I rank employers from 0 to 100 based
on their poaching hire rate, where the ranks are calculated using average employer
size as weights.
A small fraction of employers have insufficient observations to calculate this mea-
sure. In order to avoid disclosure issues related to releasing results on multiple sam-
ples, I impute missing data with the mean value of individuals who do not work at
the employer of a parent and include a control for imputed values in the empirical
specification.
A.2.7.2 Average Earnings
I calculate average earnings at the employer using full quarter employment spells.
Specifically, using data between 2000 and 2016, I retain all workers who experience a
full quarter employment spell and take the log of their earnings (I top code earnings
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at $1,000,000 to mitigate the impact of outliers). The employer-level average of log
earnings is simply the average of the quarterly earnings records. I rank employers
from 0 to 100 based on their average log earnings, where the ranks are calculated
using average employer size as weights. There are no missing data for any of the
employers in the sample.
A.2.7.3 Productivity
The firm-level measure of productivity is based on data from the Revenue Enhanced
Longitudinal Business Database (RE-LBD). The RE-LBD supplements the LBD with
revenue data from the Census Business Registrar (BR). The BR contains annual
measures of revenue measured at the tax reporting or employer identification number
(EIN) level. Haltwanger et al. (2016) describe how the revenue data and the em-
ployment data from the LBD are combined to construct firm level measures of log
revenue per worker, which represent the measure of productivity.
There are two limitations of this particular measure of productivity. First, the
coverage is not universal since the employment and revenue data for some firms cannot
be linked and since the coverage excludes non-profit firms and firms in the Agriculture,
Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (NAICS=11) and Public Administration (NAICS=92)
industries. Haltwanger et al. (2016) show that the revenue data cover about 80% of
firms in the LBD and patterns of missing productivity data are only weakly related
to observable firm characteristics. Second, the revenue per worker measure fails to
account for differences in intermediate inputs across industries, which imply that this
measure cannot be used to compare productivity of firms that are located in different
industries.
In order to overcome the latter limitation, I follow Haltiwanger et al. (2017) and
construct a time invariant measure of productivity. Specifically, after attaching firm
productivity to the employer-level dataset, I calculate average productivity for each
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employer as the employment-weighted average of log revenue per worker observed
across all periods. From each employer I then subtract the employment-weighted
average of productivity at the level of the four-digit NAICS industry code. Thus, this
measure of productivity is a time invariant measure that captures the productivity
of an employer relative to other employers in the same industry. Productivity ranks
that range from 0 to 100 are calculated within four-digit industry codes and are
employment weighted, where employment refers to the average number of employees
at the employer observed over the sample period.
A.2.7.4 Firm Age and Size
Measures of firm age and firm size are derived from the Longitudinal Business Database
(LBD).9 The LBD is an annual dataset that covers the universe of establishments
and firms in the US non-farm business sector with at least one paid employee.
Establishment-level employment is measured as the number of workers on payroll
in the pay-period that covers the 12th day of March in the previous year. Firm size
is simply the sum of employment at all establishments within the firm. Firm age
measures the number of years since the firms formation and accounts for changes in
firm identifiers as well as mergers and acquisitions.10
9See Jarmin and Miranda (2002) for a detailed description of the LBD and Haltiwanger et al.
(2014) for a description of how firm-level outcomes from the LBD are linked to the employers int he
LEHD.
10See Davis et al. (2007) for a detailed description of how the firm age variable is constructed.
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A.3 Approximation Methodology












where rp is the percentile rank of parental earnings. Because the Pearson correlation
coefficient is bounded between -1 and 1, it follows that,
cov(Diβi, yp|rp)2 ≤ var(Diβi|rp)× var(yp|rp) (A.7)
In practice, I condition on rp, but one could think to condition on more detailed ranks.
As the number of ranks approaches the sample size, var(yp|rp) approaches zero and
the covariance term therefore approaches zero. Thus,
E[ypDiβi|rp] = E[yp|rp]× E[Diβi|rp] + cov(Diβi, yp|rp)
≈ E[yp|rp]× E[Diβi|rp]
(A.8)
where equation A.7 suggests that cov(Diβi, yp|rp) will be close to zero when condi-
tioned on parental earnings ranks that are defined at a sufficiently high level of detail.
Combing these pieces yields the approximation in equation 1.3.
I assess the performance of the approximation methodology by using the same




The variance term, var(yp), is directly observed and I use the following approximation
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for the covariance term,




− E[yp]× E[yij] (A.9)
Where this approximation relies on the same assumption used to derive equation 1.3.
Table A.18 compares the estimates of the IGE from the micro data, in Panel A, to the
approximated values, in Panel B. The approximated values are virtually identical to
the actual values, which suggests that the methodology performs well in this context.
Standard errors for the counterfactual estimates in Table 1.7 are estimated via
the delta method. Specifically, let
Γ( ~B) =














E[yp|rp = k]E[Di|rp = k])− E[yp]E[Di]/5
]
(A.10)
where ~B = [β̂1, β̂2, β̂3, β̂4, β̂5] is a 1 × 5 vector where the components are the effects





















Assuming independence between the βk estimates, leads to the following expression








where var(βk) is simply the square of the standard error from Table 1.6.
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Table A.18: Approximation of the Intergenerational Elasticity of Earnings
(1) (2) (3)
A. Individual-Level Data
ρ(Yi, Yp(i)) 0.157 0.130 0.143
B. Approximation
ρ(Yi, Yp(i)) 0.155 0.131 0.143
sample daughters sons all
Notes: The results in columns 1-3 corresopnd to daughters, sons, and all children, respectively.
Panel A presents the estimated coefficient from a regression of the log of the first full-quarter of
earnings at the first job of the child on the log of parental earnings. The regression is estimated
via weighted least squares with sample weights applied. Panel B presents the approximations of
the values in Panel A.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics and 2000 Decennial Census files.
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A.4 Stylized Model
This section synthesizes my findings by developing a stylized model that describes
how the intergenerational transmission of employers affects intergenerational mobility.
Relative to other models of intergenerational mobility, the novel features of my model
are that I: (1) incorporate a employer-specific component into individual earnings and
(2) explicitly model the choices that lead individuals to work for a parent’s employer.
The key insights from the model include:
1. parents affect the earnings of their children not only by shaping the development
of their human capital, but also by providing access to higher-paying employers;
2. if working at the parent’s employer is determined by choices made by the em-
ployer and the child, then there are conditions under which the instrumental
variables estimator identifies the average treatment effect for the population
that works for their parents employer, even in the presence of selection bias and
selection on gains;
3. the effect of the intergenerational transmission of employers on intergenerational
mobility is theoretically ambiguous;
4. if parents adjust their investments in the human capital of their children based
on their expectations of whether the child will work for their employer, this
could either amplify or dampen the implications for intergenerational mobility.
Let yij denote the log earnings of individual i at employer j. Assume that log
earnings are additive in the log of the human capital (hi), the employer pay premium
(fj), and an idiosyncratic error terms (ui). Thus,
yij = hi + fj + ui (A.13)
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The individual component is defined independent of where the individual is employed
and employer transmission affects earnings entirely through its effect on the employer
pay premium.
Using the notation of the potential outcomes framework, let j(1) denote the par-
ent’s employer and let j(0) denote the employer that represents the outside option.
The employer pay premium can be written as,
fj = fj(0) +Diβi (A.14)
whereDi is an indicator equal to one if the individual works for their parent’s employer
and zero otherwise and βi = fj(1)−fj(0) is the effect of working for a parent’s employer.
An individual’s outside option is related to their human capital. Specifically,
the labor market exhibits sorting between workers and firms, characterized by the
following equation:
fj(0) = λhi + νi (A.15)
where νi is an idiosyncratic error term and λ > 0 indicates that individuals with
higher levels of human capital tend to match to employers that offer higher pay
premiums. The same matching process applies to parents, but I abstract from the
possibility that parents might work for the employers of their parents.11 Furthermore,
the relationship between the human capital of the child and earnings of the parent is
characterized by,
hi = x+ θypj(1) + ηi (A.16)
where p denotes the parent of i, ηi is an idiosyncratic error term and θ > 0 implies
that human capital is increasing in parental earnings.
11Formally, I assume that Dp = 0, where p denotes the parent of i. This assumption
simplifies the analysis and allows me to write the earnings benefits associated with work-
ing for the parent’s employer as function of parental earnings and unobserved error terms
βi = (
λ
1+λ − λθ)ypj(1) + [λ/(1 + λ)](λνp − upj(1))− [λx+ ληi + νi].
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Whether a child works for the employer of their parent depends on choices made
by both the employer and the child. Let Oi be equal to one if the parents’ employer
makes a job offer to the child and zero otherwise. The offer decision depends on the
instrument, zi ∈ {z′, z′′} with z′ > 0 > z′′, and the human capital of the parent and
the child. Specifically, Oi = 1{φhp + γhi > zi}, where φ and γ could be positive
or negative.12 Let Ai be equal to one if the child would accept a job offer from the
parent’s firm. The child will choose to accept the offer if the earnings gains, βi, exceed
any costs, c, such that Ai = 1{βi > c}. The child will work with their parent only if
they receive a job offer and it is optimal for them to accept,
Di = 1{φhp + γhi > zi} × 1{βi > c} (A.17)
Unlike the standard selection models, equation A.17 illustrates that selection into
treatment depends on the choices of multiple agents.
Combining equations A.13, A.14, A.15 and A.16 yields the following relationship
between the earnings of the child, the earnings of the parent and the effect of the
transmission of employers,
yij = α1 + α2ypj(1) +Diβi + εi (A.18)
where εi = νi + (1 + λ)ηi + ui is an unobserved error term, and where α1 = (1 + λ)x
and α2 = (1 + λ)θ. Equation A.17 illustrates that Di is related to εi through the
unobserved error terms, implying that estimating equation A.18 via OLS will produce
biased estimates with a sign that is theoretically ambiguous.13
12φ might be positive if higher-ability parents have more control over the hiring process because
they hold leadership positions, or negative if lower-ability parents work at firms that rely more
heavily on networks in the hiring process. γ may be positive if firms are more likely to make a job
offer to high ability workers, or negative if parents exert more effort to procure job opportunities for
low ability children.
13To more clearly see the relationship between Di and εi note that the offer and acceptance de-
cisions can be re-written as: Oi = 1{( φ1+λ + γθ)ypj(1) + γx−
φ
1+λ (νp + up) + γ(x+ ηi) > zi} and
230
Under the assumption that the instrument is orthogonal to the unobserved compo-
nents of the individual’s earnings (zi ⊥⊥ ηi, νi, ui) and parent’s earnings (zi ⊥⊥ νp, up),
an instrumental variables estimator that uses zi as an instrument identifies a local
average treatment effect (LATE), which is defined as E[βi|Di(z′) < Di(z′′)]. In the
standard one-agent selection framework the LATE will depend on the value of the
instruments since the decision-making process directly links the benefits and instru-
ments.
In my context, in which selection into treatment is determined by two agents, this
link is potentially broken. The implication is stated in the following proposition,
Proposition 1 If φ = 0 and γ = 0, then Oi ⊥⊥ βi and
E[βi|Di = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ATT
= E[βi|Di(z′) < Di(z′′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
LATE
(A.19)
Proof 1 If γ = 0 and φ = 0 then Oi = 1{0 > zi} and it follows that Oi ⊥⊥ βi. For
any two values of the instrument, z′ > 0 > z′′, it follows that,
E[βi|Di = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ATT
= E[E[βi|Ai = 1]|Oi = 1]
= E[E[βi|Ai = 1]|Oi(z′) < Oi(z′′)]
= E[βi|Di(z′) < Di(z′′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
LATE
(A.20)
where the first and third inequalities hold by the law of iterated expectations and the
second inequality holds as a result of Oi ⊥⊥ βi.14
If the offer decision is unrelated to the human capital of the parent (φ = 0) and
the human capital of the child (γ = 0), then the offer decision and the earnings gains
Ai = 1{( λ1+λ − λθ)ypj(1) + (
λ
(1+λ) )(νp/λ− up) > c+ λx+ ληi + νi}. See Appendix Section A.4.2
for details.
14It also exploits the fact that Oi ⊥⊥ Ai, which follows directly from Oi ⊥⊥ βi.
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will be independent (Oi ⊥⊥ βi). Under these conditions, the instrument affects the
treatment status of a random sample of individuals who would accept job offers at
their parent’s employer and the LATE is equivalent to the ATT. This equivalence,
which may hold even in the presence of selection bias and selection on gains, is possible
because treatment status is determined by the choices of multiple agents.
While the empirical evidence suggests that the intergenerational transmission of
employers reduces mobility, the relationship is theoretically ambiguous. This is for-
malized in the following proposition, which states that the counterfactual IGE corre-
sponding to a wold in which no one worked for a parent’s employer could be greater
or small than the observed IGE.
Proposition 2 Consider a deterministic case of the model by letting zi, ηi, νi and
ui be equal to zero and let c ≥ 0. Then the following statements are true:
• if 1
1+λ
> θ and φ > −θγ(1 + λ) then ρ(yij, ypj(1)) > ρ(yij(0), ypj(1))
• if 1
1+λ
< θ and φ < −θγ(1 + λ) then ρ(yij, ypj(1)) < ρ(yij(0), ypj(1))
Proof 2 To prove the results it is useful to start by noting the implications of the












− λθ)ypj(1) − λx
(A.21)
It is straightforward to show that cov(βi, ypj(1)) = (
λ
1+λ
− λθ)var(ypj(1)). In the first
case, when 1
1+λ







> 0 and ∂Di
∂ypj(1)
> 0. Under the assumption that c ≥ 0, Di and βi
are both increasing in ypj(1), and it follows that Diβi is a monotonic transformation of
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βi. Thus, cov(βi, ypj(1)) and cov(Diβi, ypj(1)) have the same sign, which implies that,
cov(Diβi, ypj(1)) > 0. The proof for the second case uses the same logic.
Proposition 2 highlight highlights two competing forces. On the one hand, the
transmission of employers will reduce mobility if high income parents are best able to
procure high-paying job offers for their children. On the other hand, the transmission
of employers will increase mobility if children from low income households have lower
levels of human capital and are more reliant on their parents to find work. In con-
trast to previous theoretical work by Corak and Piraino (2012) and Magruder (2010),
which does not model selection into the parent’s employer, reasonable arguments can
be made that the transmission of employers could either increase or reduce intergen-
erational mobility, making this relationship theoretically ambiguous. Thus, while my
empirical evidence suggests that employer transmission reduces mobility, this conclu-
sion might differ in other contexts depending the characteristics of the labor market
and the human capital accumulation process.
A.4.1 Extension with Parental Investment in Human Capital
Within economics, virtually all of the theoretical work on intergenerational mobility
builds on the framework of Becker and Tomes (1976, 1986), in which the persistence
of economic outcomes across generations is driven by investments human capital that
are determined by optimizing behavior on the part of the parents. Even the two
papers that have studied the role of parental labor market networks from theoretical
perspective, Corak and Piraino (2012) and Magruder (2010), have used this approach.
In contrast, I have ignored the decisions related to human capital investment and have
instead focused on the component of earnings attributable to employer pay premiums.
I refer to these effects on the employer pay premium, which are conditional on the
human capital of the children, as the “direct effects.” While I argue that this is most
important feature to focus on, these channels are not mutually exclusive and may
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interact in interesting ways. I explore this possibility in this section by extending
the stylized model to allow for parents to shape the human capital of their children
through investments. I refer to the effects mediated by parental investment decisions
as the “indirect effect” of the intergenerational transmission of employers.
I consider a model in the vein Becker and Tomes (1976, 1986) in which parents
make decisions regarding the optimal investments of the human capital of their chil-
dren. For tractability I focus on the deterministic setting (zi, ηi, νi and ui are equal
to zero) and assume that children only accept job offers from their parents when
the earnings benefits are positive (c ≥ 0). Furthermore, I maintain the assumptions
underlying equations A.13, A.14 and A.15. However, I do not impose the assumption
stated in equation A.16, because the goal of this section is to derive the relationship
between parental earnings and the human capital of the child as the result of opti-
mizing behavior on the part of the parents. For notation, I use lower case letters to
denote the log of upper case variables (for examples, hi = log(Hi)).
Parents care about their current period consumption, Cp, and the total financial
resources of their children, which depends on the earnings of the children, Yij, and
bequests, Bi, plus interest accrued at rate R. Parents solve the following problem:
max
Cp,Ci,Bi
{v(Cp) + u(Yij +RBi)} subject to Cp + Si +Bi ≤ Ypj(1) (A.22)
where Si represents investment in the human capital of the children and u(·) and v(·)
are continuous functions that both have the following properties: u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0
and u′(0) =∞. This setup assumes that there are no credit constraints, as bequests
may be negative.
While there are a number of ways to generate intergenerational persistence in
earnings in the absence of credit constraints, I follow Becker et al. (2018) and assume
that there are complimentarities between the human capital of the parent and the
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production of human capital of the child. Specifically, investment translates into hu-




this captures the fact that investments in human capital might be more productive
if made by parents with higher ability. I also assume that α(1 + λ) < 1 which im-
plies that there are diminishing returns to parental investment. The optimal level
of investment in human capital is defined by the level at which the marginal rate of
return is equal to the interest rate,
∂Yij
∂Si
= R. Combining terms, we can rewrite the
expression determining optimal investment as follows,








where the left-hand side represents the marginal returns to investments in human
capital and the right-hand side represents the marginal returns to bequests.
To understand how the transmission of employers shapes the investment decision
it is useful to consider three cases. As a starting point consider the case in which
parents do not account for employer transmission when making investment decisions
(exp{Diβi} = 1 and ∂exp{Diβi}∂Si = 0). Under these conditions is it straight forward to
show that the optimal level of investment is given as:




Thus, the optimal level of parental investment is increasing in the human capital of the
parent and decreasing in the interest rate and it produces the following relationship
between the human capital of the child and the earnings of the parent, hi = x +







and θ = σ/(1+λ)−(1−α)
1−α(1+λ) . Note that this linear
relationship is exactly the one assumed in Section A.4.
How will this relationship change if parents consider the possibility of helping their
child to secure a job within their employer when making investment decisions? In a
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step towards answering this question, consider a second case in which parents account
for the fact that the transmission of employers might affect the level of earnings
(exp{Diβi} 6= 1) but they do not account for the fact that investments might affect
the gains associated with transmission (∂exp{Diβi}
∂Si
= 0). Under these assumptions,




1−α(1+λ)} and it follows
that,
s′i − si =
Diβi
1− α(1 + λ)
≥ 0 (A.25)
Because exp{Diβi} ≥ 0 and α(1 + λ) < 0, this mechanism leads to an increase in
parental investment. Intuitively, the transmission of employers provide access to firms
that pay higher wages and thus parents who expect their children to work with them
will expect a higher rate of return on investments in human capital.15
In the third case I allow for the investment decisions of parents to also depend
on the anticipated effects of a rise in human capital on the gains of working for a
parent’s employer (∂exp{Diβi}
∂Si
6= 0).16 Because ∂exp{Diβi}
∂Si
< 0, it is immediately ap-
parent that if we were to plug in S ′′i into equation A.23 the sum of the terms of the
left hand side would be less than the interest rate on the right hand side. Further-












are (weakly) decreasing in Si, and it follows that the
optimal level of investment in case 3 is less than the optimal level in case 2, S ′′′i < S
′′
i .
In the mechanism highlighted in this case, the intergenerational transmission of em-
ployers reduces the incentive to invest in human capital because the earnings gains
associated with working the parents’ employer are declining in the human capital of
the child (both along intensive and extensive margins).
Taken together, the total indirect effect of the intergenerational transmission of
15Different assumptions could lead to alternative conclusions. For example, both Corak and
Piraino (2012) and Magruder (2010) assume that the effect of networks on earnings is additive
in levels, which leads them to conclude that parental investment decisions are unaffected by the
presence of parental labor market networks.
16As in case 2, I continue to allow for the possibility that exp{Diβi} 6= 0.
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employers on the level of parental investment is theoretically ambiguous.17 On the
one hand, the transmission of employers will increase the marginal returns to human
capital investments by providing access to high-paying firms. On the other hand, the
marginal returns are pushed down by the fact that higher-ability children are less
likely to work with their parents and gain less conditional on doing so.
The implications for intergenerational mobility are similarly ambiguous. For sim-
plicity, consider the case in which θ(1 + λ) < 1 and φ > −θγ(1 + λ), which implies
that the direct impact of employer transmission will increase IGE. Because these con-
ditions imply that Diβi is increasing in parental earnings, children from high income
families will tend to be the greatest beneficiaries of working with their parents (be-
ing more likely to do so and experiencing greater benefits conditional on doing so).
The mechanism highlighted in case 2 will amplify the disparities between children
from high and low income households while the mechanism highlighted in case 3 will
mitigate these differences. The total indirect effect on intergenerational mobility will
depend on which force dominates.
A.4.2 Sign of Selection Bias
In order to highlight the empirical challenges created by the unobserved components
of earnings, start by decomposing the following estimator into a causal effect and
selection bias,
E[yij |Di = 1, ypj(1)]− E[yij |Di = 0, ypj(1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
estimator
= E[yij(1) − yij(0)|Di, ypj(1)] + E[yij(0)|Di = 1, ypj(1)]− E[yij(0)|Di = 0, ypj(1)]
= E[βi|Di = 1, ypj(1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ATT
+E[εi|Di = 1, ypj(1)]− E[εi|Di = 0, ypj(1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection bias
(A.26)
where εi = (1 + λ)ηi + νi + ui. From inspection, εi will generate selection bias if and
only if cov(εi, Di) < 0.
17This follows from the fact that I have shown that S′i ≤ S′′i and S′′′i < S′′i . Thus the total effect
(difference between S′i and S
′′′
i ) will depend on whether the mechanism highlighted in case 2 or 3 is
stronger.
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In order to sign the selection bias term we must rewrite Di as a function of parental
earnings and the idiosyncratic error terms. The assumption that parents do not share
an employer with their own parents (the employer of p is j(1)) in conjunction with











(νp/λ− up) > c+ λx+ ληi + νi} (A.27)
Equation A.15 implies hp =
ypj(1)−νp−up
1+λ







(νp − up) + γ(x+ ηi) > zi} (A.28)
Thus, because Di = Oi × Ai, we have written Di as a function of parental earnings
and the idiosyncratic error terms.
Inspection of how ηi and νi enter equations A.27 and A.4.2 illustrates two potential
sources of selection bias. First note that νi and Oi are independent while Ai and νi
are negatively correlated. Thus, νi and Di will be negatively correlated and νi will
generate negative selection bias. Intuitively, children who receive job offers at low-
paying firms will be more willing to accept offers at their parents employers and
this will lead us to underestimate the benefits of employer transmission. Second, ηi
and Ai are negatively correlated, which again will tend to produce negative selection
bias. Intuitively, low-ability children will have more limited outside employment
opportunities and will be more willing to work at their parents’ employer. However,
the relationship between ηi and Oi is ambiguous and will depend on the sign of γ.
If γ < 0 then ηi and Oi will be negatively correlated, which will produce negative
selection bias because the low ability children will be more likely to receive job offers.
However, if γ > 0 then ηi and Oi will positively correlated. In this latter case, the
effect of ηi on the selection bias term will be ambiguous and will depend on the relative
238
importance of its effect on Oi and Ai.
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Chapter B: Appendix Material for Chapter 2
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B.1 Additional Figures
Figure B.1: PHA Size in Existing Research and HOPE VI Sample
Notes: This figure plots the kernel density of the log of the total number of public housing
units (measured in 1997) within each Public Housing Authority (PHA) in the U.S. The densities
are plotted for three groups: all PHAs, PHAs that received a HOPE VI demolitions grant, and
PHAs that participated in other randomized controlled studies. The PHAs from the other studies
include: Baltimore MD, Boston MA, Chicago IL, Los Angeles CA, and New York NY from the
Moving to Opportunity experiment (Ludwig et al. 2013); Chicago IL from the Gautreaux program
(Rosenbaum 1995); and Atlanta GA, Augusta GA, Fresno CA, Houston TX, Los Angeles CA, and
Spokane WA from the Effects of Housing Choice Voucher on Welfare Families project (Mills et al.
2006). The solid grey line presents the proportion of total public housing units in the U.S. that are
located in a PHA with fewer than the number of housing units indicated on the horizontal axis.
The black marker indicates the size of the Chicago PHA, which is the setting for Jacob (2004) and
Chyn (2018).
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from HUD USER.
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Figure B.2: Baseline Differences between HOPE VI and non-HOPE VI Observations
Notes: The figure presents kernel densities of normalized differences of all 92 baseline covariates
calculated from the full and matched samples (see Appendix C for a description of the variables).
To account for the clustered nature of the data within projects, we collapse data to the average
value at the project-level to calculate the normalized difference for each variable. The normalized




0)/2), where x̄d and s
2
d is the sample average and vari-
ance for the HOPE VI (d = 1) and non-HOPE VI (d = 0) samples, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
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Figure B.3: Baseline Differences within Strata
Notes: The figure presents the distribution of the absolute value of t-statistics obtained from re-
gressing a baseline variable on an indicator for HOPE VI within each stratum. The t-statistics
are calculated using the household-year dataset when the the baseline variable is measured at the
household-year level and using the child-year dataset for all other variables. Standard errors are
clustered at the project level. With 92 baseline variables (see Appendix C for a description of the
variables) and 7 strata, the figure summarizes the distribution of 644 t-statistics. To aid interpre-
tation, we also plot the distribution of the absolute value of t-statistics from a normal distribution.
All statistics are calculated on the matched sample.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
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18 20 22 24 26
age at which earnings are measured
Notes: The figure presents estimates of the effect of HOPE VI on the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS)
of annual earnings measured in the year in which the child turns 18-26. Effects on earnings are
estimated using the stratification with regression estimator where all stratum-level regressions con-
trol for the base year in which the child appears in public housing, the year in which earnings are
measured and standard vector of individual- and project- level characteristics. Standard errors are
clustered at the project level and the gray line indicates the 95% confidence interval. Estimates
are for large PHAs only.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
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Figure B.5: Baseline Differences between HOPE VI and Failed Applicants
Notes: The figure presents the distribution of the absolute value of t-statistics obtained from re-
gressing a baseline variable on an indicator for HOPE VI. Regressions are estimated separately for
large and small PHAs and the set of non-HOPE VI projects includes only the failed applicants.
The t-statistics are calculated using the household-year dataset when the the baseline variable
is measured at the household-year level and using the child-year dataset for all other variables.
Standard errors are clustered at the project level. With 92 baseline variables (see Appendix C for a
description of the variables) and regressions with large and small PHAs, the figure summarizes the
distribution of 184 t-statistics. To aid interpretation, we also plot the distribution of the absolute
value of t-statistics from a normal distribution.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
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Figure B.6: Distribution of Earnings for Household Heads and Children
Notes: The figure presents the proportion of household heads and children whose earnings are zero
or within a given quartile of the overall distribution of positive earnings. In the legend, the notation
p25 denotes the 25th percentile. Parental earnings are measured 10 years after the reference year
whereas the earnings of children are measured in the year they turn 26.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
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B.2 Additional Tables








Our interest is in understanding how
HOPE VI demolitions affected the






HOPE VI award list
The majority of scattered-sites
demolished under HOPE VI had fewer
than 5 units demolished, although there
were some scatter-sites with substantially
more units demolished. In total, less than
2% of the total units demolished under
the HOPE VI program were scattered
sites. While there is no formal definition
of scatter-site housing, the two key







Some projects received more than one




unable to assign a
project ID
The project ID is required to link records





HUD’s Moving to Work (MTW)
demonstration program exempted
participating local housing authorities
from HUD reporting requirements see
Abravanel et al. (2004).
≈50 ≈190
6
fewer than 15 occupied
units or more than
3000 occupied units
The lower threshold limits the sample to
larger public housing projects while the
upper threshold ensures that we do not




Given our focus on children, we drop
projects if they are senior housing (over
80% of residents are above 55 years of
age) or if they have no children ages 10-18
residing in them.
≈10 ≈160
Notes: This table describes the sample selection criteria that reduce the full set of 285 HOPE VI demolition
awards to the (approximately) 160 awards studied in this paper. The columns present the restriction applied
to the sample, the justification for imposing this restriction, the number of projects affected and the number of
projects remaining. The symbol, ≈, denotes that the count is rounded according to disclosure avoidance rules




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.4: Placebo Test Using Failed Applicants
Large PHAs Small PHAs
qrtrs worked IHS earnings qrtrs worked IHS earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Failed Applicant -0.058 -0.142 -0.028 -0.070
(0.037) (0.091) (0.027) (0.071)
control 2.200 6.410 2.220 6.420
[1.720] [4.490] [1.730] [4.490]
observations 99,000 99,000 124,000 124,000
Note: Failed applicants are projects that applied for but never received HOPE VI funding
(either the Revitalization or Demolition program). Columns 1-2 and 3-4 present estimates from
the stratification with regression estimators from large and small Public Housing Authorities
(PHAs), respectively. The outcome variables in the odd and even numbered columns are annual
labor market outcomes measured in the year in which the child turns 26 including number of
quarters worked and the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of earnings, respectively. All stratum-
level regressions control for the base year in which the child appears in public housing, the year
in which the child turns 26, and standard vector of individual- and project-level characteristics.
Standard errors are clustered at the project-level and are presented in parentheses. The mean and
standard deviation, presented in brackets, of the outcome for the control group are a weighted
aggregate of stratum-level statistics, where the weights are proportional to the number of treated
individuals in a strata.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10.
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Table B.5: Pseudo Outcomes Analysis
effect of HOPE VI on row variable
(1) (2) (3)
Household-Level Variables
age 0.242 0.493 0.333
(0.270) (0.303) (0.204)
black 0.026 0.054 0.036
(0.042) (0.040) (0.030)
Hispanic 0.026 0.004 0.018
(0.045) (0.025) (0.030)
white 0.001 -0.049** -0.017
(0.014) (0.024) (0.013)
other non-Hispanic -0.014 0.013 -0.004
(0.021) (0.012) (0.014)
dependents -0.001 0.018 0.006
(0.023) (0.020) (0.016)
disability -0.005 0.006 -0.001
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
household size 0.037 0.013 0.028
(0.025) (0.018) (0.017)
female 0.004 -0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
married 0.008 0.002 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
income -0.936*** -0.790*** -0.883***
(0.293) (0.240) (0.206)
Child-Level Variables
age 0.087** 0.018 0.062**
(0.039) (0.042) (0.029)
black 0.035 0.057 0.043
(0.043) (0.040) (0.031)
Hispanic 0.022 0.001 0.015
(0.038) (0.026) (0.026)
white 0.001 -0.050** -0.017
(0.013) (0.024) (0.012)
other non-Hispanic -0.024 0.015 -0.010
(0.025) (0.012) (0.017)
disability 0.003 -0.005 0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
female 0.000 -0.005** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Sample of PHAs large small all
Notes: Columns 1-3 present estimates from the stratification with regression estimator for large, small, and all
Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), respectively. Each row presents the results from a specification in which
the variable listed in the row is the pseudo outcome. For each pseudo outcome, the entire matching procedure
is implemented but the pseudo outcome (or any variable constructed using this variable) is omitted from the
process. The results presented in the table are coefficients from a stratification with regression estimator, which
regresses the pseudo outcome on an indicator for HOPE VI and the set of standard covariates (we omit the pseudo
outcome from the covariates). Note that there are four mutually exclusive race/ethnicity categories, including:
white (non-Hispanic), black (non-Hispanic), Hispanic, and other non-Hispanic. Standard errors are clustered at
the project level and are presented in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, Department of Housing
and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10.
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Table B.6: Sensitivity to Stratification and Covariates
IHS of Earnings at Age 26
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Large PHAs
HOPE VI 0.059 0.191** 0.157 0.195***
(0.102) (0.076) (0.107) (0.073)
stratification X X
covariates X X
observations 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000
Panel B. Small PHAs
HOPE VI -0.090 0.015 0.005 0.045
(0.099) (0.087) (0.101) (0.087)
stratification X X
covariates X X
observations 109,000 109,000 109,000 109,000
Notes: Panels A and B present estimates from the stratification with regression estimator for
large and small Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), respectively. The outcome variable is the
inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of annual earnings at age 26. The rows below the point estimates
indicate whether the stratification structure was used (if not, Ordinary Least Squares is used)
and whether the standard vector of individula- and project-level controls are included in the
regression. All specifications include a fixed effect for the base year in which the child appears
in public housing as well as a fixed effect for the year in which the child turns 26. Standard
errors are clustered at the project-level and are presented in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10.
252
Table B.7: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
IHS of Earnings at Age 26
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Large PHAs
HOPE VI -0.101 0.154** 0.088 0.288**
(0.091) (0.078) (0.134) (0.111)
estimated with controls no yes no yes
non-HOPE VI sample same PHA same PHA applicants applicants
observations 338,000 338,000 19,000 19,000
Panel B. Small PHAs
HOPE VI -0.206** -0.021 -0.037 0.087
(0.100) (0.086) (0.121) (0.104)
estimated with controls no yes no yes
non-HOPE VI sample same PHA same PHA applicants applicants
observations 92,000 92,000 13,000 13,000
Notes: Panels A and B present estimates from large and small Public Housing Authorities
(PHAs), respectively. Each estimate is from a separate regression estimated by Ordinary Least
Squares in which the dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of annual earnings
measured in the year the child turns 26 and the main independent variables is an indicator equal
to one if the project received a HOPE VI grant. All regressions contain controls for the year in
which the individual appears in public housing as well as the year in which the individual turns 26.
The row below the point estimates indicates whether the standard set of additional project- and
individual-level covariates are included in each specification. The sample of HOPE VI projects is
identical across all specifications and the row above the observation counts indicates whether the
set of non-HOPE VI projects includes projects in PHAs that were awarded HOPE VI funding
(same PHA) or projects that applied but did not receive HOPE VI funding (applicants to the
Revitalization or Demolition program). Standard errors are clustered at the project-level and
are presented in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.9: Dispersion of Project Co-Residents
share of former residents living within avg. log
one mile three miles five miles distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Large PHAs
HOPE VI -0.01 -0.006 -0.006 0.043
(0.006) (0.012) (0.016) (0.086)
control mean 0.065 0.193 0.315 3.29
observations 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000
Panel B. Small PHAs
HOPE VI -0.021*** -0.02 -0.016 0.047
(0.007) (0.018) (0.021) (0.088)
control mean 0.086 0.22 0.316 3.41
observations 109,000 109,000 109,000 109,000
Notes: Panels A and B present estimates from the stratification with regression estimator for
large and small Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), respectively. In columns 1-3 the outcome is
the share of former public housing residents that live within a one-, three- and five-mile radius,
respectively. The outcome in column 4 is the average log distance (measured in miles) between
the individual and each of the former public housing residents. The longitude and lattitude
of residence correspond to the the centroid of the census tract in which the child resides in
2010. All stratum-level regressions control for the base year in which the child appears in
public housing, the year in which the child turns 26, and the standard vector of individual- and
project-level characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the project-level and are presented
in parentheses. The mean and standard deviation, presented in brackets, of the outcome for
the control group are a weighted aggregate of stratum-level statistics, where the weights are
proportional to the number of treated individuals in a strata.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.11: Neighborhood Job Density
log job density log population density log job/population
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Large PHAs
HOPE VI 0.045 -0.617*** 0.220**
(0.028) (0.167) (0.087)
control mean 0.07 -1.4 0.256
observations 149,000 149,000 149,000
Panel B. Small PHAs
HOPE VI -0.005 0.081 -0.001
(0.014) (0.171) (0.056)
control mean 0.053 -2.77 0.354
observations 109,000 109,000 109,000
Notes: Panels A and B present estimates from the stratification with regression estimator for
large and small Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), respectively. In columns 1-3 the outcome
variable is a characteristic (measured in 2010) of the census tract in which the project was
located, including: the log of the job density, the log of the population density and the log of
the ratio of jobs to population, respecitvely. All stratum-level regressions control for the base
year in which the child appears in public housing, the year in which the child turns 26, and the
standard vector of individual- and project-level characteristics Standard errors are clustered at
the project-level and are presented in parentheses. The mean and standard deviation, presented
in brackets, of the outcome for the control group are a weighted aggregate of stratum-level
statistics, where the weights are proportional to the number of treated individuals in a strata.
Source: Authors’ calculations from matched Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and Decennial Census files.
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10.
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B.3 Additional Robustness Checks
Revitalization Program: While the focus of our paper is on the HOPE VI Demolitions
program, there is some overlap with the HOPE VI Revitalizations program by which
some projects received both Demolition and Revitalization grants. Typically, the
award of the Revitalization grants and their implementation took place well after the
Demolition grant, but it is possible that our estimates are affected by the Revitaliza-
tions program. To investigate this, we start by estimating two specifications. First,
we estimate a specification in which we interact the indicator for the HOPE VI Demo-
litions award with an indicator for the Revitalizations program. Second, we estimate
a specification in which we drop all projects that received a HOPE VI Revitalization
grant.1 We conduct both sets of analyses separately within large and small PHAs and
the inverse hyperbolic sine of age 26 earnings is the outcome variable. For the first
specification, the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically insignificant at the
10 percent level for both the large and small PHA samples. In other words, there
is not a statistically significant difference between the treatment effects for projects
awarded both a Revitalization and Demolition and projects that were only awarded a
Demolitions grant. The results from both the first and second specifications indicate
that the effect of the HOPE VI Demolition is positive and statistically significant at
the 10 percent level in large PHAs and is positive but statistically insignificant in
small PHAs. Taken together, these analyses suggest that our main estimates are not
affected by the HOPE VI Revitalization program. Another important result in our
paper is that the effect of HOPE VI is largest for projects that were located in neigh-
borhoods characterized by high poverty rates and limited job accessibility (proxied
by population density and commute time). To see if these results are sensitive to
1Note that in constructing the sample we already drop non-HOPE VI Demolition projects that
receive a Revitalization grant. Thus, this restriction only drops projects that received both a De-
molition and Revitalization grant.
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the presence of the Revitalization program we estimate a model in which we interact
the HOPE VI indicator with both an indicator for the Revitalization program and
baseline characteristics of the neighborhood. Our main findings with respect to het-
erogeneous effects by neighborhood characteristics are robust to controlling for the
Revitalization program. Specifically, the interaction term between HOPE VI and the
baseline characteristics is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level
in large PHAs for all three baseline characteristics, whereas this interaction term is
never statistically significant in small PHAs.
Early Demolitions: We define the year of the demolition as two years prior to
the award year. However, the microdata begins in 1997 and we therefore define the
year of the demolition as 1997 for HOPE VI projects that were awarded funding
before 1999. We conduct two sets of analyses to investigate whether the timing of
these early demolitions impact our results. First, we estimate a specification in which
we interact the HOPE VI indicator with an indicator equal to one if the award was
made prior to 1999. Second, we estimate a specification in which we drop all HOPE
VI projects that received funding before 1999. We conduct both sets of analyses
separately within large and small PHAs and the inverse hyperbolic sine of age 26
earnings is the outcome variable. For the first specification, the coefficient on the
interaction term is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level for both the
large and small PHA samples. In other words, the treatment effect for HOPE VI
projects awarded funding prior to 1999 is not statistically different from the treatment
effect for HOPE VI projects awarded funding in 1999 or later. The results from both
the first and second specifications indicate that the effect of HOPE VI is positive
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in large PHAs and is positive but
statistically insignificant in small PHAs. Taken together, these results suggest that
our main findings are not sensitive to how we treat the early demolitions that occur
prior 1999.
259
Partial Demolitions: Some projects were only partially demolished. We argue
that all residents were potentially affected by the program, since the demolitions
could change the neighborhoods in which the projects were located. Thus, our main
results estimate the effect of HOPE VI on all residents of the public housing project,
as opposed to just the ones that were forced to move. To investigate the importance
of partial demolitions, we measure the growth rate in project size between the year
of the demolition and five years after. We then estimate a specification in which we
interact this growth rate with the indicator for HOPE VI. We conduct the analysis
separately within large and small PHAs and the inverse hyperbolic sine of age 26
earnings is the outcome variable. We find no evidence of heterogeneous effects by
changes in project size. Specifically, the interaction terms between HOPE VI and
the project growth rate is positive but not statistically significant at the 10 percent
level for both the large and small PHA samples. The results provide no evidence
that residents who experienced partial demolitions faired differently relative to those
exposed to more complete demolitions.
Tuning Parameters: While our methodology is in some ways data-driven, we do
select tuning parameters that govern this process. While we use standard values for
most tuning parameters, we choose custom values for (1) the number of matched
used in the trimming procedure and (2) the thresholds for selection of covariates
to be included in the propensity score. The choice of tuning parameters was based
on their ability to eliminate baseline differences between HOPE VI and non-HOPE
VI projects within stratum. However, we also assess the sensitivity of our results
to alternative choices of these parameters. First, we try implementing the entire
stratification procedure using 3 through 8 matches (our baseline specification uses 5
matches) when creating the trimmed sample. Second, we implement the stratification
procedure with alternative thresholds for the likelihood ratio test by using values for
the threshold firs the first-order terms of 1.5 to 5 by intervals of 0.5 and setting the
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threshold value for the second-order terms to 1.71 plus the threshold for the first-order
term (our main specification uses 2.5 and 4.21 for the tuning parameters related to
the first-order and second-order terms, respectively). Using the resulting stratification
structures, we then estimate the effect of HOPE VI on the inverse hyperbolic sine of
age 26 earnings as the main outcome and do this separately for large and small PHAs.
For small PHAs the effect of HOPE VI is never statistically significant at the 10
percent level across all fourteen specifications. For large PHAs, the point estimate is
always positive and estimates in nine, twelve and thirteen of the fourteen estimates are
statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
Thus, for large PHAs only one of the fourteen estimates is not statistically significant
at the 10 percent level. Thus, our main findings are quite robust to alternative choices
of the tuning parameters.
Duplicate Observations: Control observations (individual-year observations) may
appear in the data multiple times, as they are included for each year they appear in
public housing. We cluster standard errors at the project level, which accounts for
these duplicate observations within projects. However, if individuals in the control
projects move to new projects, they will appear multiple times in the data and the
clustering will not adequately account for the correlation in their outcomes. To assess
the degree to which this is a problem we drop all individuals who appear in more
than one project in our sample. We then re-estimate our main results focusing on
the inverse hyperbolic sine of age 26 earnings. In large PHAs the effect of HOPE
VI is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level and in small PHAs
the effect of HOPE VI is positive but is not statistically significant. Thus, our main
findings are not sensitive to how we account for individuals who appear in multiple
projects within the sample period.
Heterogeneous Effects: Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of HOPE VI inter-
acted with different individual characteristics for the large PHA sample. We replicate
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this analysis for the small PHA sample. With one exception, none of the interaction
terms are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The one exception is that,
in the specification that interacts HOPE VI with race, the estimated coefficient on
HOPE VI*black is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level whereas
the estimated coefficient on HOPE VI is positive and statistically significant at the
10 percent level. Thus, there is some evidence that HOP VI may have been beneficial
for white non-Hispanic children in small PHAs.
Alternative Controls: We compare our preferred estimates to estimates from two
other estimators. We use OLS to estimate specifications in which we regress the IHS
of annual earnings at age 26 on an indicator for HOPE VI and a set of covariates.
We estimate these regressions separately for the large and small PHA samples and
experiment with using alternative samples for the control group, including: (1) non-
HOPE VI projects that are located in a PHA that received some HOPE VI funding,
and (2) the sample of projects that applied for but never received HOPE VI funding.
The results, presented in columns 2 and 4 of Table A.7, indicate that these alternative
approaches produce qualitatively similar conclusions: HOPE VI led to substantial
long-run labor market benefits in large PHAs (points estimates of 0.154 and 0.288)
but had no discernible impact in small PHAs (point estimates of -0.021 and 0.087).
The robustness of our main findings bolsters confidence in our conclusions. Columns
1 and 3 present results from OLS regressions that do not include controls. Here we
find no evidence that HOPE VI had positive effect on earnings in either large or small
PHAs. The difference between the estimates from specifications that do and do not
include covariates in the mode underscores the importance of adjusting for baseline
differences between the HOPE VI and non-HOPE VI projects.
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B.4 Description of Variables 
 






average total household 
income 
public housing project X X 
proportion of 
household heads who 
are black non-Hispanic 
public housing project X X 
proportion of 
household heads who 
are white non-Hispanic 
public housing project X X 
log of the number of 
occupied units 
public housing project X X 
proportion of 
household heads who 
are disabled 
public housing project X X 
proportion of 
household heads who 
are married 
public housing project X X 
proportion of 
household heads who 
are female 
public housing project X X 
average count of 
individuals per housing 
unit 




household heads who 
are Hispanic 
public housing project 
 
X 
average age of 
household heads 




household heads who 
are over 55 
public housing project 
  
proportion of 
household heads who 
are other race/ethnicity 
(not white, not black 
not Hispanic) 
public housing project 
  
average number of 
dependents per 
household 
public housing project 
  
proportion of children 
with disability 
public housing project 
  
proportion of residents 
who are children (under 
age 18) 




household rent per 
month 
public housing authority X X 
proportion of 
households with 
majority of income 
from wages and or 
business income 
public housing authority X X 
log of the number of 
available units 
public housing authority 
 
X 
proportion of units that 
are occupied 




public housing authority 
  
average household size public housing authority 
  
average federal 
spending per unit per 
month 
public housing authority 
  
average total household 
income 




majority of income 
from welfare 
public housing authority 
  
average of household's 
income as a percent of 
local median income 
public housing authority 
  
proportion of 
household heads (or 
spouse) who are under 
25 years old 
public housing authority 
  
proportion of 
household heads who 
are older than 62 years 
old 
public housing authority 
  




public housing authority 
  
proportion Hispanic public housing authority 
  
proportion household 
heads (with children) 
married 
public housing authority 
  
proportion of 
household heads (with 
children) single parents 
public housing authority 
  
proportion over-housed 
with more bedrooms 
than people 
public housing authority 
  
average assets public housing authority 
  
 
average number of 
months since manager 
reported on household 
public housing authority 
  
Median Family Income 
or (area median 
income), on which 
HUD bases income 
limits on 
county 1990 X X 
unemployment rate in 
1996 
county X X 
average pay in 1996 county 
 
X 




average pay in 1990 county 
  




average pay in 1991 county 
  




average pay in 1992 county 
  




average pay in 1993 county 
  




average pay in 1994 county 
  




average pay in 1995 county 
  
poverty rate 1990 census tract X X 
proportion of 
households with wage 
or salary income 
1990 census tract X X 
proportion of 
households with public 
assistance income 
1990 census tract X X 
median rent 1990 census tract X X 
median year housing 
structure built 
1990 census tract X X 
proportion of adults 
with high school 
education only 
1990 census tract 
 
X 
proportion of housing 
units vacant 




population living in 
rural area 





households with social 
security income 
1990 census tract 
 
X 
proportion of mothers 
who are single 





1990 census tract 
 
X 
proportion Hispanic 1990 census tract 
 
X 
proportion born in the 
US 
1990 census tract 
  
proportion of adults 
with graduate degree 
1990 census tract 
  




interest, dividend or net 
rental income 
1990 census tract 
  
median gross rent as 
percent of household 
income 








1990 census tract 
  




black, non-Hispanic child 
  




other race/ethnicity (not 




total household income child 
  








number of dependents 
in the household 
child 
  
total number of people 
living in the household 
child 
  
age head of household 
  
black, non-Hispanic head of household 
  
white, non-Hispanic head of household 
  
Hispanic head of household 
  
 
other race/ethnicity (not 
white, not black not 
Hispanic) 
head of household 
  
total household income head of household 
  
married head of household 
  
female head of household 
  
disabled head of household 
  
number of dependents 
in the household 
head of household 
  
total number of people 
living in the household 
head of household 
  
Notes: This table defines all of the 92 baseline variables mentioned throughout the paper. The third 
and fourth column indicate whether the variable was included in the matching specification used 
to trim the sample and considered in the propensity score estimation, respectively. Variables at the 
level of the public housing project are created using the microdata from the HUD-PIC files. For 
recipients of the HOPE VI demolition grants, the values correspond to the year of the demolition, 
for other projects the values correspond to the average values between 1997 and 2001. The 
variables at the level of the public housing authority are based on public use data made available 
through the HUDUSER web tool. Family median income is also based on public use data obtained 
through the HUDUSER web tool. The unemployment rate and average earnings are from public 
use data made available by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The characteristics of the census tracts 
in 1990 are derived from the 1990 Decennial Census and are from public use data provided by 
IPUMS (see Ruggles et al. 2019). The variables at the child and head of household level are from 
the HUD-PIC files. 
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C.1 Assessing Measurement Issues
C.1.1 Worker Flows
There is a residual term, ε̃ht , in equation 3.2. Figure C.1 plots this residual and
illustrates that it is smaller in magnitude than the poaching and nonemployment
flows and does not exhibit clear a cyclical pattern. One possible explanation for this
residual is that the flows in this section only include cases in which both the origin and
destination firms are located in our 28-state sample. In unreported results, we directly
measure the out-of-sample worker flows and find that they are not the source of the
residual term. To provide evidence that out-of-sample worker flows are not affecting
our results, Figure C.1 also plots the poaching and nonemployment flows that include
all hires into firms in our sample (including hires from firms located in states outside
of our sample) and all separations from firms in our sample (including separations
to firms located in states outside of our sample). The patterns are quite similar
regardless of whether out-of-sample flows are included, suggesting the migration in
and out of our 28-state sample is unlikely to affect our main results.
C.1.2 Productivity
To put our numbers in perspective we compare them to an aggregate measure of pro-
ductivity growth calculated from the RE-LBD. We calculate aggregate productivity
growth by limiting the sample of firms to those that appear in our sample and then
calculating the log difference between total revenue per worker within each 4-digit
NAICS industry code. Aggregate productivity growth for this purpose is measured
as the employment-weighted average of these industry-level growth rates.1 Figure
C.2 compares our measure of productivity growth to other widely used measures
1The employment used for weighting is the average of employment in the current and previous
year.
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Poaching (full sample) Nonemployment (full sample)
Poaching (within-state sample) Nonemployment (within-state sample)
Residual (within-state sample)
Notes: Differential growth rates are the difference in quarterly employment growth rates between high-
and low-productivity firms. Results are presented separately for poaching, nonemployment, and residual
flows. The poaching and nonemployment flows depicted by the dashed lines are based on the full sample.
The poaching and nonemployment flows depicted by the solid lines are based on a sample that is limited to
worker flows in which both the origin and destination employers are in one of the 28 states in our sample.
The residual growth rate is the difference between the observed changes in the share of employment at
high- and low-productivity firms and what is predicted by the poaching and nonemployment flows. Data
are seasonally adjusted using X-12.
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from the BLS and the BEA. The measure labeled BLS(industry) is the closest con-
ceptually to our measure. It is an employment-weighted average of industry-level
(4-digit NAICS) labor productivity growth rates. The industry-level growth rate is
based on the growth rate in what BLS calls sectoral output per worker. Sectoral out-
put is gross output less intrasectoral transactions. At the 4-digit level the adjustment
for intrasectoral transctions is modest. The mean of the RE-LBD based measure is
1.3 log points while the mean of the BLS(industry) measure is 1.7 log points. The
correlation of these two series is 0.85.
The BLS(sector) and BEA measures are growth rates of value added per worker for
the private, non-farm business sector. These measures are distinct conceptually from
the RE-LBD and BLS(industry) measures. The latter only capture within-industry
contributions to aggregate productivity growth while the value-added measures not
only use a conceptually different output measure but also reflect shifts in employ-
ment from low- to high-productivity industries. Still these alternative measures ex-
hibit similar patterns to the RE-LBD and BLS(industry) measures. Interestingly, the
BLS(sector) average growth rate is 2 log points which is larger than the BLS(industry)
measure at 1.7 log points. While appropriate caution is needed to compare these mea-
sures given conceptual differences, this pattern is consistent with between industry
effects contributing positively to aggregate productivity growth.
Figure C.3 compares aggregate productivity growth to the growth attributable to
worker reallocation. Data in the RE-LBD are reported at an annual frequency so we
sum the quarterly components of productivity growth from our decomposition within
each calendar year. Across all years in the sample, average aggregate productivity
growth is 1.3 log points per year and the components attributable to poaching and
nonemployment flows contribute, on average, 0.4 and -0.3 log points per year, respec-
tively. Thus, at the annual frequency our decomposition captures a quantitatively
important aspect of productivity growth. The aggregate series exhibit a relatively
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2000 2005 2010 2015
RE-LBD BLS(industry)
BLS(sector) BEA
Notes: This figure presents annual aggregate productivity growth based on four different sources that
include: (1) confidential data from the RE-LBD that characterizes the growth of all firms in our data, (2)
publicly available data from the BLS based on industry-level productivity growth, (3) publicly available
data from the BLS based on sector-level productivity growth, and (4) publicly available data on industry-
level measures of value added from the BEA. To estimate aggregate productivity growth from the RE-
LBD, we follow a methodology similar to the BLS and calculate the log difference in total revenue per total
number of workers between the current and subsequent year for each industry, then take the employment
weighted average across industries.
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larger decline in productivity growth during recessions. For example, between 2007
and 2009 annual productivity growth declined by 4.8 log points. In contrast, the
decline in productivity growth attributable to poaching flows can only account for
0.3 log points. However, part of the movements in aggregate productivity reflect
measurement error due to cyclical changes in factor utilization.
One concern with our measure of productivity is that it does not account for
intertemporal variation in factor utilization. During a recession a firm may decide
to cut back on production (possibly by reducing workers’ hours or worker intensity),
which could lead to a decline in log revenue per worker without any real changes
in productivity. This issue could affect both our decomposition results and the our
aggregate measure of productivity growth.
Intertemporal variation in factor utilization does not appear to meaningfully affect
the decomposition results. This is because, to the extent that log revenue per worker is
subject to this concern, it affects high- and low-productivity firms to an equal extent.
Figure C.4(a) plots, R̃ht−1− R̃lt−1, which is the productivity differential between high-
and low-productivity firms. The productivity differential is orders of magnitudes
larger than the short-term variation, which may be driven by intertemporal variation
in factor utilization. To illustrate that the short-term variation in these differentials
does not affect the decomposition exercise, we construct a smoothed series by fitting a
linear time trend to the productivity differentials. We then use this smoothed series to
implement the productivity growth decomposition. Figure C.4(b) presents the results
and shows that the decomposition using the actual and smoothed productivity series
yield essentially the same results. To quantify this we regress the component of
productivity growth attributable to poaching flows using the observed productivity
differentials on the series using the smoothed differentials. The R-squared is 0.99.
The analogous R-squared for the nonemployment flows is 0.999.
Variation in factor utilization over the business cycle is a greater issue for our mea-
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Poaching Nonemployment
Poaching+nonemployment Aggregate
Notes: The figure presents the components of annual productivity growth that are attributable to worker
reallocation between high- and low-productivity firms through poaching and nonemployment flows as
well as the sum of these two components. Annual productivity growth is the sum of the quarterly growth
within a calendar year for these components. The figure also presents a measure of aggregate productivity
growth that is calculated from the RE-LBD micro data.
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Poaching Nonemployment
Poaching (smoothed) Nonemployment (smoothed)
Notes: Panel (a) plots the difference between the average productivity at high- and low-productivity
firms. Panel (b) presents the components of productivity growth that attributable to worker reallocation
between high- and low-productivity firms through poaching and nonemployment flows. The results in
Panel (b) implement the decomposition using both the observed productivity differentials (depicted in
Panel (a)) as well as the productivity differentials from a smoothed series generated by fitting the observed
productivity differentials with a linear time trend. Data are seasonally adjusted using X-12.
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sure of aggregate productivity growth. Fernald (2014) produces a series of growth
in business sector TFP that adjusts for factor utilization. Figure C.5(a) presents
both the adjusted and unadjusted growth rates from these data. The unadjusted
series exhibit a larger decline in TFP during recessions relative to the adjusted series.
To get a sense of how sensitive our measure of productivity growth is to changes in
factor utilization, we use the difference between the unadjusted and adjusted series
from Fernald (2004) to adjust for variation in factor utilization.2 Figure C.5(b) com-
pares the productivity growth attributable to worker reallocation to the adjusted and
unadjusted measures of aggregate productivity growth.
2Specifically, we calculate the difference between the adjusted and unadjusted growth rates in
2001 and 2008. We adjust our growth rate by adding these differences to the growth rates in 2001
and 2008. Because our data also exhibit a large decline in 2009, we also add the 2008 difference
from the Fernald (2014) series to the 2009 growth rate.
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Figure C.5: Aggregate Productivity Growth with Factor Utilization Adjustment




















2000 2005 2010 2015
Unadjusted Adjusted


















































2000 2005 2010 2015
Poaching Nonemployment
Aggregate Aggregate (utilization adjusted)
Notes: Panel (a) presents data from Fernald (2014) on the growth in business sector total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) as well as a measure that implements an adjustment for variation in factor utilization. Panel
(b) presents the annual productivity growth from worker reallocation through poaching and nonemploy-
ment flows as well as aggregate productivity growth. In addition, Panel (b) includes a series that adjusts
aggregate productivity growth using the difference between the unadjusted and adjusted measures of




Equation 3.2 is an exact accounting identity. To see why this equation holds, begin
by assuming that there is a closed system in which all changes in employment are
accounted for by hires and separations. This assumption implies that,
∆Eit
Eit−1
= λit + δ
i
t for i ∈ {h, l} (C.1)












































x̃h = (xh − xl)θht−1θlt−1(
Et−1
Et
) for x ∈ λ, δ (C.3)
In practice, the system is not closed and hires and separations do not perfectly predict
changes in employment. Thus, define the residual term as ε̃ht = ∆θ
h
t − (λ̃ht + δ̃ht ).
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C.2.2 Productivity
Assumptions A1 and A2 allow us to isolate the component of productivity growth
that is attributable to changes in the share of workers at high-productivity firms.




















































































P̄t(k) ≡ [P lt (k) + P ht (k)]/2. Equation C.5 in combination with assumption A2 allows




















































The first term is the component of productivity growth that is attributable to worker
reallocation between high- and low-productivity firms.
C.2.3 Empirical Assessment of Assumptions
Assumption A1 states that log revenue per worker is a valid measure of productivity
that is comparable across industries up to an additive constant. Section 3.2.1 provides
some evidence to support this assumption by showing that log revenue per worker
deviated from the industry average is predictive of employment growth and survival.
To further assess the plausibility of this assumption we plot the average industry-
deviated log revenue per worker, R̃i(k), for each two-digit NAICS industry code. The
results, presented in Figure C.6, illustrate that there are no outliers in terms of the
dispersion of log revenue per worker within industries. The industry with the least
dispersion in productivity is Health Care and Social Assistance (NAICS=62) and the
difference between the average log revenue per work at high- and low-productivity
firms is 76 log points. The industry with the most dispersion in log revenue per worker
is Finance and Insurance (NAICS=52) and the difference between the average log
revenue per work at high- and low-productivity firms is 145 log points. While there
are clearly differences in the dispersion of log revenue per worker within different
industries, the lack of outliers lend some support to the plausibility of assumption
A1.
Assumption A2 states that the covariance between the share of employment at
high-productivity firms and the dispersion of log revenue per worker does not change
over time. This assumption could be violated if industries that experience an increase
in productivity growth also experience an increase in the dispersion of productivity
across firms. While this is possible, we argue that any violation of this assumption








would show up on
the right-hand-side of equation 3.3 if it were nonzero and we can show that the
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Figure C.6: Log Revenue per Worker Deviated from Industry Average

















Two-digit NAICS industry code
High productivity Low productivity
Notes: This figure presents the average value of log revenue per worker deviated from the average at the
four-digit NAICS industry code for each two-digit NAICS industry code.
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Poaching Nonemployment Covariance
Notes: This figure presents the components of productivity growth that attributable to worker reallo-
cation between high- and low-productivity firms through poaching and nonemployment flows as well as








. Assumption A2 states that the covariance term is zero. This
term is numerically equivalent for high- and low-productivity firms. Data are seasonally adjusted using
X-12.
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term is substantially smaller than the components of productivity growth that are
attributable to worker reallocation. Specifically, the average value of the absolute
value of the productivity growth attributable to worker reallocation through poaching
and nonemployment flows is nine and six times larger than the average value of the
absolute value of the covariance term, respectively. Figure C.7 makes this same point
in more detail by plotting the covariance term as well as the components of worker
reallocation through poaching and nonemployment flows over time. Taken together,
assumption A2 appears to be a reasonable assumption.
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